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The rise of multiculturalism and its impact on the U.S. academy reached its peak at the 
end of the twentieth century. Since then the rhetoric of liberal multiculturalism that 
valorized diversity has largely given way to a neoliberal multiculturalism that celebrates 
postracialism as a means to dismantle the institutional programs and critical discourses 
that took racial difference as their starting point. Yet the racially inflected demarcations 
between positions of privilege and positions of stigma that have historically characterized 
the U.S. nation-state remain intact. In this context, how do we read race in contemporary 
literature by U.S. ethnic writers when celebrations of colorblindness dominate public 
discourse? As a repository for what Foucault has called subjugated knowledges, 
minoritized literatures hold the potential to de-naturalize the neoliberal status quo, 
critique the academic discourse that surrounds it, and engage with the political economy 
within which it is produced.  
 
 
 This project argues that the institutional work of disciplining minority subjects—
once openly performed by racialization in a way no longer possible under neoliberal 
multiculturalism—has been continued in part by political, social, and economic forces I 
group under the umbrella term propriety. I expose how the designation “appropriate” 
becomes a prerequisite for political recognition and representation, analyzing 
representative political texts that are fundamental to contemporary definitions of minority 
subjects alongside national and literary-critical genealogies of discourses of difference. I 
argue that attachments to values and forms explicitly identified as “appropriate” conceal 
and maintain race-based hierarchies characteristic of U.S. national identity formation. In 
response, I theorize inappropriateness as a category of political and literary 
representation for exploring questions of visibility and enfranchisement central to the 
national narrative of the United States. Inappropriateness is a political and aesthetic 
movement that deploys subjects and forms often denounced as improper to the 
contemporary era. Inappropriate aesthetic works are those which attempt to distinguish 
difference from “diversity,” influence minority subject formation, and shape knowledge 
production in ways that are counter to the objectives of neoliberal multiculturalism. Four 
chapters establish a taxonomy of the ways inappropriateness operates: formally, 
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Introduction: Inappropriate(d) Literatures of the United States: 
Hegemonic Propriety and Postracial Racialization 
 
“At the threshold of this new millennium, we encounter once again W. E. B. Du Bois’s 
‘problem of the color line,’ but this time in more duplicitous and seductive guises. No 
doubt racism as practice/ideology has undergone a tortuous metamorphosis in the 
twentieth century. But what has not changed, and has instead become more egregious, is 
the existence of a determinate racial polity called the United States of America.” 
- E. San Juan, Jr.1 
 
“I am more interested in exploring the ways in which racisms take on the form of other 
things, wrap themselves around heated issues, descend upon political pulse points, appear 
as reasoned judgments, beyond sentiment, as they penetrate impassioned bodies.” 
- Ann Laura Stoler2 
 
“Hegemony works at leveling out differences and at standardizing contexts and 
expectations in the smallest details of our daily lives.” 




Within a week of the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, United States 
Department of Justice lawyers drafted legislation that would become the USA PATRIOT 
Act of 2001. The final version, authored primarily by Attorney General John Ashcroft 
and Assistant Attorney General Viet Dinh, incorporated provisions from earlier House 
and Senate bills. It was signed into law by President George W. Bush on October 26th, 
2001, and quickly became the most (in)famous piece of United States legislation of the 
last twenty years. 
Despite the Act’s continuing notoriety, sustained through various legal challenges 
and Congressional reauthorizations, the Patriot Act’s acronym has almost entirely 
superseded public use or knowledge of the law’s full title.4 One of its source bills, H.R. 
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2975, had been provisionally titled To Deter and Punish Terrorist Acts in the United 
States and around the World, to Enhance Law Enforcement Investigatory Tools, and for 
Other Purposes. But by the time the final version of the act was passed, following “a 
truncated process of hearings in both houses and without the usual committee reports to 
explain it,”5 its title had officially changed, to Uniting and Strengthening America by 
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act.6 
Like most significant security legislation of the last century, the USA PATRIOT 
Act codifies a particular set of rhetorics and logics into a vocabulary that proceeds to 
pervade public discourse.7 In this sense, the act’s full title is instructive. Though some 
analysts dismiss it as a convenient “backronym” conjured by legislative aides who 
appreciated the obvious poetry of the appeal to patriotism, the full title presents the 
exigence and justification for anti-terrorism activities like increased domestic 
surveillance, roving wiretaps, and access to private records. “America,” left presumably 
weak and divided by a devastating death toll and the dark audacity required to 
successfully transform four passenger jets into weapons of mass destruction, will be 
reunited and made stronger by particular “tools”—an innocuous term for the combined 
powers of the CIA, FBI, law enforcement, and the newly created Office of Homeland 
Security. Such tools would “intercept” and “obstruct” terrorism, two verbs that anchor 
their post-9/11 effectiveness in shared resonances of arresting movement from one place 
to another. The Patriot Act, its title implies, would hinder precisely the fluid, agential 




The apparently innocuous adjective “appropriate,” which serves as the crucial 
descriptor of the aforementioned tools, registers the central interest of this dissertation. 
Certainly it is a common term in legal discourse. Within the text of the Patriot Act, the 
adjective “appropriate” appears seventy times, most frequently in reference to an open-
ended or catch-all section of the law that gestures to whatever future person, agency or 
activity is deemed appropriate.8 In this context, the term functions to describe that which 
is “specially fitted or suitable, proper.” Yet the Oxford English Dictionary also defines 
the adjectival form of “appropriate” as meaning “[a]ttached or belonging as an attribute, 
quality, or right; peculiar to, own.”9 In other words, the appropriateness of the tools 
authorized to combat terrorism by this act are not only specialized, suitable and proper—
they are also the distinct purview of the act itself, peculiar to its particular amalgamation 
of violent exigence and political opportunism. 
Although then-Attorney General John Ashcroft is perhaps the figure most 
publicly associated with the creation and defense of the Patriot Act, in fact Viet D. Dinh, 
an Assistant Attorney General from 2001-2003, is frequently credited as chief architect of 
the legislation. A Vietnamese refugee who came the United States in 1978, Dinh 
published a first-person account of the twelve days his family spent aboard a boat 
between Vietnam and Malaysia in The New York Times in 1992.10 He became a U.S. 
citizen in 1989 and went on to attend Harvard College and then Harvard Law School 
before clerking for U.S. Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor and joining the 
attorney general’s staff. Mimi Nguyen’s study of the “gift of freedom,” a system of 
benevolence that burdens U.S. immigrants with obligations to capitalism and to a racist 
nation-state, examines the significance of Dinh’s co-authorship. According to Nguyen, 
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“[b]ecause the Patriot Act specifically targets the racial stranger for detention and 
deportation, Dinh’s refugee story operates as a bulwark against the worry that the act 
might target ‘just anyone.’”11 An exemplary immigrant and newly minted citizen, Dinh 
and his story of merit-based success suggest that proper racialized subjects have nothing 
to fear from this legislation. 
Ten years after crafting the Patriot Act, Ashcroft and Dinh collaborated again, this 
time co-authoring a defense of the act titled “Liberty, Security, and the USA Patriot Act” 
that appeared in a book of essays commemorating the tenth anniversary of the September 
11th attacks. The term “appropriate” serves the same flexible, pervasive purpose in this 
essay as in the Patriot Act itself, as Ashcroft and Dinh engage with influential critics who 
frequently deploy Benjamin Franklin’s adage that those who would sacrifice liberty for 
security deserve neither. In response, Ashcroft and Dinh argue that “appropriate security 
enables freedom, rather than competes against it.”12 The essay makes several claims 
regarding the act’s success that reinforce the centrality of discourses of propriety to 
antiterrorism rhetoric. First, it appeals to the act’s ostensible ability to limit or check 
governmental overreach, suggesting that it both “enables government to combat a 
protracted and difficult war against those who wish to rob us of our way of life—a way of 
life defined by freedom” and at the same time “constrains attempts by governmental 
actors to extend the government’s reach inappropriately.”13 Ashcroft and Dinh argue that 
though the act abolished the traditional wall between the intelligence and law 
enforcement communities, it nonetheless “maintained the appropriate respect for 
constitutional requirements in criminal prosecutions.”14 Finally, they cite the 2005 
Congressional reauthorization of the Patriot Act as evidence of “the effectiveness and 
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appropriateness of many of the act’s provisions,” and they argue that instances of the 
act’s furtherance of investigative overreach are mitigated by distinguishing between a 
violation of law, on the one hand, and “a law that itself offends liberty” on the other.15 
Although a 2007 Justice Department audit found that the FBI had “improperly” used the 
Patriot Act to spy on U.S. citizens, Ashcroft and Dinh state emphatically that this finding 
“does not mean the Patriot Act itself is improper.”16 To be improper, in fact, would align 
the act with the racialized subjects it was designed to discipline. The act’s situation, they 
are quick to remind us, is quite the opposite—it embodies propriety as evidenced by its 
very title. 
This dissertation argues that the use of the term “appropriate” to justify 
extraordinary measures to combat terrorism is not arbitrary, and therefore not especially 
extraordinary. Rather, this designation epitomizes a larger political and cultural shift 
toward alibis of appropriateness and propriety that seized the United States in recent 
decades, conditions that exemplify a modality of the economic and racial regime of 
neoliberal multiculturalism. I begin with an analysis of the Patriot Act to situate the 
pervasiveness of ideological propriety in official discourse within the larger context of 
contemporary race and racialization, including post-Civil Rights multiculturalism, post-
identity politics and colorblindness.17 I argue that propriety functions as a distinct and 
covert mode of racialization in an ostensibly post-identity or postracial context, the 
pretext for continued production of minoritized U.S. subjects within the larger regime of 
diversity multiculturalism that ostensibly guarantees those subjects equal rights under the 
law and equal access to political, social, cultural and economic capital. In the same 
moment that neoliberal multiculturalism flattens difference into a comfortable difference-
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as-sameness, allowing whiteness to appear in the post-Civil Rights era as just another 
ethnicity,18 it also produces appropriate difference and circumscribes such difference as 
the purview of proper multicultural citizens. The deployment of appropriate forms, 
bodies, histories and citizens reveals propriety as ideology in action—the enactment of 
the continuing hegemony of neoliberal multicultural world orders and the reproduction of 
globalized forms of late capitalism. 
In conjunction with this identification of propriety’s contemporary hegemony, this 
study inaugurates a category I term “inappropriateness” to trace the counterhegemonic 
emergence of forms of resistance to propriety’s ideologies. I situate this term through 
Trinh T. Minh-ha’s analysis of the inappropriate Other and Jacques Rancière’s notion of 
inappropriate appropriate forms, drawing from two very different aesthetico-critical 
formulations that nonetheless make use of strikingly similar language. A postcolonial 
feminist scholar and artist, Trinh theorizes the inappropriate Other as a Third World 
Women’s issue grounded in the understanding that difference is “a tool of creativity to 
question multiple forms of repression and dominance.”19 In this context, the 
inappropriate Other “moves about with always at least two gestures: that of affirming ‘I 
am like you’ while persisting in her difference and that of reminding ‘I am different’ 
while unsettling every definition of otherness arrived at.”20 The inappropriate Other is 
always also inappropriately in identity with ourselves: she prevents distinctions between 
self and other from cohering into persistent patterns, and she undermines regressive 
binaries between subjective and objective knowledges. To articulate the business of the 
inappropriate Other in the language of this project, she resists the collapsing of difference 
into sameness even as she performs difference in ways that continually affirm likeness. 
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My theory of inappropriateness also rethinks the formulation of aesthetic 
appropriateness described by French philosopher Jacques Rancière, whose Euro-centric 
work examines the complex relations between politics, aesthetics, power and education. 
Rancière contends in The Future of the Image (2007) that the representational suitability 
of forms collapses in the modern era, such that the inappropriate form is always already 
also the appropriate form. By this, Rancière means that the object or event being 
represented, in and of itself, “neither prescribes nor proscribes any artistic means [i.e., 
form or medium]  . . .  it does not impose any duty on art to represent, or not to represent, 
in some particular way.”21 In other words, there are no longer directives of representation 
that dictate which forms might be employed to represent which performances, events, 
objects or subjects. All forms are always already appropriate (i.e., suitable) and 
inappropriate (i.e., unable to actually transform representation into the real). 
The germination of inappropriateness in these disparate genealogies carries 
through the body of this project. Even now, I am not entirely certain that it is possible to 
synthesize Trinh and Rancière—or, for that matter, the theorists from philosophy, 
postcolonial studies, poststructuralism, history, psychoanalysis, American studies, ethnic 
studies and literary studies upon whom I draw—into a seamless historical and aesthetic 
methodology. But this project attempts a different kind of labor, incomplete and 
exploratory: the strategic assembly of a set of critical instruments to help theorize the 
place of race in a contemporary neoliberal system that simultaneously evacuates and 
entrenches racial concerns. Historian David Scott articulates the stakes for such a project 
when he asks: “If our sense is (difficult as it may be to establish with verifiable empirical 
certainty) that our present constitutes something of a new conjuncture, and that 
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consequently the old story about the past’s relation to the present and to possible futures 
is no longer adequate, no longer provides or sustains critical leverage, how do we go 
about altering that story?”22 Such an alteration is precisely what this study attempts, as I 
illuminate the postracial present as a new conjuncture and modify one story of its 
relationship to the past in order to engender a sustaining critical intervention. The old 
story will not be altered by professional adherence to ingrained institutional structures 
and field-specific assumptions. To register the persistence of race-based minoritization in 
the postracial present—a comprehensive ideological propriety that pervades legal, 
political, academic, public, military, and educational spheres, to name a few—requires an 
emerging kind of interdisciplinary expertise. That story will only be altered when these 
institutional sites of knowledge production and reproduction develop modes of 
collaboration that are, in many ways, inappropriate to the disciplinary structures of 
critique that have coalesced and even concretized in interventions otherwise committed to 
evaluating the status quo and theorizing alternatives to it. 
This project arose from my curiosity about the repercussions of wide-ranging and 
persistent claims in many arenas of public discourse—political commentary, judicial 
opinions, journalism, public opinion polls—that the United States has become 
“postracial.” Presumably this term is meant to indicate a teleological shift to a collective 
state of colorblindness, presenting an optimistic assessment of the meaning of Barack 
Obama’s election, in 2008, as the country’s first black president. It suggests an end to the 
kind of identity politics that characterized the post-Civil Rights era in the United States, 
not because identity-based activism has failed but because such efforts have succeeded 
and therefore are no longer necessary. This classification recognizes that slavery, 
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segregation, antimiscegenation, discrimination, and racially motivated violence are no 
longer legal and gestures to the fact that the actions or expressions that we now identify 
as racist are no longer widely or publicly tolerated. Yet if we as a nation exist beyond 
racism, if we have progressed from institutionalized and legalized racial discrimination to 
a bright colorblind society, how do we account for persistent differentiated access to 
resources, protection from violence, and political and social enfranchisement that 
continues to fall along racial lines? 
Contemporary claims to postracialization and colorblindness deny pervasive and 
continuing race-based structural inequities in employment, incarceration, education, and 
poverty. (While I most frequently use the term “postrace,” this project also folds in the 
more capacious term “post-identity” to signal its engagement with not only race and 
ethnicity but gender, sexuality, and other forms of difference.) It is true that many pundits 
who blithely proclaimed a postracial United States in the months between President 
Obama’s first election and inauguration no longer speak in such optimistic language. Yet 
even the hope of postracialism exposes the contours of thinking about race in the 
contemporary era. That most Americans aspire to a state of colorblindness from which 
legacies of slavery, dispossession, and internment will no longer materially matter 
illuminates our deep discomfort with the primacy of race and racism in U.S. history as 
well as our desire to have progressed beyond the mistakes of earlier generations. It 
suggests our willingness to overlook material inequality or ascribe such inequality to 
individual rather than structural factors. It reveals our deep-seated optimism regarding the 
power of diversity and multiculturalism. The claim of postracialism clears space for the 
continuation of race-based disciplinary mechanisms in the guise of deracialized merit-
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based systems. A pronouncement of postidentitarian thinking insists upon the success of 
multiculturalism and invalidates the need for coalition politics, elevates questions of 
individual merit and denies the presence of structural inequality, and privileges language 
of diversity and evacuates categories of difference of their historical meanings. Even 
those who publicly question whether we have achieved a postracial state do not generally 
question that the condition of postracialism is something to which we ought to aspire. If 
we are postracial, at least superficially, what takes the disciplinary place of race? In other 
words, this project asks, what do we talk about when we don’t talk about race? 
I argue that, in the absence of sanctioned racialized language, we turn to the 
vocabulary of propriety. This discourse allows us to continue demarcating privilege and 
stigma along racial lines and conceals a flourishing system of racialized discrimination 
while providing a ready alibi: that such distinctions are instead based in objective 
assessments of appropriateness. To call for appropriateness—in discourse, in bodily 
presentation, in civic engagement, in political participation, in aesthetic production—is to 
deploy coded racial language that is nonetheless welcome in postracial dialogues. 
As many critics note, the term “postracial” conflates race and racism.23 If we shift 
our focus from the collective to the individual (as neoliberalism is so eager for us to do), 
in a postracial society that conflates racism and race, what is the place and meaning of 
race for those citizens and subjects still marked as racialized? If we are beyond race, then 
race is occluded or erased and its significance in political, economic, social and cultural 
life is devalued. In this context, what happens to identity-based categories of critique like 
ethnic studies and ethnic literature? 
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This is the founding question of my project, which is focalized through literary 
studies as the problem-space of investigation.24 This dissertation asks, how do we read 
race in contemporary U.S. literature when celebrations of colorblindness dominate public 
discourse? What does race, or difference more broadly, mean at the turn of the twenty-
first century? To answer this question, I turn to the space of the literary. As a repository 
for what Foucault has called subjugated knowledges, minoritized literatures hold the 
potential to de-naturalize the neoliberal status quo, critique the academic discourse that 
surrounds it, and engage with the political economy within which it is produced. Culture 
is a site from which to “imagine the impossible,” as Grace Hong says,25 and even to stage 
the impossible as actual, as I argue of realist forms in my first chapter. Kandice Chuh 
suggests that literariness is an aesthetic modality that possesses the “distinctive ability to 
illuminate the role of sense and sensibility in the production of everyday life and the 
multiscalar articulations of dominant ideologies.”26 In other words, the space of the 
literary facilitates the kind of interpretation that illuminates textures of agency—in the 
case of this project, for inappropriate subjects and epistemologies—on the differing 
registers of text, discourse, and politics. It allows us to absorb and analyze moments of 
performance (for example, Dinh’s self-representation as the exemplary immigrant jurist) 
where subjects operate according to established narratives or scripts. The kind of 
interpretation that literature invites helps us understand the complex motions of affect and 
agency that surround subjects who perform in these situations and invites us to think 
about such performances in more nuanced ways.27 Michel de Certeau suggests that 
literature is a discredited knowledge practice that becomes the repository of what official 
knowledge deems meaningless.28 Crucially, in a country that denies the continuing 
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meaning of race, I argue, literariness registers and captures its contemporary 
meaningfulness. To invoke the literary is to pursue the affective and imaginative 
components of everyday participation in political, economic, social and cultural realms. 
A History of the Present 
This project is a history of the present, and I map the ways propriety functions at 
the turn of the twenty-first century as an ideological apparatus to discipline U.S. subjects, 
including especially minoritized subjects. In the midst of the institutions, events and 
norms that structure life under this modality of neoliberalism, Lauren Berlant suggests 
that “[d]iscussions about the contours and contents of the shared historical present are . . . 
always profoundly political ones, insofar as they are about what forces should be 
considered responsible and what crises urgent.”29 If such histories are always political, 
they are also always untimely, existing within a kind of prematurity that saturates their 
efforts. They require us to “be examining, absorbing, feeling, reflecting on, and writing 
about the archive as it is being produced, rushing at us—literally, to entertain an 
unfolding archive.”30 Yet perhaps this untimeliness, this prematurity, is matched by a 
particular timeliness. This study suggests that to identify persistent racisms is to give 
exigence to antiracist efforts in a way that neoliberal multiculturalism works to deny.31 
My project does not attempt to provide a comprehensive cultural history of the neoliberal 
United States, though it draws upon scholars who do just that. Instead, I investigate the 
critical attachments, embodiments and gestures evinced by U.S. ethnic literature—both 
literary works categorized in this way and academic literary study more broadly—under 
neoliberal multiculturalism at the turn of the twenty-first century. 
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In this study, I trace the pervasive deployment of a language of appropriateness in 
political and legal documents, in public speeches, and in editorials. The primary focus of 
these documents is not race per se, but issues like immigration, welfare reform, anti-
terrorism efforts, and electoral processes. Yet my analysis reveals just how often such 
documents invoke proper language and how calls for appropriateness or the identification 
of inappropriateness fall along racial lines. I also find such calls at the level of academic 
discourse, particularly with regard to the reception of literary texts and their authors as 
well as the theorization of the study of ethnic literatures that understands them to enable 
the management and understanding of difference in a new generation of (potentially 
postracial) citizens. I discover frequent calls to appropriateness in cultural discourse as 
well, as writers, academics and activists question what is appropriate to contemporary 
literature and what ethnic literatures ought to do and be. In a nation that aspires to 
postracialism, the place of literature that is so clearly defined by difference and that so 
clearly foregrounds a racialized perspective is uncertain. Equally uncertain, if 
paradoxically so, is the status of ethnic writers who trouble designations of authenticity or 
do not appear to foreground racial concerns in their work in the ways lay and professional 
readers often expect—in other words, who do not perform a politics recognizable as such. 
These multiple valences from which ethnic literature is produced and received 
ultimately suggest the existence of a force or impulse that unites much contemporary 
ethnic literature. I name that force inappropriateness. This term is meant to convey both 
the way inappropriateness works in opposition to the ideological apparatus of propriety 
that covertly reproduces contemporary race-based inequality and the way it conjures an 
unlikely group of cultural productions that are united not by an obvious common purpose 
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but a set of uncommon ones: to rearticulate difference, to reregister the formation and 
interpellation of minoritized subjects, to theorize alternative histories and archives, and to 
suggest alternative modes of contemporary subjectivity. 
We can trace the contours of neoliberalism and multiculturalism through the 
disciplinary history of ethnic literary studies, as a point of entry and perspective from 
which to examine both past and future. Ethnic studies arose in the post-Civil Rights era in 
response to material unrest, student and faculty activism, and a growing agitation for the 
inclusion of non-dominant histories and perspectives within institutions of higher 
education.32 Minoritized literatures were understood to present a crucial challenge to 
Eurocentric ideals of universal value that had heretofore characterized much of literary 
studies across the United States. Yet a retrospective assessment of the institutionalization 
of interdisciplinarity and the consolidation of an ethnic canon reveals just how frequently 
ethnic literature became valued for its political dimensions at the expense of aesthetic 
concerns. Even as particular works by Asian American, African American, Native 
American and Latino/a writers achieved critical recognition and became widely taught, 
the literariness of these works was generally occluded by a focus on ethnic literature as a 
transparent representation of difference—how things “really” are for communities of 
difference, as I describe in detail in my first chapter. Situating what is “ethnic” in tension 
with what is “aesthetic,” such deployments of ethnic literature inadvertently undermined 
the possibility that minoritized literatures were valuable for their formal qualities. Thus a 
hierarchy of value was institutionalized that only further naturalized canonical literary 
texts as aesthetically great and ethnic literary texts as ideologically valuable, reducing 
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ethnic literature in many senses to the kind of instruction it could provide to white readers 
about people of color. 
In many ways, this disparity continues today, despite a recent turn to aesthetic 
form in scholarship on ethnic literatures.33 It is fed from two very different streams. On 
one hand, a conservative backlash against ethnic studies departments began in the late 
1980s that emphasized the perceived aesthetic value of unmarked masterworks against 
compromised ethnic literatures.34 White privilege found itself under attack again, this 
time in the form of challenges to the traditional literary canon, and responded by calling 
into question the value of interdisciplinarity. On the other, liberalism and neoliberalism 
identified racialized immigrants as provisionary heirs of the American Dream and 
situated ethnic literatures as privileged sites from which to understand difference. When 
the justification of ethnic literary study is reduced to “diversity,” such works occupy a 
second-class status in relation to works of aesthetic greatness and are co-opted to manage 
the very questions of racism and racialization they thematically raise.35 
I link the recent emergence of propriety as an ideology of covert racialization to 
the legacies of twentieth-century U.S. racisms and anti-racisms. It is not propriety in the 
sense of decorum that I trace here, a mode of formal exchange that I believe we have 
largely discarded in U.S. national culture. Rather, it is propriety-as-discipline, 
appropriateness functioning as an ideological apparatus for the formation and 
interpellation of proper subjects: immigrants who prove themselves sufficiently 
multicultural—in other words, amenable to assimilation—are lauded, as are LGBT 
subjects who adopt a homonormative familial lifestyle and are rewarded with the 
opportunity to legally marry. (I am mindful that the limits of this analogy between racial 
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or ethnic and sex-gender difference include their incommensurate historical contexts and 
the ways political discourse often situates them in tension.) The conditions of hegemonic 
propriety this dissertation investigates exemplify a specific modality of neoliberalism that 
intersects with and relies upon postracialization.36 I argue that discourses of propriety 
function to re-align distinctions between privilege and stigma while eliding the 
continuing power and evolution of racial formations. To do so, I adopt the political, 
economic, and cultural genealogy of neoliberalism elaborated by Lisa Duggan, Jodi 
Melamed, and others, who situate neoliberalism’s rise in its rhetorical (but not actual) 
separation of economic questions from questions of politics and culture, and further from 
its ability to make the upward distribution of wealth (its primary effect) seem inevitable 
and natural—even merit based—rather than systemically determined. In the context of 
this emphasis on the commonsensical, pro-profit global business interests find a welcome 
position from which to naturalize financial austerity, minimal government, and “free” 
markets. 
During this same period, post-Civil Rights identity politics began to retreat from a 
unifying concern with material equality to pursue victories in the judicial and legislative 
realms. In response, in the United States and elsewhere, neoliberalism adopted a 
multiculturalist guise to answer calls for non-economic equality, tolerance, diversity, and 
inclusion. The key characteristic of neoliberal multiculturalism is that it fosters a form of 
diversity compatible with global business interests—in other words, a commitment to 
diversity that is rhetorical and nonredistributive. I employ Jodi Melamed’s two-stage 
definition of neoliberal multiculturalism, an era she dates from the mid-1990s: first, as “a 
market ideology turned social philosophy” that “posits neoliberal restructuring across the 
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globe to be the key to a postracist world of freedom and opportunity”; and, more centrally 
for my analysis here, as a racial formation that names “the signifying systems and 
cultural repertoires that produce and fix the meaning of human bodies and human 
groups” within national and global biopolitics.37 As a racial formation, neoliberal 
multiculturalism works to overlay former racial logics of white supremacy, from which 
the U.S. nation-state has sought to distance itself since World War II, with new processes 
of privilege and stigma that separate lives recognized as valuable from those considered 
valueless, or what Judith Butler would term the grievable and ungrievable.38 What 
neoliberal multiculturalism as global epoch means for the U.S., Melamed argues, is “a 
new flexibility in racial procedures, so that racism constantly appears to be disappearing 
according to conventional race categories, even as neoliberal racialization continues to 
justify inequality using codes that can signify as nonracial or even nonracist.”39 
Neoliberal multiculturalism is characterized by its primary impulses toward 
homogenization, appropriation, and dematerialization, and these impulses are practiced 
most frequently in the context of separating the privileged and stigmatized along old lines 
using new alibis.40 
One ready alibi, I argue, is the designation “appropriate,” which can flexibly be 
applied to laws, subjects, bodies, histories, and literary forms. Melamed describes the 
centrality of literary operations and values to the ideological and racializing vectors of 
neoliberal multiculturalism, arguing that literature functions as an antiracist technology 
that produces “truth effects” about individuality, the apprehension of difference, 
globalization and appropriate multicultural subjects. Literary sensibility, redefined under 
a rubric of multiethnic and global literature courses in U.S. universities as the ability to 
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appreciate the literature of other cultures, distinguishes successful multicultural subjects 
from backward monocultural ones and marks the elite members of a burgeoning 
neoliberal global community. According to Melamed, literature functions as an element 
of technologies of subjectivity and subjugation: 
On the one hand, the idea that literature has something to do with antiracism and 
being a good person enters into the self-care of elites, who learn to see themselves 
as part of a multinational group of enlightened multicultural global citizens and to 
uphold certain standards as (neoliberal) multicultural universals. On the other 
hand, the idea that the engagement with literature helps one to come to terms with 
difference ethically prepares elites to administer differentiated citizenship across 
the globe. In other words, literary training prepares them for the part they play 
within disciplinary and civilizing/disqualifying regimes that manage populations 
cut off from (or exploited within) circuits of global capitalism.41 
University-authorized experience with literatures of difference prepares the figure of the 
multicultural elite to fully understand and manage populations characterized by 
difference. Literature’s privilege, as a fundamental site for information retrieval and the 
management of difference, is transformed into a mandate. This understanding of 
literature as an antiracist technology reduces alterity to depoliticized and dematerialized 
“culture.” 
In my critique of neoliberal multiculturalism, I do not mean to discount the 
meaningful advances multiculturalism represents as a product of tangible victories by 
anti-racist movements. Key legal and political victories have resulted in greater rights and 
opportunities for subjects of difference in enfranchisement, education, property, 
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employment, and privacy, to name a few. On an academic scale, the widespread 
incorporation of literature by women and ethnic writers into the literary canon has 
resulted in a diversification of courses, critical methods, and textual objects of study. It is 
because of such movements that we can publicly entertain and debate the possibility of a 
postracial United States. Yet the vision that enabled these victories has narrowed in the 
last several decades, satisfied with legal victories and official mandates about 
representation and visibility—about diversity—in the absence of meaningful material 
redistribution. Furthermore, that very emphasis on diversity has been effectively co-opted 
by neoliberal multiculturalism, which points to examples of individual advancement and 
success of minoritized subjects as proof that the system is working without addressing 
lingering and fundamental inequalities. 
My work represents a profound intervention into the discourses of the historical 
present and neoliberal multiculturalism laid out by scholars like Lauren Berlant and 
Melamed, as my analysis of appropriateness as an ideological apparatus illuminates how 
forms of racially differentiated citizenship work in practice. Berlant’s work of cataloging 
the impact of affective forms and values on the political, economic, social and cultural 
realms foregrounds those “who presumed they would be protected” through the “new 
precarities” of recession, terrorism, disenfranchisement and debt; her formulations of 
privilege in crisis do not engage with the particular ways that the attachment she names 
“cruel optimism” manifests in the pursuit of “the good life” for racially minoritized 
subjects in the U.S. 42 My project articulates the specificity of cruel optimism as it attends 




In a similar sense, Melamed’s historical study articulates the terms by which 
neoliberal multiculturalism creates “new privileged subjects” by “racializing [its] 
beneficiaries . . . as worthy multicultural citizens and racializing the losers as unworthy 
and excludable on the basis of monoculturalism, deviance, inflexibility, criminality, and 
other historic-cultural deficiencies.”43 Her work is most compelling as it illuminates the 
ways that the flood of information generated about race in the twentieth century—
generated in order to produce discursive certainty that would substantiate official 
antiracisms—ultimately established capitalism as the solution to contemporary racisms. 
In this context, Melamed examines how literature functions as a tool of racial 
neoliberalism, and especially how the orders of difference constructed in literary studies 
unite with the logics of neoliberalism to create and impose normative systems of 
representation that extend to economics, politics, and law. Yet her analysis arises almost 
exclusively from an examination of African American literature and culture (with 
gestures to Iranian and Native American cultural productions), and as such invites a 
consideration of the ways the political, cultural and aesthetic genealogies of other ethnic 
populations—most notably Asian American, Latino, and Afro-Caribbean—complicate 
and revise her formulations. Furthermore, as she discloses in Represent and Destroy, her 
readings of literature are conducted under a historical-materialist lens, an orientation that 
at times elides the literariness of these aesthetic acts. My study extends her analysis to 
emphasize the aesthetic and formal possibility of these works and to identify the specific 
forms and criteria that are innovated in service of postracial racialization. 
The key to neoliberal multiculturalism is that it appears as common sense—
rational, inevitable, and even apolitical. In Melamed’s account, neoliberal 
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multiculturalism racializes as it “constitutes differential relations of human value and 
valuelessness” while “appearing to be (and being) a rationally inevitable normative 
system that merely sorts human beings into categories of difference.”44 Because 
racialization is, as Jasbir Puar has said, “a figure for specific social formations and 
processes that are not necessarily or only tied to what has been historically theorized as 
‘race,’”45 it provides the key validation for neoliberal multiculturalism, as members of 
recognized racial categories occupy places of both privilege and stigma. When this 
inevitability dissolves, momentarily, into the appearance of a choice requiring consent, it 
is reconstructed by these appeals to appropriateness that offer their own kind of common 
sense. 
Propriety as a Mode of Racialization 
The eradication of race as an overt method of regulating value and valuelessness 
leaves behind a vacuum, even as multiculturalism enables the temporary and capricious 
extension of the benefits of privilege to select minoritized groups or, more commonly, 
individuals. Susan Koshy and Rey Chow have traced how racial frames lose their power 
in the face of the ability to consume within capitalist markets, as the nation-state becomes 
subsumed into concerns of capitalist economic functions.46 These complementary 
genealogies of the contemporary U.S. gesture to “the end(s) of race” (to borrow David 
Eng’s phrasing, discussed further in the second chapter), and from their consensus my 
project addresses the flexibility that inhabits terms like “difference” or “ethnicity” and 
ensures that multiculturalism’s “benign tolerance remains cathected to advantage.”47 
Melamed suggestively argues that neoliberal racialization procedures “have 
independently and flexibly employed the criteria that white supremacy historically has 
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collapsed with color, and they have innovated new criteria, often using nationalist and 
antiracist terms of value.”48 This dissertation identifies a crucial set of criteria aggregated 
under the umbrella term Propriety: designations of “appropriate” and “proper” are 
deployed as terms of value designed to police the boundaries between privilege and 
stigma. They, along with their antonyms “improper” and “inappropriate,” become the 
signs under which full inclusion or exclusion into the profits of neoliberal 
multiculturalism are extended to individual subjects. 
In this sense, then, propriety is a function of ideology. Louis Althusser theorized 
that individuals do not possess a free, independent subjectivity; rather, they are 
interpellated into established systems of official and especially unofficial governance 
through social practices arising from institutions that he termed ideological state 
apparatuses. These ideological apparatuses complement official systems of government 
but operate primarily in the private (or privatized) realm: religion, education, family, the 
law, politics, communications, and culture.49 I adopt Althusser’s definition of ideology as 
the (imagined) relationship of individuals to their lived conditions, a relationship that 
always takes material form in the sense that it exists only via practices—the rituals of 
membership in the realms of religion, education, politics, and others—and extend it to 
identify the appropriateness that has come to signify for race in these realms in recent 
decades.50 
The power of official state apparatuses like the government and military combine 
with ideological apparatuses like propriety to establish hegemony, which Raymond 
Williams defines as “a lived system of meanings and values—constitutive and 
constituting—which as they are experienced as practices appear as reciprocally 
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confirming.”51 As my study illustrates, propriety complements other modes of hegemonic 
power, engendering the continued existence of a civil society that “operates without 
‘sanctions’ or compulsory ‘obligations,’ but nevertheless asserts a collective pressure and 
obtains objective results in the form of an evolution of customs, ways of thinking and 
acting, morality, etc.”52 Individuals are interpellated into subjectivity, into a sense of 
collective humanity, by way of these forces: “educative pressure” is applied “to single 
individuals so as to obtain their consent and their collaboration, turning necessity and 
coercion into ‘freedom.’”53 This dynamic of consent and coercion detailed by Antonio 
Gramsci is the reason propriety as an apparatus is so powerful: it appears as a choice 
available to any and all individuals. As they perform as rational contemporary subjects, 
discourses of propriety invite them to “choose” multicultural values, evince properly 
patriotic attachments, and manifest moral decisions in their everyday lives—just as other 
ideological apparatuses invite people to profess Christianity, protect their children, or 
abide by the law. What these choices occlude are the myriad sanctions that attach to those 
who do not choose properly. 
The power of propriety as an ideological apparatus of neoliberal hegemony is 
two-fold. First, it lies in the way propriety’s relations of domination and subordination 
appear “normal.” Williams describes this achievement in this way: “the pressures and 
limits of what can ultimately be seen as a specific economic, political, and cultural 
system seem to most of us the pressures and limits of simple experience and common 
sense.”54 Second, propriety’s particular ideological saturation in the United States at the 
turn of the twenty-first century arises from its ability to occupy the gaps and fissures that 
remain after the multicultural elision of race and racism described earlier. What results 
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from this discursive elevation of appropriateness in the public sphere, this establishment 
of propriety as an alibi for covert racisms and a state which minoritized subjects are 
expected to aspire, is a relation of what Berlant terms “cruel optimism,” which comes 
into being “when something you desire is actually an obstacle to your flourishing.”55 The 
power of such attachments and the desire they engender—in the case of this study, to 
perform as appropriate bodies and citizens and to have one’s cultural productions 
recognized as valid forms and histories—obscures the deeply destructive nature of such 
attachments. 
Appeals to propriety range across the political spectrum, inhabiting conservative 
calls for individual responsibility and identification of model minorities as well as liberal 
faith in diversity models that promote visibility to the exclusion of material redistribution. 
We see appeals to propriety working to justify violence and inequality in anti-terrorism 
legislation like the USA PATRIOT Act, which establishes propriety as a prerequisite for 
protection, as well as in welfare “reform” legislation like the Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996 and immigration legislation 
like the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 
1996.56 We see appeals to propriety that would regulate bodies and performances of 
identity to multicultural, heteronormative guises.57 We see appeals to propriety by 
members of dominant and minoritized communities that promote particular 
representations of ethnic identity and suppress others.58 
Propriety’s flexibility comes from its unmerited reputation as a matter of 
individual choice—the apparently universal freedom to adopt the behavior, appearance, 
investments and attachments of proper U.S. citizens. It presumes an agency common to 
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all citizen-subjects that is independent from structural considerations or affective 
complications. Even as the boundaries of what can be called appropriate shift (recent 
examples include support for gays in the military and gay marriage more generally), 
those boundaries claim a level of explicitness that indicts those who continue, to their 
peril, to “choose” inappropriateness. 
Propriety’s connection to questions of freedom and agency can be traced to post-
enlightenment moral and aesthetic philosophy. Key figures like John Locke, Adam 
Smith, David Hume and John Stuart Mill understood liberty as a form of propriety, 
defined as “appropriate agency” and tied to questions of ownership, dignity, rights, 
judgment, taste, and justice. As Duncan Kelly outlines, the notion of propriety that has 
been passed down in the West incorporates both an individual and collective 
understanding. One meaning “concerns something like the quality of agency one owns 
oneself . . . predicated upon a discrete conception of personhood” that defines someone as 
“at liberty to act.” Yet propriety also refers to “shared or intersubjective judgments about 
the propriety of particular actions, rooted in a common conception of justice.”59 
Propriety’s implicit appeal to common or universal judgments of what is proper 
reestablish and maintain racism, for as David Lloyd argues, Western aesthetic culture and 
the disinterested perceiving subject which emerges from it (and which is its goal) 
becomes the basis for universalizing judgments and a developmental hierarchy of 
racialized subjects who can and cannot produce such judgments. In this context, the 
discourse of racism is constituted not by “the antagonistic recognition of difference” but 
rather “the subordination of difference to the demand of identity” via the process of 
mandatory assimilation (or an equally mandatory expulsion).60 
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I want to be clear that I do not mean to establish ideological propriety as a flexible 
form of contemporary racial formation in contrast to older, ostensibly static or less 
powerful forms. I do suggest that the disarticulation of appropriateness explicitly from 
phenotype allows for propriety’s unique consolidation, in that the exemplary individuals 
who are exceptions to propriety’s racializing logics operate in the public sphere to belie 
the existence of those logics—as, for example, when critics of affirmative action point to 
public figures like U.S. Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor as proof that minoritized 
citizens can achieve the highest echelons of education and public service without the aid 
of such measures. Yet Ann Laura Stoler reminds us that “old” racisms were not limited or 
unwieldy, arguing that eighteenth- and nineteenth-century colonialisms evinced their own 
particular felicity and adaptability in deploying “changing properties” like “cultural 
competencies, moral civilities, and affective sensibilities that were poorly secured by 
chromatic indices.”61 Old (colonial) racisms were both fluid and flexible, and they often 
relied on affective and social components to distinguish between figures in positions of 
privilege and those in positions of stigma. My work situates contemporary U.S. 
ideological propriety within the colonial genealogy Stoler marks out between race and 
appropriateness.62 I contend that the dialectic of fixity and fluidity that has always 
characterized racial logics endures in the neoliberal moment under the umbrella of 
propriety, but the hierarchy of terms has shifted: whereas propriety once mediated or 
helped determine imperial racialization, now racialization continues under the guise of 




Alongside the emergence of propriety as an ideological discourse that this 
introduction sketches, another opposing force arises unevenly during the neoliberal 
multicultural era. I identify this force—or more accurately, this set of acts, affects and 
representations—as inappropriateness. I do not mean to suggest that the minoritized 
subjects and artists under discussion would identify themselves, or group themselves, in 
such a way (although some certainly would, using related if different terminology). 
Rather, I posit inappropriateness as category of political and literary representation for 
exploring questions of visibility and enfranchisement central to the national narrative of 
the United States. Understanding these acts, affects and representations as part of a 
political and aesthetic movement—one that deploys subjects and forms often denounced 
as improper to the contemporary era—illuminates the connections and imbrications of 
acts that neoliberal ideology frames as discrete, unrelated, or dislocated from everyday 
life. 
Inappropriateness is a capacious concept that encompasses both the aesthetic 
object and the creating subject. It has two trajectories or functions: the epistemological, 
which includes the creation of new modes of knowledge through the deployment of 
inappropriate forms, and the subjectivizing, which is concerned with the formation and 
interpellation of new kinds of subjects by the circulation of alternate epistemologies. I use 
the term “improper” in all its registers to gesture toward external and internal 
expectations that minority subjects must negotiate in the processes of aesthetic creation 
and identity formation. In the face of such expectations, inappropriate aesthetic works are 
those which attempt to distinguish difference from “diversity,” influence minority subject 
28 
 
formation, and shape knowledge production in ways that are counter to the objectives of 
neoliberal multiculturalism. 
I commence this work by way of an aesthetic archive because such an archive 
indexes the lived relations of people in the world—their affects and attachments—in 
relation to larger questions of structure and ideology. Nonetheless, I am not naïve about 
the institutional power wielded by literature, or more precisely literary studies, in the 
expansionist pursuits of neoliberal multiculturalism. Melamed’s analysis of the role of 
literary studies in official antiracisms suggests how literature perpetuates the sort of 
“liberal antiracist terms of difference” that have “structured and maintained systems of 
heteronormativity, political economic normativity, and U.S. national cultural normativity 
by limiting which social representations of difference have appeared reasonable, possible, 
or desirable.”63 It is not only the universalizing aesthetic of taste hierarchies or the 
homogeneity of an established canon that promotes this pervasive institutionalization. 
The very politics of representation that attend to cultural productions by U.S. ethnic 
writers contribute to neoliberalism’s entrenchment and are complemented by the politics 
of multiculturalism that accompany the academic study of literature, as college and 
university students are encouraged to approach the study of ethnic and global literatures 
as rarified opportunities for the knowledge and future management of difference. 
In a particular way, then, this project posits inappropriateness as a 
counterhegemonic force. The way hegemony works—as a “system . . . which persuades 
people of the rightness of any given set of often contradictory ideas and perspectives”—is 
powerful precisely because its ideas, as Jack Halberstam notes, “do not present 
themselves as ideology or try to win consent.”64 I would emphasize that such ideas do not 
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appear to solicit consent; in fact, they are deeply oriented toward the creation of 
acquiescent and unaware subjects. They do not expend energy in the business of 
persuasion, but rather reserve their efforts for the purpose of presenting themselves as 
naturalized facts, appealing to the normative, the already established, and the obvious. 
This is not to suggest, as so much critical attention to hegemony inadvertently 
does, that hegemony is as total or dominant as it aspires to be. Too often critiques of 
hegemony themselves reinscribe the dominance of the force they mean to analyze and 
unsettle.65 One reason hegemony appears so dominant is its flexibility in incorporating 
oppositional arguments, whether those “arguments” take critical or literary form. It is 
difficult to distinguish between oppositional movements that a specific hegemony 
incorporates in order to reproduce itself (in the process limiting the efficacy of such 
opposition), and those movements that operate independently from a given hegemony. In 
other words, to adopt the language from my fourth chapter, it is difficult to determine 
which counterhegemonic efforts “fail,” reproducing hegemony, and which efforts resist 
incorporation into the cycle of production and reproduction. Crucially, Raymond 
Williams in Marxism and Literature (1977) theorizes a third possibility, a category of 
works and ideas which are “clearly affected by hegemonic limits and pressures” but that 
nonetheless represent, at least in part, “significant breaks beyond them, which may again 
in part be neutralized, reduced, or incorporated, but which in their most active elements 
nevertheless come through as independent and individual.” Thus the counterhegemonic 
intensity generated by inappropriate ideas and works need not be total, or perpetual, to be 
significant. We can better equip ourselves to see the significance of such ideas and 
works—to discern the interplay of failure and success—“if we develop modes of analysis 
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which instead of reducing works to finished products, and activities to fixed positions, are 
capable of discerning, in good faith, the finite but significant openness of many actual 
initiatives and contributions.”66 It is this mode of analysis, this form of good faith 
discernment, which this project strives to practice, as we interrogate the limits, straining 
seams, and other vulnerabilities of hegemonic propriety. 
Together, the following four chapters present an alternative archive to establish a 
taxonomy of the ways inappropriateness operates: formally, corporeally, nationally, and 
historically. I comparatively investigate U.S. ethnic literatures from Asian American, 
Afro-Caribbean American, Latino/a, and Native American traditions. These works and 
artists present realism as the appropriate inappropriate form for the contemporary 
moment; theorize the racialized body as an alternate archive by which to negotiate 
memory and history; posit adoption as a new trope for racialized citizenship in order to 
rethink conventional immigration narratives; and suggest the power of so-called failed (or 
literary) histories to de-naturalize the historical present. 
In Chapter One, “Representation and the Real: Realism as Inappropriate Form,” I 
investigate the identity politics of representation that attend to contemporary ethnic 
writers’ use of realism. I read form as an epistemological frame in Jamaica Kincaid’s 
novel-memoir My Brother (1997) and Jhumpa Lahiri’s short story collection 
Unaccustomed Earth (2008), arguing that the realism of these texts makes legible the 
processes of minoritization organized under neoliberal multiculturalism and calls forth a 
community of readers who cannot contribute to neoliberalism’s diversity economy 
because they do not understand difference in the “right” way. 
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Registering the limits of the archive as another epistemological frame allows 
minoritized U.S. citizens to privilege embodied modes of knowing to counter 
institutionalized knowledges. In Chapter Two, “Embodied Knowledges: Synesthesia and 
the Archive in Monique Truong’s Bitter in the Mouth,” I read the word-taste correlations 
produced by the protagonist’s auditory-gustatory synesthesia as an embodied archive. 
Locating inappropriateness in the figure whose bodily difference illuminates the failure 
of systems of representation, I argue that Truong’s 2010 novel theorizes a subject who 
cannot be entirely assimilated into the archive or, by extension, the nation. 
Lauren Berlant and David Eng have argued that the private realm has become a 
privileged space for negotiating sovereignty and citizenship at the turn of the twenty-first 
century. My third chapter, “Adopting National Identity: The Necessary Gestures of 
Proper Citizen-Subjects,” examines apparently private acts of adoption and property 
ownership as performances by which multicultural Americans attempt to identify as 
proper national subjects. Centered on Chang-rae Lee’s novel A Gesture Life (1999), this 
chapter argues that appropriate multiculturalism, coded in economic and kinship terms, 
elides the violence minoritized subjects must experience and enact in order to fulfill the 
requirements of racialized U.S. citizenship. As Lee’s novel stages the pursuit of U.S. 
citizenship over and against a failed citizenship elsewhere, it situates domestic forms of 
neoliberal multiculturalism in the context of planetary subjectivity. 
Distinctions among citizens rely upon a historical archive that facilitates both the 
record of the past and its necessary forgetting. Chapter Four, “Making Literary History: 
The Improper Accounts of Flight and The Brief Wondrous Life of Oscar Wao,” 
investigates how the literary archive encounters and revises the historical archive. 
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Answering Lisa Lowe’s call for attention to “the politics of our lack of knowledge,” this 
chapter theorizes a counter-historicism that understands memory and forgetting as equal 
partners in the project of history. I argue that these literary histories by Sherman Alexie 
and Junot Dìaz, both published in 2007, stage an encounter between embodied memory 
and tropes of the book (storytelling, writing, the lost book, the blank page) to imagine a 
mode of history that does not naturalize the historical present. 
Together these texts suggest venues for displays of difference that complicate 
neoliberal multiculturalism’s privileging of proper forms of alterity. Even as they are 
alternately castigated for insufficient political investment and venerated for their 
ostensibly postracial portrayals of contemporary ethnic life, these literary works resist the 
appropriation of minority discourse as manifested in late capitalism and re-articulate 
difference inappropriately as a potent force against propriety’s disciplinary apparatus. 
They gesture to the possibilities of literariness and to its limits, inciting readers to 
embrace affective and ephemeral knowledges, to question received values and tastes, to 
fail spectacularly and read improperly, and to desire differently. 
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Chapter One: Representation and the Real: Realism as 
Inappropriate Form  
“There are no longer any inherent limits to representation, to its possibilities. This 
boundlessness also means that there is no longer a language or form which is appropriate 
to a subject, whatever it might be.”—Jacques Rancière1 
 
Introduction 
“These aren’t particularly healthy times,” Zadie Smith states flatly in “Two Paths 
for the Novel,” her critique of post-September 11th literary realism published in The New 
York Review of Books on November 20, 2008.2 Smith argues that novels as a genre 
always “attempt to cut neural routes through the brain, to convince us that down this road 
the true future of the novel lies,” and in healthy times, she suggests, their modes and 
forms are varying and various. But in the years following the turn of the twenty-first 
century, Smith laments, lyrical realism—and its central tenets, “the transcendent 
importance of form, the incantatory power of language to reveal truth, the essential 
fullness and continuity of the self”—has gained a stranglehold in English language 
literature. The formal experimentation of postmodernism has been consigned to a limited 
subset of literary history, and lyrical realism has become entrenched—not because it is 
“the closest model we have to our condition,” as proponents of realism have long argued, 
but because it is “the bedtime story that comforts us most.” 
Smith’s criticism is grounded in her analysis of Joseph O’Neill’s Netherland 
(2008), a novel she depicts as casting about in aesthetically pleasing description for “the 
real thing” on which its middle-class readership can base a sense of self and relation to 
the world. Two weeks after Smith’s review, The New York Times named O’Neill’s novel 
to its list of “The 10 Best Books of 2008,” a middlebrow reception that seems evidence of 
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Smith’s claims about contemporary realism’s pervasive appeal. 3 More than her critique 
of lyrical realism as a larger literary mode, Smith’s primary charge against Netherland 
and novels like it concerns its perfect translation of realism to our twenty-first century 
milieu. In fact, she suggests, “to read this novel is to feel a powerful, somewhat 
dispiriting sense of recognition . . . It’s so precisely the image of what we have been 
taught to value in fiction that it throws that image into a kind of existential crisis.” 
Though Smith does not, in this piece, proceed to elaborate on what she believes “we have 
been taught to value in fiction,” the evaluative gesture itself is one of this chapter’s 
central concerns. How do we, as readers and literary scholars, come to value certain 
modes of fiction and denigrate others as ideologically suspect? What do such values 
reveal about the politics being imagined and practiced in the U.S. context at the turn of 
the twenty-first century? Why are American readers and literary critics—even writers 
like Smith herself—so invested in establishing an appropriate form for our era, and what 
does such a pursuit reflect about the way concerns of appropriateness have taken hold in 
our cultural and political understanding? 
In the process of addressing these questions, this chapter identifies and examines 
forms that might be considered particularly inappropriate to the contemporary era, and 
considers how their violation of “proper” literary, discursive and political conventions 
situates them in unique relation to their readers, to literary studies, and to the political 
economy. Inappropriateness here is grounded in the literary because, as Jacques Rancière 
argues, literature possesses its own politics, defined as “the cluster of perceptions and 
practices that shape this common world . . . a way of framing, among sensory data, a 
specific sphere of experience.”4 In this way, the politics of literariness exist apart from 
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any political investments of the writer: “literature ‘does’ politics as literature” and in fact 
“there is a specific link between politics as a definite way of doing and literature as a 
definite practice of writing.”5 Thus I open with Smith’s public attempt to formulate a 
theory of proper literary form in the hope of commencing a more concentrated analysis of 
the ways in which form becomes coded in public discourse as appropriate or 
inappropriate, particularly in ethnic literature of the United States under neoliberal 
multiculturalism. In order to examine the precise crisis of representation in U.S. ethnic 
cultural production of the past two decades, I situate these questions of form within the 
context of what Rancière has termed modernity’s aesthetic regime of the arts, an epoch of 
cultural production characterized by a lack of hierarchy in subject matter and the end of 
requisite correlations between subject and form. In short, the convention that certain 
subjects require certain forms or that certain forms are best yoked to certain subjects no 
longer has wide purchase: all forms are potentially suitable and so no forms are specific 
to particular subjects. I draw on Rancière’s formulation but particularize it to the 
contemporary neoliberal moment to analyze the ways that ethnic literature responds to 
the manifestations of propriety as an ideological apparatus in the political and cultural 
spheres, most notably to the reinvigoration of discourses of authenticity and 
representationality. Under Rancière’s formulation, all forms are concomitantly 
appropriate and inappropriate to any task of representation to which they are set. 
Beginning with this premise that the appropriate form is always the inappropriate form, 
this chapter examines the regulatory power of the designation “inappropriate” as applied 
to literature in order to better understand the functions of literary discourse in the United 
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States and the challenges that literature written from a minoritized perspective poses to 
received knowledge about what contemporary literature should do and be. 
I look to literature written from a minoritized perspective to consider form 
because such literary productions carry the burden of propriety on multiple valences: not 
only in the content of their narratives but also their formal experimentation (or lack 
thereof), their publishing and marketing strategies, and their perceived appeal (or lack 
thereof) to a mainstream white readership. Specifically, ethnic literary texts are expected 
to perform, both by members of their respective ethnic communities and externally by 
wider arbiters of multicultural diversity, as appropriately representative of the ethnic and 
cultural contexts from which they emerge—whether this means striving for assimilation 
or, with equal fervor, opposing such integration into U.S. and transnational 
multiculturalism. In this way, discussions of form always already invoke the political. 
I also consider U.S. ethnic literature because the histories of U.S. ethnic literary 
production present a condensed genealogy—a microcosm—in which national debates 
about aesthetics appear with particular clarity. Literary texts tend to face contradictory 
claims from the archive of literary studies and the archive of cultural studies.6 As such, 
minority discourse in the post-Civil Rights era becomes a proving ground for debates 
about politicization at the expense of the aesthetic and, conversely, about the untenable a-
politics that comes from an overinvestment in the aesthetic. On the one hand, politically 
inflected readings of literary texts have resulted in increased visibility of and tolerance 
toward minoritized perspectives in the late twentieth century. Such readings necessarily 
situate literature in a larger political, social and economic context, registering the 
relationship between literature and “other kinds of discourses, institutions, and material 
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forces” in the processes of racialization and subject formation.7 But ethnic studies 
scholars calling for a formalist revival contend that such relationships often situate what 
is “ethnic” in tension with what is “aesthetic.” Read prescriptively, ethnic literature 
becomes a transparent window into difference that collapses the literary into the “real” in 
service of neoliberal multiculturalism’s production and management of difference. Yet 
attention to aesthetics can tip too far in the opposite direction as well, leading to a 
reification of form and an understanding of literature as transcendent—as sufficient, in 
and of itself, to revolutionize the aesthetic and political realms. In this case, material 
political action is rendered unnecessary because literature is, itself, “enough.” 
Studying literature written from a minoritized perspective reminds us that certain 
forms or formal conventions are not limited to a particular group or time period, 
contradicting the dominant narrative of U.S. literary history that collapses genre and 
period to consign realism to the latter half of the nineteenth century. Minoritized 
literatures also complicate the kind of formalism that would characterize certain devices, 
approaches or techniques as the special purview of particular groups, especially ethnic 
labels like “Asian American,” created for their usefulness to identity politics, that do not 
meaningfully correlate to or describe forms of literary production. In light of the history 
of this term, Colleen Lye argues that “there is no such thing as an Asian American 
aesthetic form.”8 I would extend this to emphasize that there is no U.S. ethnic form per 
se. 
As minoritization reveals certain underlying expectations endemic to discussions 
of form, so an analysis of form, I propose, will help make legible the processes of 
minoritization codified under neoliberal multiculturalism, particularly the transformation 
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of race into ethnicity and the flattening of difference such that difference becomes 
reclassified as sameness under the heading of “diversity.” Form, understood as an 
aesthetic act and as an epistemological frame, enables recognition of the subjects of 
literature. Form signals to the reader that a work possesses or at least aspires to the 
qualities of literariness, that it seeks recognition as literary. Form is a strategy by which 
literature attempts to obscure its own limits and at the same time a device by which it 
gestures to those limits. Politically invested, form organizes experience and regulates 
legibility, while always containing the conditions of its own breakdown. And 
inappropriate forms, I posit, are those forms that reveal their own exteriority—that, as 
they seek recognition as literary, point us to what exceeds their frame and the political 
ramifications of that excess. 
In this sense, this study begins with form as such not to suggest that form is 
sufficient in and of itself, but that we must consider form as a condition of political 
possibility. This chapter examines two literary works that operate on different valences of 
formal impropriety in order to illuminate a relationship between neoliberalism and formal 
inappropriateness. More specifically, these works demonstrate formal engagement with 
realism, enabling an articulation of realism and its putative relationships with various 
ideologies and political economies. My intervention into the modes and functions of 
realism operates on three different registers. At the level of the individual literary text, I 
consider formal innovations and gestures that create a kind of inappropriate relation 
between the narrative content of story and the form of its narration. The second register 
concerns the functions of academic discourse: the way realism has been appraised and 
critiqued within literary studies and the relation between literary studies and narratives of 
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popular reading practices that coalesce in the U.S. literary imagination. Finally, at the 
level of the political, I consider realism’s relationship to neoliberalism: the way realism 
evoked by the formal properties of a text and codified at the level of academic discourse 
functions on the register of political economy to naturalize or denaturalize the status quo. 
I begin by analyzing a highly descriptive realist work, Jamaica Kincaid’s novel-
memoir My Brother (1997). Existing scholarship on this text tends to center on the ethical 
ramifications of writing from the U.S. about a Caribbean figure, usually arguing that 
Kincaid’s narrative about the three years following Devon Drew’s AIDS diagnosis 
exploits the diseased body of her brother in order to foreground the narrator as a diasporic 
and literary subject. While remaining mindful of the ethical questions this work raises, I 
am dedicated to rethinking the formal aspects of Kincaid’s work. This realist text is 
characterized, I argue, by its experiments with ekphrasis, defined broadly as verbal 
representation of visual representation. Yet My Brother eschews conventional parameters 
of ekphrasis to stage an encounter with images of bodies othered by disease. Early in the 
text these encounters arise out of other representations, most crucially from medical 
photographs. Eventually, though, the narrative evaporates even this tenuous distinction 
between art and life to bring body as aesthetic object, speaker-seer, and reader into a 
relation of transformative closeness. In these ekphrastic moments, inappropriate 
ekphrasis becomes a strategy by which the aestheticized body becomes re-naturalized, 
complicating the realist text’s relationship to the putative “real.” 
From Kincaid’s inappropriate ekphrasis, this chapter moves to consider the short 
stories of Bengali American writer Jhumpa Lahiri. As Smith foregrounds the regressive 
ideologies endemic to realism at the level of political economy, so Lahiri’s critics in the 
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realm of academic discourse often condemn her work for its ostensible striving to a kind 
of apolitical universality, resulting in stories that comfortably depict “normal life.” 
Accused of taking up a form that is inappropriate to her contemporary moment and 
especially to representations of minoritized figures in U.S. literature by virtue of its 
conventionality, Lahiri nonetheless enacts a political critique of her own in her refusal of 
the expectations that she, as an ethnic writer, must perform a politics recognizable as 
such. I will argue that Lahiri’s appropriate—domesticated, genteel—formal realism as 
practiced in “Going Ashore,” the final story in Unaccustomed Earth (2008), is 
inappropriate not because it does not do justice to U.S. ethnic immigrant experience but 
precisely because it resists the expectations of formal experimentation and the discursive 
common sense that would designate realism as a normative, repressive, appeasing genre. 
Turning to Judith Butler’s explication of epistemological frames that regulate 
apprehension and recognition, I suggest that literary form functions as one such 
epistemological frame, and that Lahiri’s overt use of realist framing devices effects an 
inappropriate materialization of realism’s concealed operations. 
It is my contention that the deployments and forms of inappropriateness I describe 
here help generate alternatives to neoliberal modes of representation because they are 
forms that encourage re-materialization—a return to bodies, to material inequality, to 
precarity and visibility and biopolitics. Neoliberalism dematerializes, unyoking economic 
causes from their effects and positing a theoretical universal subject who inhabits a 
fictionalized meritocracy unavailable and unrecognizable to U.S. citizen-subjects who 
live in poverty, violence and rampant race, gender, and sexuality-based inequities. An 
economic structure by which wealth is distributed upward by way of “free” markets, 
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deregulation, and unfettered transnational capitalism, neoliberalism masquerades as 
common sense—the appropriate form of political economy in our era of globalization. 
Inappropriate ekphrasis in Jamaica Kincaid’s realist text My Brother re-situates the 
diseased body in the context of the natural, in the process bringing speaker-seer and 
embodied art object together in a way that nonetheless resists the collapse of difference 
into sameness. Inappropriate realism in Jhumpa Lahiri’s short story “Going Ashore” 
overtly stages the process of frame building and maintenance in order to draw attention to 
the framing devices by which realism creates the illusion of the real. In doing so, Lahiri’s 
multiplicity of frames conveys the precarity of bodies, both those appropriate to 
neoliberalism by way of their fluid multicultural status and those casually designated for 
illegibility and death. 
The question of form consistently revolves, as a return to Zadie Smith’s essay on 
“the future of the Anglophone novel” reveals, around what it teaches us to expect or 
recognize and how it flouts or disrupts these expectations and recognitions. Responding 
to what she determines realist novels like Netherland attempt to offer—the authentic 
story of a self—Smith provocatively resists this illusion of inevitability: 
is this really what having a self feels like? Do selves always seek their good, in 
the end? Are they never perverse? Do they always want meaning? Do they not 
sometimes want its opposite? And is this how memory works? Do our childhoods 
often return to us in the form of coherent, lyrical reveries? Is this how time feels? 
Do the things of the world really come to us like this, embroidered in the verbal 
fancy of times past? Is this really Realism? 
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How memory works—how time feels—what is “really” real: it is these questions that 
literature, by way of its formal qualities, supposes to answer. Smith’s litany of questions 
contests what she sees as the insidious epistemological frames of contemporary literature 
that exist with the goal of containing and cataloguing proper notions of how life feels, of 
how living works. Yet these questions come in an essay attempting to establish precisely 
what contemporary literature should(n’t) be and do. 
As part of a larger project about the disciplinary operations conducted under the 
guise of propriety in the U.S. at the turn of the twenty-first century, this chapter sets 
critical work on racialization under neoliberalism in conversation with Rancière’s 
theorization of the politics of aesthetics. In Represent and Destroy (2011), Jodi Melamed 
traces the way the U.S. government reacted to global scrutiny of white supremacy 
following World War II by developing and promulgating official, state-sponsored 
antiracisms to justify and consolidate its position as the leader of global capitalism. In a 
series of race-liberal regimes over the succeeding decades, procedures of racialization 
“independently and flexibly employed the criteria that white supremacy historically has 
collapsed with color, and . . . innovated new criteria, often using nationalist and antiracist 
terms of value.”9 This project argues that one crucial set of new criteria can be grouped 
under the umbrella of propriety, as terms like “appropriate” and “proper” are strategically 
deployed as nationalist terms of value that naturalize the political and economic status 
quo. Such terms attempt to construct and are mutually enforced by what Rancière has 
termed the distribution of the sensible, “the system of self evident facts of sense 
perception” that regulates the terms of visibility and perception and creates a community 
of perceivers—the sensible—in common.10 
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Rather than establishing and then reinforcing such notions of what is proper, 
inappropriate forms produce new modes of knowledge by the deployment of narrative 
and representational strategies that foreclose conventional methods of aesthetic 
apprehension and engagement. In this way, their impropriety moves between and 
consolidates the realm of the literary and the realm of the political in the creation of a 
particular audience. This is especially true of realism as a formal mode with a 
complicated history, and of other formal conventions like ekphrasis that this chapter 
considers within the larger context of realist ethnic literature. Inappropriate forms, then, 
are concerned with bringing into being a different kind of audience, inaugurating the 
kinds of aesthetic states that do not serve primarily to educate—either our tastes or our 
sense of the real that translates into the common (and communal) sense of inevitability—
but instead to evoke resistant valences of desire and identification. This project imagines 
the production of new collectivities able to withstand the demands of neoliberal 
multicultural formulations of what Lauren Berlant has termed “the good life.”11 As 
consumers of inappropriate texts, newly inappropriate subjects produced in this shared 
readership are created—subjects who cannot contribute to the neoliberal diversity 
economy because they do not understand difference in the “right” way. 
Inappropriate Form as Appropriate Form 
While this chapter negotiates various meanings of form at the level of literary text 
and beyond, the goal of my analysis is to move beyond our investments, as literary 
scholars and readers, in form as an end in itself to consider political structures and 
economies that regulate contemporary life. For this reason, I begin with Rancière’s 
definition of aesthetics as “a specific regime for identifying and reflecting on the arts: a 
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mode of articulation between ways of doing and making, their corresponding forms of 
visibility, and possible ways of thinking about their relationships.”12 Rancière theorizes 
the aesthetic regime, which he dates as beginning with Flaubertian descriptive realism in 
the mid-nineteenth century, as functionally “destroying the mimetic barrier that 
distinguished the ways of doing and making affiliated with art from other ways of doing 
and making.”13 In contrast to the ethical regime, concerned with questions of artistic 
purpose, and the representative regime, which regulated mimesis by monitoring “proper” 
correlation between subject matter and form, the aesthetic regime leaves aside questions 
of proper forms or ethical merit in an abandonment of aesthetic hierarchy. Within this 
regime, Rancière explicitly situates artistic representation in political terms, defining 
aesthetic acts as “configurations of experience that create new modes of sense perception 
and induce novel forms of political subjectivity.”14 Aesthetics understood in this way 
governs the distribution of the sensible, which in turn determines the parameters of what 
is taken as common sense; it sets the terms by which we recognize, understand and 
characterize art and art’s role in political and social formation. 
And so, as Rancière notes elsewhere, the question of the political is also a 
question of form. In The Future of the Image, he describes form’s new role within an 
aesthetic regime that has abolished not only hierarchies of form but also all rules 
governing the relationship between subject matter and medium. Images and events have 
been unyoked from expectations of what should be represented (appropriate subjects) and 
how (appropriate forms): “there are no longer any inherent limits to representation, to its 
possibilities. This boundlessness also means that there is no longer a language or form 
which is appropriate to a subject, whatever it may be.”15 In other moments Rancière is 
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even more explicit about the relationship between appropriate and inappropriate forms, 
arguing that “the appropriate form is also the inappropriate form. In and of itself the event 
neither prescribes nor proscribes any artistic means. And it does not impose any duty on 
art to represent, or not to represent, in some particular way.”16 Yet Rancière’s 
theorization of form also requires an understanding of how this “radical autonomy of art” 
established by the conditions of the aesthetic regime concomitantly requires a collapse of 
the distinction between representation and the real, between the spheres of fact and the 
spheres of fiction, undermining the conventional autonomy art has been understood to 
possess in its existence as apart from real life.17 Because realism as a formal mode strives 
to enact such a collapse as well, though in aesthetic terms, this chapter foregrounds the 
tense and complicated relationship between representation and the real. 
This analysis of appropriate and inappropriate forms is the starting point for my 
invocation of inappropriate form as the defining feature of contemporary U.S. literature 
written from a minoritized perspective. I depart from Rancière’s work, however, in terms 
of the scope of the deployment of inappropriateness to which I attend in this chapter. He 
would characterize all formal choices since the mid-nineteenth century as inappropriate 
in the sense described above. I want to reiterate that the inappropriate forms delineated in 
this chapter function as a vehicle for the resistant creation of minoritized subjects under 
the political epoch of neoliberal multiculturalism.18 
In making these arguments, I draw on and extend Christopher Lee’s definition of 
form as “a process of representation through which the world becomes legible, a process 
that both makes use of and disrupts given formal conventions.”19 In its broadest sense as 
an epistemological frame, form is in conversation with the literary devices that we 
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recognize as components of literary form. Form refers to the structure of a literary work, 
and is constructed through the deployment and disruption of recognizable literary devices 
and formal conventions. In this sense, form is a container, a vehicle, for narrative; story 
and form together are the primary components of literary meaning-making. This chapter 
also traces form as a strategy of representation designed to capture the reader’s attention. 
Form in this iteration is meant to register literariness—the particular qualities of a literary 
text crafted to authenticate its privileged status as literature. Form also registers processes 
of subject formation represented in the text and the possibilities suggested by such 
representations, and gestures on a larger scale to the concealed operations of social, 
political and economic structures that condition us for life under late capitalism. Finally, 
form functions as an epistemological frame by which conditions of contemporary life 
come to be understood. 
Unsettling reader expectations about genre, period, experimentation, 
representation and political engagement, inappropriate form both draws attention to these 
implicit expectations and suggests our own dissatisfaction with them—their failure, in 
aesthetic terms, to achieve the promise of formal transcendence on which we have been 
taught to pin our political imaginings. First and most obviously, inappropriate form can 
be characterized by its fundamental flouting of the conventions of literary form: 
experimentations with the parameters of genre, with the boundaries between artistic 
media, with the literary traditions and attendant political expectations endemic to 
particular modes like realism. But the inappropriateness of inappropriate form stems not 
from its formal experimentation, though such experimentation is one way literary 
impropriety is most often recognized. Rather, inappropriate form for the purposes of this 
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project is form which disrupts the distribution of the sensible by way of its formal 
experimentation; it is form that makes us see differently and, because of this, presents the 
possibility that we might desire differently, in the context of literary challenges to the 
politics and ethics of neoliberal multiculturalism. As we shall see, inappropriate form is 
form that complicates literature’s investment in maintaining its own inevitability, and that 
works against its own power to delimit the boundaries and hierarchize the components of 
legible human action—power that stems from literature’s capacity to influence proper 
ways of doing, making, and being. 
Neoliberal Multiculturalism and Inappropriate Realism 
If form is a process of representation through which the world is created and made 
legible, then inappropriate forms extend legibility beyond the proper boundaries 
maintained through neoliberal multiculturalism’s technologies of representation. The 
central tension of ethnic literary study operates along a supposed continuum between 
aesthetics and politics. Considered broadly, literary critics tend either to resort to 
formalism and the reification of form that limits politics to aesthetics, or to read 
minoritized literature as cultural artifact. As cultural artifact, ethnic literature becomes 
transparently political and historical, its literariness occluded. Often this divide between 
formalism and artifact maps onto the contested territory between cultural studies and 
literary studies. As I discuss in my introduction, neoliberal multiculturalism encourages 
and reinforces this divide, exploiting the history of U.S. ethnic studies and minority 
discourse to distract from the ways literary studies can function to support its project of 
dematerialization. Following Melamed, I understand neoliberal multiculturalism as a 
racial formation that codifies bodies and groups within a global biopolitical regime and 
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makes such codification—and the ensuing racialized demarcations between positions of 
privilege and positions of stigma—appear the fair and natural outcome of economic 
freedom and multicultural ideals. Under neoliberal multiculturalism, literature performs 
as an antiracist technology that produces “truth effects” about personhood, difference, 
globalization, and contemporary propriety. 
Inappropriate forms generate literature and a readership which fundamentally 
cannot serve this function, and they resist investment in maintaining their own 
inevitability by overtly staging their underlying conditions of possibility in such a way as 
to reinforce how they could always have been otherwise.20 If inappropriate form is that 
which disrupts the distribution of the sensible, the epistemological frames that structure 
recognition of value, then such forms offer no ready authorization to would-be 
multicultural elites of the neoliberal era. Even when operating in the realist mode, the 
effects of such forms should not be mistaken for the art-for-art’s-sake aesthetic encounter 
of literary formalism. In fact, it is literary formalism which serves the neoliberal project 
outlined in the introduction, because it is an aesthetic philosophy that depoliticizes 
political ideology and allows it to appear as moral truth. These universalized moral truths 
become hierarchized above any local, individual, cultural truths, eventually becoming the 
only aspect a U.S.-based reader needs to take away from a given work of literature. In 
contrast, inappropriate forms are strictly opposed to such formalism; whether overtly 
politically charged or apparently apolitical, whether obviously experimental or 
deceptively “normal,” inappropriate forms chip away at formalism’s universal claims and 
resist designations of literary value that would reduce literature to its potential for 
providing information about difference. Inappropriate forms recall us to the body that 
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underlies representation rather than occluding it. They register precarity and its causes 
and consequences under neoliberalism. They make manifest the assumptions about race, 
class, gender and sexuality that facilitate the workings of neoliberalism. 
This chapter argues that realism is one inappropriate instantiation of form that 
exploits the tension between politicization and aestheticization of U.S. ethnic literature. 
In its elusive craftedness, realism encourages aesthetic apprehension and engagement in 
the unpacking of a densely literary work. Yet the devices it deploys to establish its sense 
of credibility—like historical allusion and framing—concomitantly encourage political 
investment in the historical past, present, and future. Marxist critics from George Lukacs 
onward have argued that realism presents a condensed model of the world to our scrutiny, 
available for critique21; yet this formulation must also address realism’s concomitant 
insistence on the externality and significance of the world it claims to represent.22 In 
other words, the very tools by which realism seeks to create the illusion of reality are the 
devices that can be marshalled to undermine realism’s project and return us to the 
external world, existing as distinct from the world of representation. The particularities of 
time, character and place identified by Ian Watt as the fundamental components of 
realism23—the devices by which realism attempts to represent and, in representing, 
occlude the representative project—become the devices by which we are returned to the 
realness, and political necessities, of the world in which we live. 
I consider instances when realism, particularly realist texts written from a 
minoritized perspective, offers a unique challenge to neoliberalism’s perceived 
hegemony. I do not seek a total rehabilitation of realism; certainly, realism can and has 
been complicit in the solidification of normative cultures, politics and economies. But it 
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is also true that some of the most trenchant critiques of realism veer toward 
homogenizing and reifying difference, collapsing valences of difference into a single, 
knowable instantiation. Furthermore, distinctions between the literary and the real 
disappear as U.S. ethnic texts are asked, even expected, under the strictures of 
multiculturalism to work transparently as cultural artifacts that reveal or testify to cultural 
difference.24 
In considering realism in contemporary U.S. ethnic literature, I suggest that the 
critical debate in discourses of realism between referentiality and textuality can be 
mapped, in certain productive ways, onto the debates in U.S. ethnic studies between 
political prescriptiveness and aesthetic formalism. Specifically, scholars’ respective 
investments in referentiality or textuality become the foundation for what will be 
considered appropriate ethnic literature, on the textual register, and the appropriate 
critical uses of that literature on an academic register.25 It is this intersection of 
referentiality and textuality that makes realism the appropriate inappropriate form for an 
examination of the thorny political and aesthetic investments of U.S. ethnic literary 
studies. Further, such an understanding of mutually sustaining tensions might prove 
suggestive in the project of reading U.S. ethnic literature in the shadow of neoliberal 
multiculturalism. In her work on nineteenth-century American realism, Lilian Furst 
argues that realism must be understood as both referential and discursive: the illusion of 
referentiality is created and maintained discursively, and realist narrative always 
incorporates “the semblance of reference into the illusion-making process.”26 Thus, the 
two cannot be disentangled without creating a partial or mangled account of the way 
realism works. Further, she suggests that the tension between referentiality and textuality 
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is in fact central to the project of realism: “The realist novel must be taken at one and the 
same time as a record (more or less faithful, as the case may be) of a past social situation 
and as a texture made of verbal signs. Far from cancelling each other out, the two overlap 
in an inescapable and reciprocally sustaining tension that forms the core of realism’s 
precarious enterprise.”27 
In certain instantiations, realism is a particular deployment of form that most 
clearly activates the tension fundamental to all representative acts: the relationship 
between the work of representation itself and the external “real” world. In literary 
criticism, realism is generally identified by the literary conventions—density of 
description, particularity of time and place—that create an illusion of “reality” and 
contribute to what Sue-Im Lee calls the “localizability” of characters within a realist 
framework that itself implies a direct correlation to the realities of the external world.28 
At the level of critical discourse, realism is often described as an ideological technology 
of subject formation or a strategy for managing power and powerlessness in the 
imagining of a world that is coherent and stable.29 Yet recent reformulations, like the 
“peripheral realisms” theorized by Jed Esty and Colleen Lye, suggest that realism 
“mark[s] a shared investment in theorizing the referential function of the text even as it 
inspires extraordinary flexible and active ways of reconceiving and transcoding social 
referents.”30 Realism matters and is a useful term because, in the peripheral realisms 
identified by Esty and Lye, it takes seriously the attempt to represent the totality of global 
capitalism—“rather than thematizing its unrepresentability”—and in doing so questions 
its “status as permanent fact.”31 
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While this chapter will at times consider the use of literary devices in the creation 
of worlds suggestively constructed to evoke a sense of the real, I am more interested in 
the larger question of realism as a form that concomitantly evokes and interrogates this 
assumed real. Edward Barnaby calls this process the attempt “to render social experience 
visible by accounting for what was possible to express and to observe within a particular 
social reality.”32 Christopher Lee, drawing on and revising Frederic Jameson, suggests 
that realism is “an aesthetic as well as an epistemological literary form” that activates and 
questions “the possibility of objective knowledge in/of a heterogeneous world.”33 The 
aesthetic and epistemological claims of realism compete, staging the tension of all 
literary attempts to represent the real by way of the non-real most overtly. In other words, 
if realism is successful aesthetically, the illusion of a literary work’s reality is sustained. 
But if realism is successful epistemologically, it is a mode by which we come to 
knowledge of an external world that is fundamentally separate from the work of 
representation. 
To summarize, when inappropriate form takes shape as realism, this translates to 
an improper materialization on the three registers under discussion here: text, discourse, 
and ideology. Realism’s inappropriateness at the level of literary text is reflected in the 
ways it frames character beliefs and actions, unrealistically (in the sense that it does not 
function as a mirror of “real life”) marking out particular events as significant. At the 
level of academic discourse, realism’s impropriety comes as it overreaches the historical 
boundaries established for it. Finally, at the level of political economy, realism becomes 
inappropriate when it seeks, in a non-experimental guise, to undermine the neoliberal 
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multicultural project by interrogating the literary devices, academic discourse and 
political distribution of the sensible that are its tools. 
I want to mark a distinction here, drawn from Melamed, between the function of 
individual works of literature and the function of literary studies as a discourse. In the 
decades after World War II, literature became understood as “a privileged tool for 
information retrieval, a privileged domain for coming to terms with difference, and a 
social guarantee of racism’s eventual irrelevance.”34 Literary texts, in this larger rubric, 
come to stand as sufficient in and of themselves: reading a literary text is a path to real 
knowledge of the other, a privileged technology for the creation and training of good 
multicultural elites who will administer the codes and criteria of neoliberalism’s 
privilege/stigma divide. Literature eventually functions collectively as an “antiracist 
technology” that produces not truth but “truth effects.35 But while Melamed’s 
theorization critiques the institutionalization of literature—its formal coalescence as 
literary studies and its installment in colleges and universities—as complicit with and 
subject to neoliberalism’s attempts to regulate difference, it also preserves the 
transformative possibilities of individual literary texts. The processes by which literary 
studies fosters neoliberal agendas—serving as a tool for information retrieval, a safe 
space for encounters with difference, and a sign of society’s postracial promise—are 
processes that do not attend to form except in the ways form might offer a shortcut to 
mastery of difference. Individual works of literature can counter this flattening, Melamed 
suggests—works that present “antiracist visions incompatible with liberal political 
solutions to destructively uneven global social-material relations.”36 
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So, this chapter asks, can inappropriate forms withstand the relentless hegemony 
of literary studies and multiculturalism more broadly? And how exactly do inappropriate 
forms generate alternatives to the commonsensical propriety of late capitalism? Finally, 
even when they fail to stage such alternatives, what might inappropriate forms suggest 
about the possibilities for resisting neoliberalism that are grounded in the aesthetic?  
Certainly realism is a form that evokes the real. But literature's power is often situated in 
the fact that it has no requirement to accurately reflect real life and so it can imagine, and 
then represent, any thing in any way. I propose that this dynamic is at the heart of why so 
many scholars find realism suspect, though they would likely not articulate it in this way: 
because the underlying assumption of this understanding of realism is that it would be 
better to be real than to be representative. As realism is a formal attempt to sustain the 
illusion of the real, it exchanges representation’s political and aesthetic potential for a 
weak and blighted attempt to operate as the real—despite the fact that literature is 
fundamentally always inadequate in this attempt to represent the real by way of the non-
real. But what if we understood realism as possessing no such aspirations and no such 
correlation? In that case, perhaps realism does not forgo the possible for the actual but 
instead becomes a form in which the possible gets staged as actual, in the process 
increasing the force and fact of its possibility for the reader. Understood this way, realism 
as an appropriate inappropriate form assumes a kind of political manifestation in advance 
of its realization in the world of the actual. 
Inappropriate Ekphrasis 
Inappropriate form describes less a genre than an orientation, as I suggest by 
opening my textual analysis of inappropriate realism with a consideration of the prose 
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ekphrasis in Jamaica Kincaid’s novel-memoir My Brother (1997). In his review of the 
novel following its release, Craig Seligman relates a conversation he had with young 
Jamaica Kincaid when they both worked for the New Yorker: “She told me over lunch 
one day that she wasn’t happy with the formal strictures of stories and novels; ‘I want to 
find a new form,’ she said.”37 Though My Brother employs Kincaid’s characteristic 
impressionistic style and non-chronological timeline, this work also evinces the quotidian 
details, family dynamics, quest for knowledge of the self and others, and narrative of 
subject formation generally recognized as attributes of the style of representation known 
as realism. These textual characteristics of My Brother work together to create and 
sustain “the illusion that the characters we encounter are somehow real,” Christopher 
Lee’s description of realism’s central effect.38 This impression is further reinforced at the 
level of discourse by widespread knowledge of the work’s autobiographical inspiration: 
Kincaid’s half-brother, Devon Drew, died of AIDS in Antigua in 1996. For the three 
years between his diagnosis and his death, Kincaid regularly traveled between her home 
and family in the United States and her birthplace and family of origin, bringing her 
brother the life-extending antiretroviral medication not available to him in Antigua. 
Reviews of My Brother indicate that the novel-memoir’s minor experimentations 
actually shore up its realist project. Tangential descriptions of My Brother at the time of 
its publication are highly suggestive when we consider what they register as visible, or 
true, or normal, or “realistic,” within the distribution of the sensible such reviews 
reinforce. Writing for The New York Times, Anna Quindlen affirms that the work is in 
fact “a lesson in constructing a memoir that resembles not a neat narrative but the 
meandering river of human memory” and that “memory feels exactly like” Kincaid’s text. 
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She goes on to testify that My Brother “provid[es] . . . the deep satisfaction of 
recognition.”39 Quindlen is not the only critic to gesture to the text’s powerful handling 
of our impulses and expectations. Seligman argues that “Kincaid’s fiction doesn’t feel 
like fiction. It has the misshapen contours of the real, not the symmetry of art.”40 
Contrasting his first impression with the way the work reshapes his frames of reference 
on an extremely detailed scale, Seligman admits that “a first reading left the impression 
of something highly artificial, but when I went back it didn’t seem artificial, it seemed 
inevitable.”41 These reviews provide a kind of microcosm of realism’s aspirations. 
Though Seligman’s first impression was artifice, the novel-memoir’s residual effect 
worked on him in the space of one reading to convince him of its own inevitability. 
Quindlen’s argument that memory feels just like Kincaid’s narrative even leads Quindlen 
to suggest that it should serve as a “lesson” for writers and readers alike.  These reviews 
argue for Kincaid’s text as model or lesson, marking its regulatory function within 
literary production and literary studies. The discourse produced around Kincaid’s semi-
autobiographical experiment suggests that Kincaid has taken that which might have 
previously been considered improper subjects of representation—decaying genitalia, the 
horror of advanced-stage AIDS—and rendered it in a novel-memoir for the masses. 
My Brother begins with the Kincaidian narrator’s return to Antigua after learning 
of her brother’s diagnosis from a family friend. There, she enlists the help of Dr. Ramsay, 
the island’s foremost expert on AIDS, whose approach to prevention and treatment of 
HIV/AIDS operates in conflict with the prevailing views of the island’s medical and lay 
communities: “In Antigua if you are diagnosed with the HIV virus you are considered to 
be dying,” Kincaid writes. “Public concern, obsession with the treatment and care of 
61 
 
members of the AIDS-suffering community by groups in the larger non-AIDS-suffering 
community, does not exist. There are only the people suffering from AIDS, and then the 
people who are not suffering from AIDS,” strict boundaries policed by careful attention 
to social norms (31). Intrigued by the public-health component of Ramsay’s practice—
contraception and the prevention of STDs—Kincaid attends one of his lectures and 
encounters the doctor’s photographic slides of infected genitalia of patients in various 
stages of sexually transmitted disease. The powerful images erase her memory of the 
actual lecture, and her deep and unwilling engagement with the photographs is the subject 
of the text’s first extended prose ekphrasis, in which Kincaid crafts a triangle between 
herself as speaker-seer, the reader of her narrative, and the slides of infected genitalia as 
fraught art object. Here, Kincaid’s use of the photographs renders them aesthetic objects. 
Framed by the discourse of disease Ramsay presents in his lecture, these slide 
photographs as represented in Kincaid’s text operate as a kind of inappropriate ekphrasis. 
Unusual scenarios of reading and self-education in this text extend to Kincaid’s 
attempts to read the body of her diseased brother and negotiate the complex dynamics of 
their “intimate otherness,”42 setting the diseased body as a discursive space on which to 
write the history of their relationship and her evolution as a writer. These imbrications of 
self, home and family are reiterated in this work in the conflicted relationship it portrays 
between image and text. Therefore, the complicated tensions manifested in this text’s 
distinctive relationship to image require closer examination, particularly in moments of 
ekphrasis, the verbal representation of visual representation. Ultimately, Kincaid’s 
ekphrasis transitions from representing visual representation to representing visual 
apprehension; rather than maintaining the distinction between speaker-seer and object 
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that fundamentally characterizes conventional ekphrasis, Kincaid’s inappropriate 
ekphrastic project brings the two into closer relation. Furthermore, My Brother’s 
moments of ekphrasis become the ground upon which the text enacts a naturalization of 
the diseased body via the deployment of metaphors of flowering, growth and gardens. 
This naturalization and the transition to apprehension structure the text’s experimental 
realism and attempt to representationally re-materialize a body dematerialized by medical 
discourse and othered by disease. 
Thus far I have employed James Heffernan’s broad construction of ekphrasis as 
“the verbal representation of visual representation.”43 Heffernan characterizes ekphrasis 
as an often-gendered poetics of power that speaks not only about, but also to and for, 
works of visual art.44 Kincaid’s uneasy relationship with Devon, a brother she only knew 
for the first three and last three years of his life—the brother whose birth to which she 
attributes her mother’s transformation from a beautiful to a bitter woman—finds 
interesting analogy in the ekphrastic situation.45 Though half-siblings, Kincaid and 
Devon are widely divergent subjects in very different situations. What they share in racial 
heritage and familial ties is not just countered but overwhelmed by their differences: in 
economic class, in sexual orientation, in social identity. These differences consume 
Kincaid for much of the narrative, as she seeks to distance and distinguish herself from 
Devon’s life, choices and fate. Most significantly, they differ in their relative power 
within the narrative: Devon cannot speak, but only be spoken about, as Kincaid controls 
the modes and methods of representation and ultimately the picture of Devon’s life and 
death that will be presented to the reader. 
63 
 
At first, Kincaid’s text reinforces the ways even potentially inappropriate 
ekphrasis—inappropriate in the most basic sense that it takes as its art object the 
photograph of a diseased body—is susceptible to the pitfalls of aestheticization. Here I 
retreat momentarily from Rancière’s formulation of the politics of aesthetics to 
aestheticization in a more conventional sense: a stylization that extracts the subject/object 
from the realm of the “real” to the realm of “art.” Analysis of the first moment of 
ekphrasis, the medical photographs, reveals a violation of the integrity and identity of 
their subjects. Kincaid prefaces the actual description by noting only that “the pictures 
were amazing,” a gesture to an aesthetic encounter that is simultaneously banal and 
extraordinary, in that the subject of these pictures is not water lilies or a nude but actual 
diseased bodies. Kincaid transitions from her brief assessment of the slides as a whole 
into an extensive ekphrastic passage: 
There were penises that looked like ladyfingers left in the oven too long and with 
a bite taken out of them that revealed a jam-filled center. There were labias 
covered with thick blue crusts, or black crusts, or crusts that were iridescent. 
There were breasts with large parts missing, eaten away, not from a large bite 
taken at once but nibbled, as if by an animal in a state of high enjoyment, each 
morsel savored for maximum pleasure. There were pictures of people emaciated 
by disease, who looked very different from people emaciated from starvation; 
they did not have that parched look of flesh and blood evaporated, leaving a 
wreck of skin and bones; they looked like the remains of a black hole, something 
that had once burned brightly and then collapsed in on itself. (37-8) 
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Here we see how ekphrasis tends to unleash dematerializing forces that would reduce the 
object of study to merely a subject of representation. In a figurative sense, the trope that 
is most prominent on the first reading of this passage is the unlikely allusion to 
consumption. The penises appear to have had “a bite taken out” that reveals “a jam-filled 
center”; the labias are covered in various “crusts,” while the breasts are “morsels” that 
have been “nibbled.” Kincaid evokes not only gustatory overtones but explicitly 
pleasurable ones, as the creature biting and nibbling is imagined as “an animal in a state 
of high enjoyment,” even “maximum pleasure.” This describes not the aesthetic pleasure 
of an encounter with the sublime, but unhurried digestive pleasure yoked to images of 
destruction and decay. The close-up photographs of genitals in the first half of the 
passage, represented as baked goods in varying stages of edibility, are contrasted directly 
with the emaciated bodies in the second half of the passage, emphasizing the irony that 
the same bodily figures, emaciated by disease rather than starvation, would be the owners 
of the veritable bakery of diseased genitalia. In contrast to the penises, breasts and labias, 
the bodies in entire appear as the detritus of a collapsed black hole, inviting the reader to 
experience a sense of wonder and risk that complicates the experience of aesthetic 
pleasure with overtones of fear or danger. 
Though this ekphrastic moment allows aestheticization—and its cathartic 
subsuming of horror to pleasure—full sway, the text unsettles these forces in its 
movement between ekphrasis of photographs of bodies and the text’s ekphrasis of bodies 
themselves. This fluctuation from ekphrasis of photographs to ekphrasis of bodies, most 
frequently the body of Devon Drew, allows the reader to grapple along with Kincaid with 
alternative forces that complicate this aestheticization via a repeated, enforced return to 
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the body that underlies the representation. As moments of ekphrasis come to consist of 
apprehension rather than representation, we as readers are insistently returned to the 
“real” body even as we register over and over again the relationship of copy to copy 
underlying the ekphrastic encounter. 
Although generally overlooked by reviewers and critics, ekphrasis is crucial to the 
project of My Brother’s inappropriate realism, in that it is a formal device that insists we 
attend to the “outside” of the narrative’s sustained reality in the form of an image. As a 
genre or situation that intrinsically—though not always explicitly—involves the reader in 
a triangular relation with the speaker-seer and the visually represented “art object,” 
ekphrasis makes manifest the complex relations at work in the narrative of My Brother by 
registering the components necessary to sustain the illusion of reality. This triangular 
relation necessarily intrudes another element into the realist compact between reader and 
author/narrator, disrupting the relationship through which fictional disbelief is suspended 
and the world of the novel establishes its credentials of realness. Further, what Brian 
Glavey has identified as the dual mimesis of ekphrasis—its status as an overt copy of a 
copy—reintroduces the question of representation and brings the literary text’s status as 
representation to the forefront.46 Thus, in moments of ekphrasis, realism as a mode is 
revealed for what it is: an attempt, always already a failure, to make representation appear 
as reality. 
My Brother’s repeated inclusion of a situation inherently at odds with the realist 
mode in and through which this literary text operates is this chapter’s first example of 
inappropriate form. As I depict below, Kincaid’s deployment of ekphrastic realism 
becomes one example of the way U.S. ethnic literature can turn to the realist mode to 
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register literariness and maintain aesthetic possibility without sidestepping political 
critique. Just as Kincaid’s inappropriate ekphrasis becomes, on a textual level, a way to 
rematerialize the properties of the diseased body and bring speaker-seer and body-as-
aesthetic object closer, so the text’s use of inappropriate form suggests that an ideological 
alternative to the dematerializing forces of neoliberalism might arise from literary 
realism’s particular status as representation distinct from the real that nonetheless returns 
us to the realm of the political. At the same time, the fact that lay and professional readers 
generally miss this element of My Brother identifies the limits of inappropriate form to 
redistribute sensibility, reinforcing that literary form alone is insufficient to transform the 
political. 
Theorizations of modes of looking from queer studies and disability studies help 
illuminate the relationship My Brother registers between looking and legibility, 
representation and materiality. Articulating a formal intervention he terms “queer 
ekphrasis,” Brian Glavey considers the ways the ekphrastic situation between art object, 
speaker-seer and reader complicates modes of visibility, identification, and desire. He 
writes against the vein of ekphrastic criticism (most notably W.J.T. Mitchell’s Picture 
Theory) that understands ekphrasis as an autonomous, colonizing gesture that 
subordinates the visual to the verbal. Glavey posits instead that ekphrasis is “a form that 
emphasizes the impossibility of coherence and identity even as it testifies to the power of 
their appeal.”47 The gaze of the queer ekphrastic situation does not seek to master, 
control, or classify; it displays the body of the aesthetic object/subject while enabling this 
body to maintain its difference from the apprehending audience. In a similar fashion, 
Rosemarie Garland-Thomson’s work on acts of looking distinguishes between the stare, 
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which is motivated by astonishment, and the gaze motivated by desire. She argues that 
“[s]taring offers an occasion to rethink the status quo. Who we are can shift into focus by 
staring at who we think we are not.”48 
The inappropriate ekphrasis I trace here functions in similar ways, becoming a 
mode of approach to difference that allows for the maintenance of difference, all the 
while creating the conditions for a relation of closeness that might avoid the colonizing 
collapse of art object into speaker-seer.49 Jumping scale to the regime of the political, this 
expansion of conceptions of identity functions similarly on a public, social level, 
Garland-Thomson suggests, in that “when people with stareable bodies . . . enter the 
public eye . . . their public presence can expand the range of the bodies we expect to see 
and broaden the terrain where we expect to see such bodies.”50 In other words, the act of 
staring and in fact “starees” who invite the stare disrupt the distribution of the sensible 
with regard to the regulation of bodies. In the context of My Brother’s realist mode, 
inappropriate ekphrasis makes visible the distribution of the sensible that, under 
neoliberalism, structures and regulates what can be designated as the proper relation 
between representation and what we understand as “real.” 
My Brother is a literary work about acts of looking, and inappropriate ekphrasis, 
the verbal representation of visual apprehension, characterizes many of Kincaid’s 
interactions with her brother in this text. The novel-memoir invites this understanding of 
ekphrasis in that Kincaid explicitly aestheticizes the body of her brother in an extended 
description of Devon Drew’s body at the end of Part One—a description that returns the 
reader to the scene described in the memoir’s opening lines, when Kincaid first sees him 
in the hospital. The passage at the end of Part One activates and denies the reader’s 
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expectations of ekphrasis by imagining her brother’s physical appearance in aesthetic 
terms. Observing his face and body on that first day in Holberton Hospital, Kincaid notes 
that “his lips were scarlet red, as if layers and layers of skin had been removed and only 
one last layer remained, holding in place the dangerous fluid that was his blood” (83). 
This reference to the danger of his disease evolves into overt aestheticization of his sickly 
face, which “was sharp like a carving, like an image embossed on an emblem, a face full 
of deep suffering, beyond regrets or pleadings for a second chance,” the face “of someone 
who had lived in extremes, sometimes a saint, sometimes a sinner” (83). In the last 
glimpse of Devon Drew before the narrator opens Part Two with the abrupt 
announcement of his death, Kincaid complicates the conventions of ekphrasis by 
descriptively transforming a diseased body into an aesthetic object: a carving, an 
embossed image. In doing so, she registers the danger of aestheticization inherent to all 
ekphrastic encounters. At the same time, she reinforces the legitimacy of dwelling upon 
the body wracked by disease as a moment of insight into the relation between self and 
other. 
Modes of looking such as ekphrasis are complicated and at times inadequate ways 
of engaging with subjectivity. Glavey argues that ekphrasis critiques the conditions of 
public representation in its suggestion that minoritized figures “need to see [themselves] 
represented” but that “such figurations are always disfiguring.”51 But Garland-Thomson’s 
formulation allows for increased agency for those figures she terms “starees,” the 
recipients of the stare, by arguing that “staring is a conduit to knowledge. Stares are 
urgent efforts to make the unknown known, to render legible something that seems at 
first glance incomprehensible. In this way, staring becomes a starer’s quest to know and a 
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staree’s opportunity to be known.”52 In fact, Garland-Thomson argues, looking away 
from a stare is not actually a mark of propriety or respect but a form of non-recognition—
“an active denial of acknowledgment” and a surrender to the impulse to re-stabilize the 
world that attends each instance of “inexplicable sight.”53 Kincaid’s prolonged dwelling 
on the diseased body of her brother, understood in these terms, demands that the reader 
grapple with the feeling of being unsettled. It does not distance us from the object/subject 
being represented but rather brings us closer. In this sense, then, inappropriate ekphrasis 
functions as a form of staring that disrupts the processes of normativization endemic to 
neoliberalism. Insistent and relentless toward the reader, yet oriented and even generous 
toward the object of representation, inappropriate ekphrasis creates an epistemological 
and ontological space in which difference and likeness coexist. 
We see how My Brother is not satisfied with conventional ekphrastic recourse to 
object-as-art most explicitly in a scene, reminiscent of Ramsay’s slides in its careful 
catalog of the symptoms of disease written on the body, that establishes a crucial 
intratextual contrast between photograph and live encounter. The passage begins with 
Kincaid’s silent gazing upon the body of her brother, a gaze that continues for “a long 
time” before he notes her presence (90). Immediately, he “threw the sheets away from 
himself, tore his pajama bottoms away from his waist, revealing his penis, and then he 
grabbed his penis and held it up” (91). Such action essentially frames the diseased 
member with his hands as separate from the larger figure of his body, a gesture that re-
enacts the slideshow’s separated exhibition, first of disease in part (genitals alone, 
disembodied) and then in its entirety (the emaciated bodies). The description of his penis 
extends Kincaid’s figurative language about the ravages of AIDS, combining edible 
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metaphors with garden imagery: “his penis looked like a bruised flower that had been cut 
short on the stem; it was covered with sores and on the sores was a white substance, 
almost creamy, almost floury, a fungus” (91). Ramsay’s slides are referenced in the 
“creamy,” “floury” nature of the fungus, while the description of the penis as a “bruised 
flower” connects this image to the novel’s repeated correlations of Devon with the 
garden. In addition to being diseased, Devon’s body-as-art-object is portrayed as being 
deformed, “cut short,” as if the painting of his body has been defaced by AIDS. 
A brief foray into Kincaid’s writing on gardens showcases her reliance on the 
naturalized image as a method for working through the relationship between 
representation and the real. Writing of the Botanical Museum at Harvard in 1999’s My 
Garden (Book):, Kincaid describes specimens of blown glass on display there: “These 
fruits and flowers, decaying or unblemished, are all beautiful, and, as is the way of 
likenesses, seem more representative of the real than do the things that they are meant to 
resemble” (79). Here representation achieves greater “realness,” in flower and in decay, 
than the “real” specimens of fruit and flowers. Yet two pages later Kincaid offers an 
example that suggests representation might, in fact, be a conduit to the real. Reading a 
descriptive text on roses, Kincaid writes, “I’ve found when I’m reading this book a copy 
of the Pickering Nurseries catalogue . . . is good company. Sometimes [the] description is 
so tempting . . . that I want to have the rose being described” (81). Here a causal 
relationship is suggested between an encounter with representation and the subsequent 
awakening of desire for the real. 
In her last visit to Antigua while her brother lives, Kincaid reinforces the complex 
relations of nearness and distance that characterize their relationship and are evident in 
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her ekphrastic project. Kincaid situates herself as “looking at him through the louvered 
windows,” an action that results in greater acknowledgment of the fraught connection 
between speaker-seer and art object: “I began to distance myself from him,” she writes, “I 
began to feel I didn’t like being so tied up with his life” (90). But Devon’s death in the 
second half of the text does not, in fact, enact this distance, but rather collapses it even 
further. The memoir’s final ekphrasis of a diseased body comes as Kincaid looks upon 
dual presentations of his dead body. Having requested that the undertaker refrain from 
cosmetic modifications to the corpse until she views it, Kincaid confronts her brother’s 
body “in a plastic bag with a zipper running the length of its front and middle . . . a 
plastic bag like the ones given to customers when they buy an expensive suit” (178). The 
zipper undone, Kincaid encounters the corpse: “He looked as if he had been deliberately 
drained of all fluids”—the same “dangerous” fluids of an earlier ekphrastic passage—“as 
if his flesh had been liquefied and that, too, drained out. He did not look like my brother, 
he did not look like the body of my brother . . . His hair was uncombed, his face 
unshaven, his eyes were wide-open, and his mouth wide-open, too” (178-9). At the 
funeral, the body in the coffin bears little resemblance to the corpse from the zippered 
bag, for Devon’s “hair was nicely combed and dyed black . . . his lips were clamped 
tightly together and they made a shape that did not amount to his mouth as I had known 
it; and his eyes had been sewn shut, sewn shut” (180-1). In both instances, the food and 
flower imagery is no longer present; presumably in death the baked goods have been 
completely consumed, the blooms fully decayed. Here the body has been aestheticized in 
a different, funereal sense: prepared for viewing and properly “made up” to resemble life. 
But the very process intended to manufacture this resemblance in fact underscores the 
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difference from life: the clamping of his mouth has produced “a shape that did not 
amount to his mouth” as Kincaid would recognize it. Thus, this scene conceives of 
aestheticization and naturalization as mutually exclusive forces. 
Kincaid’s desired distance from the body of her brother, articulated in other 
passages, has been fully achieved in this moment: his hair is “styled in a way [she] had 
never seen it styled,” his eyes “closed, shut, sealed, like an envelope, not a vault,” his 
body “delicate, fragile-seeming, all bones, finally stilled”—ultimately, “his farawayness 
so complete, so final” (190). Elizabeth Loizeaux has argued that the power and 
complexity of ekphrasis lies in the tension between “disciplined looking” and “the 
distance available . . . [that] may make it possible to look on suffering and not succumb to 
despair.”54 Most of My Brother, I suggest, works inappropriately to subtend the 
possibility of such “disciplined looking” in favor of undisciplined looking—the stare that 
makes visible and disrupts our bodily distribution of the sensible; the garden imagery that 
re-naturalizes a body wracked by disease; the de-privileging of representation and 
paradoxical insistence on what lies beyond the representational event. Yet here something 
different seems to be happening. The suspension between distance and nearness in the 
passage and the unresolved state of the ekphrastic moment is figured here in terms of 
words: face to face with her brother’s corpse, Kincaid concludes that “he shall never 
speak again; he shall never speak again in the everyday way that I speak of speech” 
(190). This passage again differentiates between Kincaid and Devon, noting the different 
meanings “speech” holds for each of them, now that he is dead—a differentiation that 
reinforces the text’s tension between recognition and misrecognition of self and other. 
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In its unexpected and embodied route to the experience of an aesthetic state—
which Rancière defines as that “pure instance of suspension, a moment when form is 
experienced for itself” and “the moment of the formation of a specific type of 
humanity”55—My Brother harnesses the power of the ekphrastic situation to make visible 
in literature the gaps and elisions of minoritized subjects at the level of political 
economy. Kincaid’s often quoted negotiation of the delicate balance between recognition 
and misrecognition comes after the revelation of Devon’s secret life: “His homosexuality 
is one thing, and my becoming a writer is another altogether, but this truth is not lost to 
me: I could not have become a writer while living among the people I know best” (162). 
This observation connects their respective life trajectories while seeking to maintain 
sufficient distance. Her identification with Devon as living an untenable life in Antigua is 
slightly revised a few pages later, as she sets the details of their lives side by side to assert 
that “his life is the one I shall not have, the life that, for reasons I hope shall never be too 
clear to me, I avoided or escaped. Not his fate, for I, too, shall die, only his life” (176). 
Here Kincaid finds relief in the limits of her own abilities of recognition, recording her 
hope that the reasons for her life’s trajectory “shall never be too clear,” a gesture to the 
fearful knowledge and ethical imperatives that often accompany a correct reading. The 
role of our Kincaidian narrator as privileged migrant is frequently referenced in the 
text—her early desire to write, her belief in writing as a kind of self-salvation (“I became 
a writer out of desperation” (195)), her conflicted feelings of relief each time she returns 
from her brother’s bedside in Antigua to the comforts of home and family waiting in 
Vermont. As Sangeeta Ray has noted, the titular character of My Brother does not occupy 
the center of this narrative because “even as the narrator vividly describes the vicissitudes 
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of the deteriorating diseased body, the suffering of the AIDS-ridden body gets written 
over by the body of the healthy heterosexual woman who is so glad to have escaped the 
possibility of this fate through migration.”56 Yet I would argue that the ekphrastic 
moments already identified present exceptions to this characterization. In Kincaid’s 
purposeful dwelling upon of the body of her brother and the constructing of a triangular 
relation between his body, herself as narrator, and her reader, the materialization of the 
AIDS-ridden body is, if not fully enacted, at least suggestively posited. 
Ultimately, though, Kincaid is confronted by her failure to adequately read her 
brother’s body in a climactic scene that takes place, ironically, at Kincaid’s first book 
reading following Devon’s death. A familiar-looking woman approaches her, and she 
realizes that this woman attended the same Ramsay lecture where Kincaid first viewed 
the photographic slides. In the presence of this near-stranger, she recalls “that whole 
afternoon of the AIDS support group listening to Dr. Ramsey and viewing his display of 
slides depicting all sorts of stages of sexually transmitted diseases with all the sexual 
organs looking so decayed the viewer could almost smell the decay just by looking at 
them” (158). This strategic reference re-situates the reader in the space of ekphrasis, 
where knowledge is questioned, where the certainty Kincaid attributes to Antiguans and 
shares with them is revealed as a failure to recognize. The woman tells Kincaid that she 
provided a space for homosexual men to gather without stigma every Sunday at her 
home, and Kincaid’s brother, “she said, was a frequent visitor to her house. She only said 
all that” (161). On the receiving end of an aesthetic education that entails a re-reading of 
the body of her brother as a closeted gay or bisexual man, Kincaid imagines his life 
“unfold[ing]” before her—but “not like a map just found, or a piece of old paper just 
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found” (162). In this unfolding, we learn only that upon this life “there was everything to 
see and there was nothing to see; in his life there had been no flowering, his life was the 
opposite of that, a flowering, his life was like the bud that sets but, instead of opening 
into a flower, turns brown and falls off at your feet” (162-3). Language of the garden here 
reminds us of the revelation of his diseased penis and its resemblance to a bruised flower 
by which Kincaid communicates the extent of his disease. More important, though, is the 
distribution of the sensible imagined in Kincaid’s claim that “there was everything to see 
and there was nothing to see.” The difficult paradox of visibility is itself mapped here. 
This phrasing suggests that this moment of recognition, situated in a revision of an earlier 
ekphrastic encounter, eradicates the boundary between visible and invisible. 
The most evocative example of the relation Kincaid theorizes between 
representative and real in her book on gardens is characterized by an obsession with what 
is available to be seen. She describes a visit to Claude Monet’s garden: 
to see these things—the wisteria, the Japanese bridge, the water lilies, the pond 
itself . . . —is to be suddenly in a whirl of feelings. For here is the real thing, the 
real material thing: wisteria, water lily, pond, Japanese bridge—in its proper 
setting, a made-up landscape in Giverny, made up by the gardener Claude Monet. 
And yet I see these scenes now because I had seen the day before in a museum . . . 
and it is the impression of them (wisteria, water lily, pond, Japanese bridge) that I 
had seen in these other ways before (the paintings in the museums, the 




Representation makes the real visible; Kincaid can only see the real because she has seen 
it represented ahead of time. More importantly, representation makes the real materialize, 
these passages suggest—in the sense that the represented elements take material form, 
and in the sense that they are made available for recognition. 
Yet even in descriptions of the interplay between paintings of gardens and 
gardens restored to “match” their painted depictions, Kincaid does not lose sight of the 
regulative power of representation. At the end of the essay on Monet’s garden, Kincaid 
acknowledges the way that the interplay of representative and real serves a disciplining 
function: “The garden that Monet made has been restored to itself, has been restored so 
that when we now look at it, there is no discrepancy, it is just the way we remember it 
(but this must be the paintings), it is just the way it should be” (130, emphasis mine). 
Memory and expectation unite here to designate a naturalized view as proper, precisely in 
the way inappropriate ekphrasis in My Brother disallows. Drawing the reader into 
triangular ekphrastic relation, moments of verbal representation of visual apprehension 
de-privilege representation’s regulatory status; as a result, the text suggestively represents 
not “the way it should be” but the way it is and, in fact, should not be. Extended staring 
as staged in inappropriate ekphrasis becomes a conduit to knowledge (to paraphrase 
Garland-Thomson) of the re-materialized body that nonetheless, maintaining its 
illegibility, resists subordination to the representative sphere, insistently attempting to 
make the neoliberal unknown known. 
Form as Epistemological Frame 
As reviews of My Brother suggest, realism is generally deemed most successful 
by popular audiences when it realizes its investment in making its form and events appear 
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natural and inevitable. For this reason and others, realism as a mode of fiction has not just 
fallen out of favor in academic circles but in the latter half of the twentieth century 
became regularly accused of inescapable ideological complicity. The litany of theorists, 
particularly poststructuralists and postcolonialists, who malign realism is long: Michel 
Foucault, who argues that realism is a bourgeois tool; Roland Barthes, who denigrates 
realism for merely recording when writing should perform; Kwame Anthony Appiah, 
who tracks realism’s inescapable enmeshment in nationalism; Pascale Casanova, who 
suggests that realism’s hegemony is most enacted in the most “impoverished” literary 
spaces; and of course Zadie Smith, who argues that realism perpetuates our 
preoccupation with an authentic, transformative self.57 The realist mode has been accused 
of impossibly retrograde investments in teleology, the middle class, the nation, and 
normativity, as critics suggest that realism naturalizes the status quo while obscuring 
operations of power—in other words, by duping the middlebrow readers who appreciate 
its clean sense of inevitability. Even a traditionalist defense of realism, Robert Anchor’s 
1983 “Realism and Ideology,” acknowledges that realism stages a tension between the 
closed world of a work of fiction and the openness of history and negotiates this tension 
“stylistically, by fulfilling expectations along unexpected lines, which the text coaxes us 
into accepting as if they had been expected.”58 Realism, critiques and defenses suggest, is 
anything but formally experimental, and anything but politically progressive. 
Jhumpa Lahiri would almost certainly agree with at least one of those charges. 
“I’m the least experimental writer,” she told Boris Kachka in an interview in the wake of 
the publication of Unaccustomed Earth (2008). Scholars and reviewers note her “lapidary 
eye for detail,” her “scrupulous realism,” and suggest that “stylistically, she doesn’t have 
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a hook.”59 Lavina Dhingra and Floyd Cheung are preoccupied with what they term the 
“easy consumability” of her work.60 Andrew Hoberek, in an introduction to a special 
issue of Twentieth Century Literature on postmodernism, credits Lahiri’s “traditional, 
highly crafted prose” with the creation of her consistent “middle class realism.”61 Like 
Kincaid, she is frequently cited for misrepresenting the political implications of the 
diasporic situations portrayed in her works and for focusing on upwardly mobile 
heterosexual (in this case, Bengali) experience to the exclusion of other minority 
populations within the U.S.62 But none of these existing studies manages to answer the 
implied question at the heart of their critique: what is gained or lost in Lahiri’s embrace 
of traditional, highly crafted realism as the formal vehicle for her stories of migration and 
diasporic experience? 
One reason Lahiri might be drawn to realism, Min Song suggests in his discussion 
of her 2003 novel The Namesake, is that experimental form no longer signifies to mark 
“serious postwar American fiction” as it once did: 
a generational shift in perspective has taken place. The cultural landscape that 
confronted an earlier cohort of pioneering high cultural postwar novelists required 
hard work to make imaginable the phenomena we have come to group under the 
capacious and aging sign of postmodernism . . . The narrative of The Namesake, 
on the other hand, can assume the pressures such phenomena have placed on the 
concept of the nation and must furthermore contend with a mainstream that has 




In other words, although the literary movement we term postmodernism has successfully 
unsettled the apparent naturalness of concepts like nation, the formal experimentation we 
tend to associate with postmodernism is no longer sufficient to productively unsettle an 
increasingly jaded or overexposed contemporary readership. This is not to say, as Song 
makes clear, that Lahiri’s works evince a naïve relation to postmodern phenomena; her 
work stages border porousness, the acceleration of life under late capitalism, and the self-
fashioning of hypermobile global citizens. But Song argues that Lahiri’s innovation lies 
in the complex self-reflexivity of her otherwise conventional realist narratives. In 
contrast, I want to suggest that it is precisely Lahiri’s inappropriate and untimely use of 
the realist mode that makes her acutely appropriate for the contemporary moment. 
Thwarting the ethnopolitical expectations that attend to her as a successful South Asian 
American writer, Lahiri deploys a representational mode often understood as the literary 
embodiment of propriety against the very arbiters of multicultural appropriateness who 
dominate public discourse about ethnic literature in the United States at the turn of the 
twenty-first century. The aesthetic investments of Lahiri’s work do not evaporate the 
need for political investment—rather, they call forth such a politics. 
Jhumpa Lahiri’s short story collection Unaccustomed Earth takes its title from 
Nathaniel Hawthorne’s Custom-House preface to The Scarlet Letter (1852), a signal that 
explicitly locates Lahiri’s text in the tradition of the American literary canon. Such a 
move suggests Lahiri’s familiarity and engagement with the distribution of the sensible 
surrounding the production of U.S. ethnic contemporary literature, including but not 
limited to the questions of genealogy and canonicity that continue to attach to works 
written from a minoritized perspective despite the emergence and proliferation of ethnic 
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studies anthologies, course offerings and scholarship in the post-Civil Rights era. In the 
passage Lahiri has chosen for her epigraph, Hawthorne’s narrator argues that “Human 
nature will not flourish, any more than a potato, if it be planted and replanted, for too 
long a series of generations, in the same worn-out soil” and expresses the hope that “My 
children . . . so far as their fortunes may be within my control, shall strike their roots into 
unaccustomed earth.” The collection includes eight stories that grapple with the second-
generation effects of migration to the United States, presenting the familial and cultural 
tensions experienced by Americanized Bengali children now grown. Many of them have 
Anglo-American spouses and children who do not speak or look Bengali, and nearly all 
of them live with a defining sense of obligation to their more traditional parents. 
While Lahiri’s realist form is recognizably conventional in many ways, I argue 
that her deployment of it is not. To elucidate this, I turn to Judith Butler’s theorization of 
epistemological frames, the structures that regulate what is made available for 
apprehension and recognition. In Frames of War, Butler seeks to isolate the 
epistemological frames that mediate our relationship to violence (especially in the context 
of war) and that determine which lives are valued as such and are thus available to be 
grieved. Her work describes the ways that this “recognizability” of life is differentially 
distributed in the contemporary era. Calling for a new “bodily ontology” that would focus 
on questions of interdependence, vulnerability, and persistence, Butler argues that the 
loss of those lives that are not deemed grievable becomes coded in the biopolitics of 
precarity as necessary to protect the “living.”64 I yoke Butler’s theory of epistemological 
frames that generate specific ontologies of the subject with Rancière’s distribution of the 
sensible to situate my theoretical analysis at the intersection of aesthetics and subject 
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formation. I do so in order to engage with contemporary debates about the value and 
visibility of minoritized figures under U.S. neoliberal multiculturalism that have taken, as 
one arena, the realm of the literary. 
This section analyzes realism’s use of frames as literary devices, epitomized in 
the final story, “Going Ashore,” as a strategy for examining realism itself as a formal 
frame. Just as Rancière’s work suggests that an established distribution of the sensible is 
vulnerable to the power of aesthetic acts which reconfigure it, so Butler emphasizes the 
vulnerability of epistemological frames to the very characteristics that constitute their 
“frameness.” These frames, Butler suggests, are operations of power that attempt “to 
delimit the sphere of appearance itself”—to determine what is made available for 
apprehension and recognition.65 These processes of delimitation and differentiation are 
fundamental to ontologies of subjectivity, in that they become “norms which, in their 
reiteration, produce and shift the terms through which subjects are recognized.”66 Frames 
are a regular device of literary realism, Lilian Furst argues in her work, and attention to 
their workings is crucial to a discursive understanding of how realism interacts with 
professional and lay readers to reinforce its illusion of realness. Drawing on the work of 
Furst and Butler, I contend that literary form itself functions as an epistemological frame, 
organizing experience and determining what is made visible, and incorporating the 
necessary conditions of its own breakdown. Further, in the context of “Going Ashore,” I 
isolate realism as an exemplary frame: one that is often hospitable to teleologies of 
progress and the recertification of the status quo but that also possesses political and 
aesthetic impropriety at the core of what we generally register as its very proper mode. 
82 
 
To attend to the frame is to attend to its parameters, which implicitly calls the 
power of the frame into question. This process reveals “that something was already 
outside, which made the very sense of the inside possible, recognizable. The frame never 
quite determines precisely what it is we see, think, recognize and apprehend. Something 
exceeds the frame that troubles our sense of reality; in other words, something occurs that 
does not conform to our established understanding of things.”67 The frame’s interior is 
only made possible by its exterior, to which it quietly but relentlessly calls attention. In 
and of itself, the frame registers its own inherent limits; these limits are compounded by 
the circulation required for the frame to do its epistemological work of making some 
things visible and occluding others. According to Butler, this circulation requires a break 
with context, as the frame leaves its originary situation and moves through space and 
time. In her formulation, the frame does not merely permit but actually necessitates such 
breakage: 
The frame breaks with itself in order to reproduce itself, and its reproduction 
becomes the site where a politically consequential break is possible. Thus, the 
frame functions normatively, but it can, depending on the specific mode of 
circulation, call certain fields of normativity into question. Such frames structure 
modes of recognition . . . but their limits and their contingency become subject to 
exposure and critical intervention as well.68 
If this is how form as an epistemological frame functions, what would it mean in this 
sense to be an inappropriate form? If we understand realism as one such frame, Butler’s 
formulation would suggest that realism’s continuing cultural traction—not, perhaps, 
within academic circles but within the U.S. literary population more broadly69—in fact 
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inappropriately holds the potential for its own “politically consequential break.” As 
realism reproduces itself, its frame is translated into new contexts. These new contexts 
reveal the frame for what it is, a limited epistemological structure, and call into question 
the very sense of inevitability of the status quo—in our case, of neoliberal 
multiculturalism—that realism is often considered to perpetuate. 
Unlike Lahiri’s previous work, the stories in Unaccustomed Earth formally 
accentuate the collection’s realist frames by moving between third-person narration, often 
of more than one viewpoint, and single-character focalization. In the first title story, 
Ruma prepares for a rare visit from her newly widowed father, gradually shifting from 
worry that he will expect an invitation to live with her to desire for him to accept such an 
offer, even as her father grows more resolutely opposed to such an arrangement. “A 
Choice of Accommodations” finds Amit negotiating what he calls the “disappearance” of 
his marriage at the wedding of a friend on the grounds of his old boarding school, while 
“Only Goodness” follows Sudha’s relationship with her brother and the way his 
alcoholism affects her marriage and young son. “Nobody’s Business” is focalized 
through Paul, a white American whose housemate, Sang, experiences romantic conflict 
with her longtime boyfriend. In the collection’s first section, only the second story, “Hell-
Heaven,” is told in the first person, as Usha describes the entry of an uncle-type figure 
into her unhappy family life and her mother’s deep-seated infatuation. 
To register the particular ways that Unaccustomed Earth foregrounds its realist 
frames in order to attend to their breakages, I turn to the last three stories in the 
collection. These stories are set aside from the preceding five as a short story cycle or 
novella with its own title: “Part Two: Hema and Kaushik.” This section represents its 
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own break with Lahiri’s past work, alternating between first and third person to present 
the relationship between Hema and Kaushik, two Bengali American children whose 
families lose touch as they grow up but who individually reconnect as adults decades 
later. “Once in a Lifetime,” narrated by Hema in first-person direct address to Kaushik, 
describes how Kaushik’s family temporarily lived in her home after returning to the U.S. 
from India following his mother’s terminal breast cancer diagnosis. In its opening line, 
the direct address is unmistakable: “I had seen you before, too many times to count, but a 
farewell that my family threw for yours, at our house in Inman Square, is when I begin to 
recall your presence in my life” (223). Hema’s story has an audience of one, and her tale 
of their mutual adolescence is filled with the “you” that formally gestures to her 
relationship with Kaushik even as the details of the narrative reinforce their connection: 
“When I was born, your parents were the only friends to visit the hospital. I was fed in 
your old high chair, pushed along the streets in your old pram” (225). The story ends with 
Kaushik’s revelation to Hema that his mother is dying of breast cancer (a secret from 
everyone else) and his family’s exit to an elaborate modernist house on the North Shore. 
“Year’s End” resumes a few years later, when Kaushik returns home from college 
for Christmas and meets his father’s new Bengali wife and her two daughters. The 
narrating “I” has clearly shifted from Hema to Kaushik, but the “you” of direct address 
appears as well—not immediately, but three times in the course of the narrative. Thinking 
back to the time after his mother’s death when acquaintances were invited to take her 
clothing, Kaushik thinks, “[t]hat is probably the last time I remember you from that 
period” (256). Later, thinking about his mother’s attachment to Christmas, Kaushik 
describes how she loved that time of year: “she spoke fondly about Cambridge, about 
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your family and the others we had left behind” (265). Finally, following an angry 
encounter with his young stepsisters, who have rifled through a sealed box containing 
photographs of his mother, Kaushik drives aimlessly north along the eastern seaboard. 
Looking through ads for Maine waterfront properties, Kaushik is reminded of his parent’s 
Massachusetts real estate search: “And it was then, wandering alone that winter up the 
coast of Maine, that I thought of you, and our weeks in your house during another winter 
five years before” (291). That time with Hema’s family, he determines, was “the last 
place that had felt like a home” (291). 
In these ways, the first two stories of the concluding novella establish a particular 
style that is both utterly realist and oddly not, as Ambreen Hai has suggested—an 
assessment that echoes Zadie Smith’s complaint against Netherland. Considering the way 
Unaccustomed Earth stages competitions between families of origin and families of 
choice, Hai argues that these two first-person narratives “provide far too much detail to 
serve as realistic voices; they are a composite of thoughts and memories, evoked perhaps 
in the unspecified present of the third story.”70 This sense of highly mediated memory in 
two otherwise conventionally realist stories is reinforced not only by the direct address 
but by the final story’s return to alternating third person—a shift that impacts the reader 
precisely because of its contrast to the first-person direct address of the preceding stories. 
For this reason, my consideration of form as an epistemological frame centers 
primarily on the collection’s final story to interrogate the ways its apparent return to a 
more conventionally realist mode in fact works to facilitate a breakdown of realism’s 
epistemological frames. “Going Ashore” begins en media res with a description of Hema, 
now an adult: “Again she’d lied about what had brought her to Rome” (294). Fleeing an 
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impending arranged marriage, Hema goes to Italy during a course release from Wellesley 
to research the Etruscans. Kaushik, we learn, had moved to Rome years earlier for a now-
departed ex-girlfriend and his career as a photojournalist. The story centers on the details 
of their brief but passionate affair, itself prompted by their mutual nostalgia for the past. 
It culminates with Kaushik’s death, confirmed by news reports but not itself represented 
in the narrative, in the Indian Ocean tsunami on December 26, 2004, that killed more than 
200,000 people. 
The other seven stories in Unaccustomed Earth together produce a textual frame 
that conditions our encounter with the final story. Preoccupations with the visual, often 
the photographic, populate earlier narratives: the postcards Ruma’s father sends her from 
abroad in “Unaccustomed Earth”; the revealing photographs in “Hell-Heaven” suggestive 
of the illicit family Usha’s mother yearns to form with Pranab Kaku; the John Van Eyck 
painting that registers the exterior forces at work on a betrothed couple and in front of 
which Sudha meets her husband-to-be; and Kaushik’s early preoccupation with the act of 
taking and developing his own photographs, his mother speculating that his darkroom is 
what death will feel like. The collection’s title, drawn from Hawthorne, indicates the 
literal and figurative role that nature plays, the question of roots that will flourish or 
wither giving way to Ruma’s father’s garden with the hydrangea meant to honor her 
deceased mother, the bullfrogs calling to one another around the pond of Amit’s former 
boarding school in “A Choice of Accommodations,” and finally the Maine landscape into 
which Kaushik forcefully buries the photographic evidence of his mother’s life that has 
been violated by his father’s new family. And because of its crucial absence from the first 
six stories, History is made prominent when it intrudes in “Going Ashore.” Each of the 
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stories that come before extract readers from the contemporary moment, unmooring them 
from historical markers or characteristics (beyond brief period details like Deborah’s 
1970s style hair that attracts Usha so much in “Hell-Heaven”). In this way, our re-
immersion into a sense of History with a representation of the 2004 tsunami signals the 
myriad discourses realism calls upon to establish its reality, even as it prompts the reader 
to recognize the ways the story’s “political present” is influenced by contemporary 
readers’ senses of experience and expectation—categories that influence the relationship 
of a narrative to its historical subject and a reader to that narrative as described by David 
Scott and discussed in greater detail in this dissertation’s fourth chapter. 
The literary framing devices in “Going Ashore” center on the activity of 
photography and the recurrence of earthquakes. Kaushik began taking photographs, we 
learn in the two earlier stories, around the time of his mother’s breast cancer diagnosis, 
but the hobby is transformed into profession in an early scene marked with an 
earthquake—one of two such scenes framed this way in “Going Ashore.” The 
retrospective narration begins straightforwardly, telling of a day during Kaushik’s travels 
with a friend through El Salvador amid civil war: 
While sitting with Espen one afternoon, eating lunch in a village outside Morazán, 
the table began to shake, dark stew spilling from bowls. By then he’d grown used 
to occasional tremors, the earth’s violence yielding a moment’s pause. They 
picked up their spoons, continued eating, but then people began exclaiming, 
running past them through the small square. He and Espen leapt up, following the 
crowd, thinking perhaps a building had fallen, but the commotion had nothing to 
do with the tremors. They turned a corner to see a young man lying in the street. 
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He’d been shot in the head, blood pouring like a slowly widening river away from 
his skull, but not a speck of blood, or even dirt, Kaushik still remembered, 
staining his tan shirt and trousers. (304) 
At first, Kaushik does not respond to the “moment’s pause” yielded by “the earth’s 
violence,” a violence that he believes to be distinct from the human violence in which the 
region is embroiled. But it is precisely this moment’s pause that enables the framing of a 
single act of violence in such a way as to differentiate it from the general milieu of fear 
and uncertainty to which Kaushik has become accustomed during his travels through 
Central America. The death of this man shot in the head is not like all the other deaths, 
precisely because it follows the earthquake. The silence produced by the tremor is 
broken, and the breaking is registered by the very fact of the silence which preceded it. 
The quake continues to frame the scene, as Kaushik’s first expectation—a collapsed 
building—is replaced by the singularity of a particular dying body; “dark stew spilling 
from bowls” becomes “blood pouring like a slowly widening river,” emphasizing the 
crucial connection between tremor and death even as Kaushik misreads these signs as the 
properties of two discrete events. 
Kaushik understands this scene and his life choices that follow as having “nothing 
to do with the tremors,” but this assessment is belied by the presence of another crucial 
earthquake in this story—a tremor that reminds him of this first moment of photographic 
witness and re-activates the emphasis on the natural world for Lahiri’s readers. Following 
the resolution of his relationship with Hema, who has refused to leave her tenured 
position at Wellesley to accompany him to Hong Kong, Kaushik retreats to a beachfront 
resort in Thailand and casually befriends a Swedish television editor vacationing with his 
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wife and young children. The next day, it is Henrik who informs Kaushik of the story’s 
second tremor, asking “You felt your bed shake this morning?” before telling him, with 
the brevity that characterizes Henrik’s dialogue, “They said in the hotel, a small 
earthquake . . . Over now” (329). This scene correlates to the representation of the first 
earthquake in certain ways, particularly the story’s marked attention to the fact of the 
event. In each case, a participant describes the event in the first person; in each case the 
tremor registers in the space of the quotidian, shaking a bowl of stew and a bed. Yet the 
detailed description of the first tremor becomes here an event in absentia: Kaushik has 
slept through the tremor, and is informed about it only by a second party. It happens off-
screen, so to speak, preparing the reader for the way Kaushik’s death in the tsunami 
generated by the quake will go similarly unrepresented. 
The next paragraph indicates the continuing presence of the tremor frame: 
“Whatever had happened, Kaushik had slept through it. He thought back to the day in El 
Salvador when he’d taken his first real picture, and the tremor that had come just before: 
the stew spilling from its bowls, the young man in impeccably clean tan trousers lying in 
a pool of blood on the street” (329). We come to realize that the momentous day in El 
Salvador is not, in fact, significant in Kaushik’s memory because of the quake or the 
death, though these are the events that mark it for Lahiri’s reader. Such events happened, 
in Kaushik’s then-present, on a regular basis. The reason the day is significant for 
Kaushik is because that was the day he snapped his first “real” photograph. Once again, 
Kaushik’s presence at the epicenter of significant events is coupled with his 
obliviousness; whereas before he continued to eat his stew and then downplayed the 
connection between the quake and the young man’s death, here he actually sleeps through 
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the event that he casually designates (indicating distrust for Henrik’s account or perhaps 
just a lack of interest entirely) as “whatever had happened.” 
Furst’s discussion of the narrative strategies realism employs to sustain its illusion 
of reality identifies framing as the most significant because of its role as container and 
bridge: drawing limits between reality and representation, the frame concomitantly 
invites the reader to cross from the former to the latter and then to forget such a crossing. 
In Furst’s analysis, the frame is formed by narrator and reader pretending together; it is 
“the fundamental fictional truth the text has to generate.”71 Certain key components of 
the formation of the frame as literary device include narratorial voice, the establishment 
or abdication of knowledge authority, and intertextuality, as references to other works 
provide a framing mythos to guide readerly interpretation. In essence, the frame 
“produces a concord, a contract, by adumbrating a set of agreements not only about the 
happenings in the narrative, but also about appropriate modes of interpretation.”72 And 
yet, while the frame as literary device delimits appropriate modes of interpretation, the 
frame as epistemology calls attention to the ways these proper modes must exclude 
certain elements in order to sufficiently sustain the illusion of their own inevitability. 
Our understanding of Unaccustomed Earth benefits from analysis via Butler’s 
frames of war on several registers, a fact reinforced by Kaushik’s profession as an 
international photojournalist. This detail suggests his status as the appropriate 
multicultural subject described by Melamed. He is a world traveler, at ease in many 
cultural spaces and without ties to a permanent home: “For most of the past five years, 
Rome had simply been a place from which to get where he needed to go” (302). In fact, 
Kaushik is a global economic subject who enables the flow of news around the world. 
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The closest he comes to recognizing his status is when he admits, in one brief moment, 
that “he knew that in his own way, with his camera, he was dependent on the material 
world, stealing from it, hoarding it, unwilling to let it go” (309). Here we see that 
Kaushik is the primary beneficiary of this relation, though in later moments he will 
instead emphasize the value of his acts in countering state-sponsored violence. 
The short story’s presentation of his professional accomplishments departs from a 
model minority presentation of meritocratic ascension, as it foregrounds not Kaushik’s 
work ethic but rather the way he stumbles upon his profession accidentally. After that 
first tremor, it is his friend Espen, a journalist with whom he has “watched air force 
planes dropping bombs at night,” who tells Kaushik—up to this moment an amateur—to 
take a photograph. Because “he did not have a long lens with him”—in other words, 
because he was not prepared to document such an event—“[he] had to get in close” 
(304). This closeness breeds distance, however; though he remembers his hands shaking, 
“otherwise he felt untouched by the situation, unmoved once he was behind the camera” 
(305). 
From the two stories that precede “Going Ashore,” readers recognize that much of 
Kaushik’s photographic detachment stems from the melancholic fear surrounding his 
mother’s early death from breast cancer and what he perceives as his father’s replacement 
of her with a new, more traditional family. At a young age, it was the distance provided 
by his photographic pursuits that gave him a ready alibi for escape, first from Hema’s 
home in which his mother was secretly, claustrophobically ill, and later from the 
impersonal modernist house in which she dies. But in the scene of the tremor Kaushik 
also functions as the perfect pluralist multicultural subject—close enough to witness the 
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“truth” of this death, he nonetheless occupies the position of elite observer.73 And his 
position leads to a sense of satisfaction: he is deeply aware of his status as “the only 
person to document what had happened,” and “though he had not saved the man’s life 
he’d felt useful, aware that he had done something to mitigate the crime” (305). Whatever 
Lahiri’s politics (or lack thereof), this representation of Kaushik invites critique of the 
multicultural subject whose position as witness enables the continuation of global 
neoliberalism’s requisite violence. The circuits of news and money continue unabated—
Kaushik only knows his photographs have been printed when he receives “a small check, 
and then, when the photo was picked up by a European newsmagazine, a larger one” 
(305)—and the acts of witnessing and documentation become invested, in Kaushik’s 
mind, with sufficient political significance such that no greater intervention is required. 
This episode is suggestive of the way neoliberalism can co-opt aesthetics to ensure its 
functioning remains undisturbed. Because Kaushik is present to record, the implication is 
that those who view his photograph can satisfy themselves that they have acted 
adequately against violence through the act of witnessing alone. Aesthetics becomes 
sufficiently political, such that it replaces the need for political action, even as the 
violence is safely framed within the bounds of the photograph and set apart from “real 
life.”74 
But the reader’s attention is drawn by the form of Lahiri’s story to note the 
insufficiency of Kaushik’s own framing gesture as the violence he first captures on the 
day of the tremor finds fulfillment in a litany of subsequent (and progressively more 
violent) assignments: he goes on to photograph “bodies with faces smashed and throats 
slit and penises hacked from between their legs,” and eventually can “no longer 
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remember all the corpses he’d photographed, their faces bloated, their mouths stuffed 
with dirt, their vacant eyes reflecting the passing clouds over their heads” (305). 
Reference to the dirt in their mouths and clouds in their eyes suggestively affiliates the 
fates of these bodies with natural acts, implicitly attributing their deaths to a violence that 
is both political and, in a limited sense, natural. Violence has not been contained by the 
photographic frame, the literary frame suggests. The realism of Kaushik’s story requires 
the escalation of violence that would reflect the work of a wartime journalist at the 
beginning of the twenty-first century—and in this way Lahiri’s literary realism also 
suggests that to photograph a scene of violence does not in fact impact or prevent future 
violence. 
The end of “Going Ashore” continues to register the presence of discursive 
frames, this time by overtly exceeding the story’s primary one. Following a paratextual 
icon on the page (shaped like a fan, or a leaf), the coda to this story breaks with the third-
person omniscient voice of the preceding section. We shift, in the final two pages, to 
first-person direct address—the “I” speaking to a “you” that characterizes the first two 
stories in the Hema-Kaushik trilogy, themselves the most formally experimental of any of 
Lahiri’s published work to date. What is the effect of this direct address that breaks the 
realist frame? Kaushik’s section has ended just lines before, with a scene in which he 
overcomes his fears of the ocean and lowers himself into a sea “as warm and welcoming 
as a bath. His feet touched the bottom, and so he let go” (331). In fact, then, this break 
with the frame marks Kaushik’s death—a death the story leaves conspicuously 
unrepresented, in contrast to the gruesome deaths Kaushik has framed, recorded and 
disseminated via his photographs. Kaushik cannot frame the final tremor’s violent 
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aftermath; he is, in fact, its victim.75 And so the story suggests that violence—whether 
“natural” or political—will inevitably escape its frame and encompass those citizens who 
believe themselves secure as witnesses, protected by aesthetic mediation from the 
violence produced as a necessary condition of neoliberal multiculturalism. Caught 
sleeping, Kaushik cannot witness, cannot frame, cannot separate this violence’s effects 
from its causes. 
So, how is realism the appropriate inappropriate form in which to stage this crisis 
of representation? The first tremor becomes inextricable from political violence through 
its timing—the bowls of stew transformed into blood on the streets. While the second 
scene of violence, the off-screen tsunami, might appear at first as “natural,” the first 
tremor scene (which includes the shooting of the man in tan clothes) has taught us to 
question such distinctions between natural and political. In “Going Ashore,” natural 
violence and political violence seem yoked. The “real” here is, overtly, a historical 
tsunami, but the representation of the real (the realist story) is the vehicle that allows the 
tsunami to be framed not as neutral history but as political event, one of many forms of 
violence required for the expansion and sustenance of global neoliberalism. The reach of 
such violence is wide: it extends from South America to Rome to Thailand and India and 
(presumably, along with Hema and her new husband) back to the United States. 
Hema’s reaction to Kaushik’s death underscores what this text hopes to inspire in 
the reader: it is the possible as actual within the realist mode. For this reason, the final 
section—Hema’s first-person response to Kaushik’s death—merits close attention. It 
begins with an indictment that seems, in the context of this study, to extend to privileged 
populations in general: “All day I was oblivious” (331). Caught up in the economic 
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exchange at the heart of wedding preparations, Hema only thinks of Kaushik in the 
moments fear flares up and she questions whether she has chosen the wrong man, the 
wrong future. Returning to her parents’ apartment, she is notified that “a terrible thing has 
happened” and settles down to coverage of the tsunami “in a pink sitting room with stark 
fluorescent light” that foregrounds the act of watching as much as the scene represented 
on television: “I saw images of the Indian and Sri Lankan coastline, glimpses from 
vacationers’ video cameras never intended to capture such a thing. I saw a massive surge 
of water moving so quickly that the tape seemed to be playing at an unnatural speed” 
(332). Hema continues her media binge, buying newspapers to search for Kaushik’s 
photo credit and checking his website for updates that never post. Eventually, though, 
Hema’s everyday life intrudes into this moment of witnessing, as everyday life always 
does, separating her from violence and its victims: “Navin pulled me away from you, as 
the final gust of autumn wind pulls the last leaves from the trees. We were married, we 
were blessed, my hand was placed on top of his, and the ends of our clothing were 
knotted together. I felt the weight of each ritual, felt the ground once more underfoot” 
(332). No longer tremoring, the ground below her—the ground that solaced Kaushik on 
his first foray into the ocean in years—provides a firm footing. But there is some 
indication that Hema’s “return . . . to [her] existence” is not complete. Before formal 
confirmation is available, Hema turns to her body to register Kaushik’s loss: “A small 
obituary ran in The New York Times. By then I needed no proof of your absence from the 
world; I felt it as plainly and implacably as the cells that were gathering and shaping 
themselves in my body” (333). Pregnant not with Kaushik’s child (“We had been careful, 
and you had left nothing behind”) but with her husband Navin’s, Hema nonetheless 
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experiences Kaushik’s loss unmediated and (un)materialized—a growing fetus that both 
exists and reinforces the end of Kaushik’s existence. 
One might argue that Kaushik’s off-screen death is in actuality just a re-
establishment of the realness of realism: his death cannot be appropriately narrated, and 
so the suspension of disbelief for which realism strives can only be sustained by an 
implied drowning in a historically situated tsunami. But the story’s unlikely coda 
demonstrates that Kaushik’s death is represented to others on the stage of international 
media, in the end of his picture bylines and website updates, and finally confirmation in 
the Times obituary, all of which Hema tracks from India as she prepares for her wedding. 
It would seem, then, that the short story itself precludes the representation of Kaushik’s 
death: such a representation would re-enact the problematic distancing whereby Kaushik 
creates a framed representation of violence and then his viewers witness that violence 
safely ensconced in their privileged lives. Because Kaushik’s death is not represented, we 
cannot “witness” via literature and be satisfied that this is all that is required of us. 
Instead, we observe as another figure (Hema) witnesses it secondhand. What is 
transmitted instead of aesthetic satisfaction is an ontological and epistemological 
dissatisfaction with this process of political engagement. 
Conclusion 
Both My Brother and “Going Ashore” (as well as Unaccustomed Earth more 
broadly) turn to the visual to interrogate the limits of realist representation. My Brother 
generates an ekphrastic mode that interpellates the reader as a third participant in the 
apprehension of otherness, while “Going Ashore” ultimately denies us the solace of 
witnessing to prevent us from being satisfied with an aestheticized representation of 
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violence. Both these works stage these interventions from a realist mode, suggesting how 
a genre defined by its frames is the appropriate inappropriate space to register the 
presence of framing devices in all literary productions. 
If, as I have argued, inappropriate forms resist the “truth effects” necessary to 
sustain neoliberal multiculturalism, then how does inappropriate realism function 
instead? Daniel Kim’s analysis of another contemporary U.S. ethnic literary work 
considers “the demands of the realist mode” to suggest one possibility: that even 
representation of a failed utopian political vision might still engender in its readers the 
longing for an alternative politics.76 Reading Kim’s analysis of the failed political vision 
fictionalized in Chang-rae Lee’s Native Speaker (1995), I posit that it is precisely at the 
moment of such failure that Lee’s novel resists the truth effects demanded in neoliberal 
multiculturalism. If the multicultural coalition sought by the novel’s primary political 
figure were successful, the ideological construction necessary to neoliberal 
multiculturalism would reach literary culmination. Instead, what is produced is not 
information about difference, or the authority to manage difference, or a vision of 
difference assimilated, but rather a reaction in an entirely different mode: the affective. 
As Kim argues, “if this work of literary representation fails in the end to satisfy the 
political longing that it seeks to engender, this shortcoming does not mean that the 
longing itself . . . is buried along with the fictional campaign of a fictional figure . . . 
What is most to be valued . . . then, is not the politics that it as a novel could never give 
us anyway but the politics that it might make us want.”77 Rather than embodying the 
triumph of a post-racial United States, such a novel, in the very fact of its failure, might 
enable or inspire us to desire differently. This conception of failure is taken up again in 
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chapter four, where I investigate the act of forgetting and consider how such failures of 
memory are required by what we understand as History. For the purposes of this 
discussion, what matters is that a desire engendered by failure does not prompt the 
literary text to become a mode of authorization, because the politics as imagined by Lee 
are such that “a novel could never give us anyway,” because politics cannot find their 
ends in aesthetics. But the affective engendering of desire—always still conditional, as 
signaled by Kim’s “might”—redefines the relationship between politics and aesthetics in 
a configuration that opposes the co-optation of literature as antiracist technology. 
Such a project of inciting readers to desire differently is the project of 
inappropriate forms. In My Brother, inappropriate form produces through ekphrasis a re-
naturalized and eventually re-materialized body available for recognition and legibility 
under global multiculturalism. In “Going Ashore,” the authority to manage representation 
is contravened by relentless attention to the epistemological work of framing and the 
ideological ramifications of the frame’s breakdown. Both these works appeal to the 
interplay between literature and visual culture—ekphrasis, photography—to foreground 
modes of apprehension and recognition that break away from propriety’s hegemonic 
necessities. 
One resistant vector to the program of literary studies as currently practiced 
within U.S. universities might be the description of literariness offered by Rancière: a 
regime of “democratic disorder” in which the distribution of the sensible is utterly 
democratized. Exploring this conception, Rancière describes politics as “the cluster of 
perceptions and practices that shape this common world . . . a way of framing, among 
sensory data, a specific sphere of experience . . . a specific intertwining of ways of being, 
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ways of doing and ways of speaking.”78 It is true that Rancière’s invocation of literature’s 
participation in the distribution of the sensible aligns in certain respects with literature’s 
participation in the neoliberal multicultural project of producing subjects fit to subjugate 
that Melamed describes. Yet Rancière is more invested in literature’s democratic 
tendencies within the aesthetic regime of the arts, when we understand democracy not as 
a state project but as a specific distribution of the sensible that “upset[s] any steady 
relationship between manners of speaking, manners of doing and manners of being.” In 
fact, literature in this context actively enables a democratized distribution of the sensible, 
and Rancière details the process by which an inappropriate audience might be born in the 
midst of “the democratic disorder of literariness,” for “literature is the art of writing that 
specifically addresses those who should not read.”79 In The Politics of Aesthetics, 
Rancière goes even further to describe the ways in which the equalities of the aesthetic 
regime ultimately create “a community of readers as a community without legitimacy” in 
the Platonic sense—“a community formed only by random circulation of the written 
word.”80 Such “uncertain communities,” he later writes, “contribute to the formation of 
political subjects that challenge the given distribution of the sensible.”81 What happens if 
we understand contemporary U.S. ethnic literatures as actively creating a “community 
without legitimacy”—a community that is unsanctioned, unauthorized, utterly 
inappropriate? Could such an inappropriate, illegitimate community of readers, expanded 
beyond the boundaries of literary studies and academic discourse—democratized and 
desiring following their individual and collective encounters with literature that deploys 
inappropriate forms—mount a challenge to the hegemony of neoliberal multiculturalism? 
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Inappropriate form seeks to establish a community without legitimacy, an 
inappropriate cadre of readers to push back against the strictures and disciplinary 
demands of neoliberal multiculturalism by rejecting propriety as an acceptable rationale 
for discipline or a compelling impulse for life. Perhaps those who should not read, less 
susceptible to the conventions and signposts by which literature has historically sought to 
imitate inevitability, might come together in a community without legitimacy to create an 
illegitimate distribution of the sensible—one that is utterly, appropriately, inappropriate. 
The next chapter takes up the case of an exceptionally inappropriate reader, the 
synesthetic protagonist of Monique Truong’s Bitter in the Mouth. Reinforcing this 
chapter’s insistent return to the body that underlies representation but shifting from an 
exploration of the visual to one of taste, chapter two analyzes the story of Linda 
Hammerick, a Vietnamese American woman with auditory-gustatory synesthesia 
growing up in the American South. In a literal as well as figurative sense, Linda reads 
and interprets her family’s secret histories, her uncertain status as a minoritized subject, 
and the difference her synesthesia makes through an embodied archive of word-taste 
correlations. Staging the conditions of contemporary subjectivity—both archive fever as 
theorized by Jacques Derrida and synesthesia as a trope for minoritization more 
broadly—the second chapter investigates the counterhegemonic possibilities of bodies 
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Chapter Two: Embodied Knowledges: Synesthesia and the Archive 
in Monique Truong’s Bitter in the Mouth 
“I asked myself what is the moment proper to the archive, if there is such a thing, the 
instant of archivization strictly speaking . . . ” – Jacques Derrida1 
 
“The dispersion of the boundaries of bodies forces a completely chaotic challenge to 
normative conventions of gender, sexuality, and race, disobeying normative conventions 
of ‘appropriate’ bodily practices and the sanctity of the able body.” – Jasbir Puar2 
 
“We are in need of archives,” Jacques Derrida writes in Archive Fever (1996).3 
This need infects subjects of twentieth-century Western modernity. The characteristics of 
archive fever are numerous: “It is to burn with a passion. It is never to rest, interminably, 
from searching for the archive right where it slips away. It is to run after the archive . . . It 
is to have a compulsive, repetitive, and nostalgic desire for the archive, an irrepressible 
desire to return to the origin, a homesickness, a nostalgia for the return to the most 
archaic place of absolute commencement.”4 In other words, symptoms of archive fever 
include the desire for that which is elusive (“right where it slips away”), as well as 
nostalgia for not just “the past” in general, but for the moment of origination, of 
beginnings. Archive fever seeks knowledge that might secure us ontologically and 
epistemologically through encounter with a kind of primary self. 
But why are we in need of archives, defined for the purposes of this study as a 
general “meaning-making system that allows for some statements to be enunciated and 
others to lack intelligibility”?5 And to sharpen this question to the scope of this study, 
what is the discursive, historical, political work of archives in the United States at the 
turn of the twenty-first century? Certainly, archives are intimately intertwined with our 
desire to locate ourselves, to make visible the residue of the past as it informs the present, 
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to make sense of legacies (historical, intellectual, affective) that intimately inform our 
sense of ourselves as subjects. Yet archives have been called into question over the past 
several decades in discourses as wide-ranging as performance, queer, feminist and 
postcolonial studies.6 Such critical work identifies the archive as a formulation by which 
the ephemeral and the personal are erased in favor of the enduring and the state-
sanctioned as the archive, in turn, bolsters such institutions as the nation-state.7 
Nevertheless, despite our legitimate suspicions of the way the archive inevitably 
facilitates the consolidation of authority and erasure of difference, we cannot leave the 
archive behind. As Derrida argues, “There is no political power without control of the 
archive, if not of memory. Effective democratization can always be measured by this 
essential criterion: the participation in and access to the archive, its constitution, and its 
interpretation.”8 In other words, the archive is at the center of that which we deem the 
political; it is a throughline to and for power, history, memory and identity. Tracing the 
emergence of “migrant archives” that “reside in obscurity” outside official spaces of 
archivization, Rodrigo Lazo argues that such archives prompt renewed attention to “how 
memory is constituted, how history is written, and how research is connected to identity” 
and the ways that “control of the archive has epistemological and political 
ramifications.”9 Like migrant archives, minoritized bodies are the bodies that resist 
representation in the conventionally dominating discourse of archives, and so they enable 
a rearticulation of archive’s primacy as a place of knowledge production. Therefore, in 
the face of the archive’s historical enabling of the contrived hegemony of official 
histories and institutionalized documentation, I argue that it is a meaning-making system 
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that nonetheless holds the potential for a revised political engagement for minoritized 
subjects. 
In his examination of archives that implicitly critique nationalism rather than 
mutually reinforce it, Lazo notes that “the archival claim, meaning the terms under which 
the archive is constructed, always threatens to become hegemonic.”10 In other words, the 
archival context into which recovered works are inevitably incorporated always also 
jeopardizes them. However, Lazo goes on to suggest that “some texts may contain a 
difference emphatic enough to prompt a reconsideration of the archive’s limits.”11 
Though Lazo’s analysis is restricted to the recuperation of historical works, his claim is 
suggestive for the terms of this study as well. Might literary representation of such 
difference, difference “emphatic enough”—or difference that “robustly appear[s],” Jodi 
Melamed’s claim for Native literature discussed in chapter four—require a renegotiation 
of what we understand as archive and the limits of that archival structure? 
This chapter considers a poststructuralist theorization of archive fever in tandem 
with manifestations of archive fever at the site of minority subject formation. I explore 
the archive as an analytic category by which to understand embodiment and subjectivity, 
and as a crucial intersection between representation and knowledge, particularly in the 
dematerializing context of the neoliberal era. Anchored by Monique Truong’s second 
novel, Bitter in the Mouth (2010), this chapter investigates narratives of minority subject 
formation within the increasingly pervasive conception of propriety in the United States. 
Analyzing the ways that subjects who are understood to be improperly embodied 
construct different epistemological relationships to their surroundings, I argue that the 
creation of improper archives—archives that catalogue highly ephemeral and subjective 
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events and experiences, and in doing so challenge expectations of content, curation and 
transmission—facilitates the inappropriate and productive epistemes of these literary 
works. Two questions drive this chapter as part of a larger study of the way propriety 
becomes established as a mode of regulation between privilege and stigma in the United 
States in the vacuum following what Howard Winant has termed the post-World War II 
“racial break.”12 First, what is propriety’s relationship to the archive, embodied here by 
the minoritized subject? And, extending these considerations of archive and embodiment 
even further into the representational realm, what is the inappropriate archive’s 
relationship to the aesthetic? 
A “proper” archive works not only to stabilize institutions like the nation-state but 
to constitute and codify the link between body and knowledge. But who or what 
designates a body, or an archive, as improper? Theorizing from the discourses of 
psychoanalysis, queer theory, and biopolitics, Judith Butler and Jasbir Puar identify the 
role of the improper body in contemporary U.S. politics and culture: to exist as the 
outside other who gives meaning, or “matter,” to appropriate (most frequently wealthy, 
white, male, hetero/homonormative) bodies. Both Butler and Puar note that these 
ostensibly externalized bodies nonetheless arise from internal constructions of the 
appropriate body, and so the disavowal of these bodies betrays the deep-seated anxiety 
that attends to structures of propriety. Disentangling the automatic association between 
materiality and the body, Butler demonstrates that what we assume to be material is 
actually constructed, and must be continually constructed, in order to materialize at all. In 
other words, the characteristics we ascribe to materiality, when the term “material” is 
meant to be synonymous with “natural,” are undermined by materiality’s status as a 
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function of discourse. The necessity of this process of “reiteration” is “a sign that 
materialization is never quite complete, that bodies never quite comply with the norms by 
which their materialization is impelled.”13 Of course, the materiality of appropriate 
subjects, and the appearance of their compliant bodies as “natural,” is dependent on the 
same repudiated bodies that threaten the self-evidence of the correlation between 
materiality and the body. Puar explicitly registers the centrality of propriety in 
constructions of bodies in her study of the post-September 11th figures of the suicide 
bomber and the tortured enemy combatant, whose bodies she argues are queer 
assemblages that serve as “barometer[s] of ab/normality involved in disciplinary 
apparatuses.”14 Defining the “improperly racialized” subject as one who exists “outside 
the norms of multiculturalism,” Puar concomitantly identifies the potential power 
adhering to improper bodies that this chapter seeks to disclose. Her gesture to a space 
outside multiculturalism prompts the question of what existence outside the norms of 
multiculturalism might entail. In describing the minority subject who must be improperly 
racialized and perversely sexualized in order to materialize in the first place, Puar’s work 
implicitly suggests that it is via inappropriateness that one might access the “outside” and 
perhaps tentatively engender an existence less governed by neoliberal multicultural 
structures and discourses. 
Monique Truong’s novel Bitter in the Mouth theorizes an understanding of the 
archive that illuminates the centrality of processes of racialization for subject formation 
and political representation in the contemporary era of neoliberal multiculturalism. This 
chapter examines this story, of a figure whose bodily difference becomes the mode by 
which a radically embodied archive is created, in order to consider ways the archive 
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enables a complex negotiation of legacies of violence, trauma, and racial formation. 
Truong’s novel expresses a fundamental impropriety between sensation and 
representation, centering minority subjects as the site upon which the inappropriate, 
inadequate link between the body and the archive as knowledge repository can be 
indexed and disentangled. 
Registering the curious correlations in the functions of race and the archive in 
U.S. culture and politics—correlations staged in Truong’s work—this chapter attempts to 
provoke a rearticulation of difference in our time. David Eng initiates this process in his 
analysis of Truong’s first novel, reading “the end(s) of race” evidenced in The Book of 
Salt (2003). Eng suggests that the novel is an “archive of traces” that registers the 
dialectic of race and freedom.15 He situates Truong’s first novel in the context of the shift 
to an ostensibly “postidentity” politics, framed in political discourse as the culmination of 
narratives of progress and the triumph of colorblindness. Eng explains, “we inhabit a 
political moment when disparities of race, not to mention gender, sexuality, and class, 
apparently no longer matter; they neither signify deep structural inequities nor mark 
profound institutional emergencies.”16 Yet, as he succinctly puts it, “race has always 
appeared as disappearing,” by which he means that postidentity conceptions of minority 
subjectivity actually reinscribe a familiar thesis. Therefore, we require a spatial and 
temporal dislocation of the ideological frames, notably U.S. exceptionalism, which 
condition contemporary understandings of race and racialization. If, with Eng, we refuse 
the erasure of such structural inequities and institutional emergencies, how do we 
interrogate the political culmination of postidentity? I propose to examine the archive as a 
figuration that, like race, always appears as disappearing, and is consequently a 
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generative locus for grappling with contemporary modes of racialization in the context of 
minority subject formation at the turn of the twenty-first century. 
The archive is distinct from memory or history. Though it shapes memory as 
fundamentally as it affects what we designate as “history,” the archive is more systematic 
and referential than memory, and differs from history in its status as that which preserves 
“across time.”17 Archival knowledge claims are based on traces which mark that which 
has been lost and metonymically signify for the lost past itself; investigating the archive 
as an epistemological mode makes visible the archive’s deceptively naturalized claims of 
stability and cultural authority. Such questions of authority and knowledge formation are 
central to Bitter in the Mouth. I use this text to investigate the link between race and the 
archive by examining the archive produced by an Asian American synesthete who tastes 
language and spends her life amassing a catalog of taste-word correlations in the hope of 
recovering memories of her childhood. Analysis of the synesthetic archive generated by 
the novel’s protagonist, Linda Hammerick, allows us to denaturalize the link between the 
body and knowledge-as-archive that characterizes the archive’s work of world-making. 
Doing so reveals the archive’s complicity in the flattening of difference necessitated in 
the structures of liberal and neoliberal multiculturalism. 
Re-invoking representations of difference in contemporary U.S. ethnic literature, 
this chapter’s conclusion argues that Linda’s inappropriateness to any archive suggests 
that she might be considered as a figure for the aesthetic itself. Russ Castronovo defines 
the aesthetic as the mode of making and doing that yokes “the divided and shifting 
ground upon which matters of beauty, perception, taste and the sublime stand” to 
“material engagements with embodiment, collectivity, and social life.”18 Jacques 
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Rancière presents a more expansive definition, theorizing aesthetics as “a mode of 
articulation between ways of doing and making, their corresponding forms of visibility, 
and possible ways of thinking about their relationships.”19 If we accept this 
formulation—that aesthetics makes difference and assesses correspondences among 
differences—then it follows that aesthetics is the mode for determining value and 
creating hierarchies, and for naturalizing those hierarchies through the creation of an 
apparently universal common sensibility. As such, aesthetics is the realm of racialization 
as well as representation. At the same time, aesthetics is a mode for challenging and 
dismantling those hierarchies, for disrupting common sense, as inappropriate texts of this 
study suggest. A figure whose body itself evades representation in the archive—even, as 
we will discover, in the archive of her own making—Linda’s demonstration of the 
archive’s limits ultimately returns us to the realm of the aesthetic, suggesting the way the 
aesthetic conditions the appearance of race in postracial national discourse and the 
potential for racialized subjectivity negotiated in aesthetic terms. 
Insufficient Archives 
Bitter in the Mouth is the story of an utterly improper subject: racially, culturally, 
regionally, and normatively. Adopted in the 1970s under mysterious circumstances by a 
white North Carolina family, Linda, we learn in a surprise revelation at the end of the 
novel’s first part, is a racialized Southern subject of Vietnamese descent. Narrating non-
chronologically in the first person, Linda presents her story retrospectively, a 
bildungsroman of her adolescence in the rural South with an aloof and secretive adoptive 
family. After the trauma of losing her biological parents in a trailer fire and being raped 
as a young teenager, Linda pursues her adoptive father’s path to law school and a legal 
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career, all the while keeping the bodily difference of her synesthetic condition a secret 
from everyone except her childhood best friend, Kelly. Her synesthesia isolates her from 
an adoptive family overly concerned with appropriate appearances and a conservative 
community that values normalcy. More significantly, the novel suggests that her 
condition fundamentally structures her epistemological relation to the world: what 
knowledge she seeks of the past, what she comes to know, and how she interprets what 
she learns are intimately conditioned by her auditory-gustatory synesthesia—by the fact 
that she tastes words. 
Formulations of propriety haunt this text and Linda’s childhood. The novel 
associates these formulations with certain characters who invoke the specter of proper 
thoughts, behaviors, and interpretations. DeAnne Hammerick, her adoptive mother, 
rejects Linda’s disclosure of her condition with the declaration that she will not accept 
“crazy” in her family. Linda’s law school textbooks privilege the figure of the 
Reasonable Man, historically used in legal discourse to determine reasonable (proper) 
action and in whom Linda recognizes the person of her adoptive father, Thomas. The 
Reasonable Man activates a legal subtext that reinforces how propriety is wrapped in 
spoken legal codes, as well as in unspoken social ones. Adult Linda’s longtime partner, 
Leo Benton, stands in for the specter of clinical diagnostics and heteronormativity, as a 
doctor and psychiatrist who medicalizes all relationships, even requiring that Linda pass a 
physical before he will commit to a formal engagement he has initiated. These three 
sectors of propriety—the social/familial, the legal, and the medical—collectively institute 
Linda’s fundamental inappropriateness as they operate to curtail the memory retrieval 
and meaning-making made possible by her synesthetic condition. 
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Through an opening series of gestures and refusals, Truong establishes the ways 
this novel seeks to undermine the implicit authority of reason, facts, and even first-person 
narration. Linda’s memory has broken down: she has no recollection of the first seven 
years of her life with her biological family or of the fatal fire. She is consumed with 
recovering these details in service of her own identity formation. Yet the novel opens by 
upending the privileged position of facts in a hierarchy of knowledge, deploying a 
metaphor to illustrate how facts are easily mishandled, whether purposefully or 
accidentally. Beginning her narrative, Linda gives us an overview of the story to come in 
grammatically simple sentences that ostensibly address the “easy things first”—“So 
factual and flat, these statements will land in between us like playing cards on a table” 
(4). The initial biographical list is comprised of ten brief sentences: “My name is Linda 
Hammerick. I grew up in Boiling Springs, North Carolina. My parents were Thomas and 
DeAnne. My best friend was named Kelly. I was my father’s tomboy. I was my mother’s 
baton twirler. I was my high school’s valedictorian. I went far away for college and law 
school. I live now in New York City. I miss my great-uncle Harper” (4). The brevity of 
these terse statements of fact suggests they are straightforward and true. Immediately, 
however, Linda refuses these simple autobiographical statements, noting that playing 
cards thrown upon a table evince “distorting overlaps”: 
I grew up in (Thomas and Kelly). My parents were (valedictorian and baton 
twirler). My best friend was named (Harper). I was my father’s (New York City). 
I was my mother’s (college and law school). I was my high school’s (tomboy). I 
went far away for (Thomas and DeAnne). I live now in (Boiling Springs). I miss 
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(Linda Hammerick). The only way to sort out the truth is to pick up the cards 
again, slowly, examining each one. (5) 
In this passage, Truong presents the structure and function of this narrative: the re-sorting 
of jumbled facts; the careful, individual consideration of small pieces of the disordered 
larger picture; the futility of any attempt at comprehensive analysis based in memory or 
self-reflection. Though Linda never explicitly acknowledges this, however, we learn in 
the course of the novel that the jumbled pile contains as many “truths” as the factual pile. 
Her father’s premature death and Kelly’s teenage pregnancy are two catalysts that initiate 
Linda into the world of adulthood—she “grows up in” and through these events. Linda’s 
best friend is her closeted transvestite uncle Baby Harper, who serves as the family’s 
archivist and first teaches Linda how photographs (and eventually archives) can be 
manipulated. Linda indeed functions as her father’s New York City, in the sense that she 
is the embodied legacy of the woman he met and fell in love with while in law school at 
Columbia University. This scene seems intended as a lesson about the necessary care that 
must accompany any attempt to uncover the truth of what appears simple biography 
(“pick up the cards again, slowly, examining each one”). But because a reader who has 
finished the novel will recognize the “truths” of the jumbled pile, the arbitrary pile of 
playing cards functions instead in the opposite way, to reinforce the role that seemingly 
coincident juxtaposition plays in registering the “facts” of any story. Though Linda offers 
what she has characterized as disrupted and illogical associations, these associations 




As we come to learn, Linda’s relation to the world is organized according to an 
element both individual and ephemeral: her synesthesia. The bitter taste of the novel’s 
title refers to the last word spoken to her by an unknown member of her biological 
family; she seeks the taste in order to identify the word, in turn in order to register a shred 
of connection to her lost family and process the trauma of their loss. Thus the mystery of 
the bitter taste resides at the core of Linda’s search for her history. It signifies both the 
word she cannot identify and the traumatic event whose details are lost to her memory. 
The synesthetic residue of the memory haunts her: it is a “mystery [with] two halves . . . 
There was something bitter in the mouth, and there was the word that triggered it” (15). 
Of the taste, which Linda associates with the bitterness of “greens that were good for us” 
or “simmering resentment” in a comparison that reinforces the affective component of 
her synesthesia, Linda reveals that she has yet to find the “corresponding flavor,” the 
“match.” But immediately she asserts that, “even if identified, [such a match] would only 
allow me the illusion of communication and you the illusion of understanding” (15). Here 
Truong forecloses any temptation her reader might feel to reach for a stable correlation 
between representation and reality, explicitly negating the possibility that any taste, or 
narrative, could accomplish what literature implicitly claims for itself: namely, the 
representation of the real by the non-real. Yet in another manifestation of the narrative’s 
anxiety about the role of “telling one’s story” in the processing of trauma, Linda’s direct 
address—“you”—functions in a mimetic, stabilizing fashion to conjure up the possibility 
of a “real” reader. Perhaps the most generative reading of this section would be to 
interpret this claim as Linda’s attempt to undermine the goal of the archive itself—the 
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“illusion of understanding” the archive facilitates in its putative claim to correlate the 
archival object and the moment, event or individual it alleges to represent. 
Truong’s novel is a narrative of a body whose condition expands our 
understanding of the functions of archive fever. Linda’s status as an improbable 
synesthete whose sense of taste is wired to the words she hears spoken aloud facilitates 
an improper relationship to knowledge, to “evidence” of trauma and to her own archive. 
Linda’s synesthetic archive attests to the intimate relationship between the archive and 
the body: the body as archive, the archive as producer of and imbricated with 
embodiment. In other words, as I elaborate below, it allows us to extend our 
understanding of the archive as producer and repository of history and memory, and thus 
of embodiment as intimately connected to the processes of history and memory as well. 
Echoing Derrida, Truong’s novel itself suggests that we are nonetheless in need of 
archives. Saturated with archives in variously recognizable and unusual instantiations, 
Bitter in the Mouth presents Linda’s catalogue of tastes as an archive situated in the 
context of countless other archives that fail to represent Linda.20 The most significant of 
these are the photographic albums of the Hammerick family compiled by Linda’s uncle, 
Baby Harper—and through which he instructs her to attend to the constructedness of 
archive and the centrality of what has been left out—and North Carolina Parade, a 
historical textbook that young Linda reads, absorbs, and uses comparatively to measure 
her own historical relevance. Of Baby Harper’s numbered photo albums, Linda writes 
that he “hid from the official history of our family. By excluding himself, he ensured that 
our history was a false one. Or, at the least, an incomplete one. He never hid that fact 
from me. My great-uncle always suggested that his photographs weren’t to be trusted . . . 
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he would tell me what I couldn’t see” (41).21 After Baby Harper sends four 
supplementary albums to Linda in Boston, she eventually realizes that not only the 
photographs but the album catalog itself is crucially lacking. These albums, which 
chronicle Baby Harper’s decades-long cross-dressing, are notably unnumbered, 
signifying their existence outside the primary, family-sanctioned catalog and ameliorating 
this sense of archival incompletion. The unnumbered albums are accompanied by several 
loose photographs of Linda’s adoptive father in New York City with her birth mother—
the only images Linda ever encounters of Mai-Dao Nguyen. Received knowledges are 
catalogued even more explicitly in the North Carolina Parade: Stories of History and 
People. Reading this textbook, Linda describes “something reassuring about having the 
history and people of your world reduced to 209 pages and a handful of drawings” but 
goes on to imagine in detail a “rest of the story” for each historical figure: Roanoke 
settlement infant Virginia Dare, the Wright Brothers, African American slave poet 
George Moses (52). History itself, defined as “what you wanted to remember,” is 
characterized as “always [having] a point of view” (52).22 
Still more smaller scale archives populate this text: the letters Linda and her best 
friend Kelly exchange from age seven onward, each assigned a number; the so-called 
“hagiography” of Dolly Parton they shamefully compile as tribute to their icon; the 
unusually catalogued personal library of Baby Harper, in which books are organized not 
by author or title or year but by what they signify for their owner (for example, “B for 
Buy another Copy as Gift”); and even the oral histories of Yale University, Linda’s alma 
mater, which counteract the university’s official narratives about endowments and 
building dedications with alternative genealogies of queer love. These archives occupy 
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this narrative, formidably indicating the centrality of evidence, histories, and memories to 
the milieu Linda negotiates as an embodied and knowledgeable subject of difference. 
But the novel insists that none of these archives is individually or collectively 
sufficient to encompass our protagonist: to incorporate, register, catalogue, and preserve 
Linda Hammerick as minoritized subject or to enable the performance or archival 
“transfer” of her subjectivity. Each archive supplements another, yet they contain gaps 
that Linda communicates and interrogates through her first person narration. In this way, 
the novel suggests the impossibility of doing away with archives altogether, despite what 
we recognize as their complicity with normative discourses of subjects and the nation. 
Truong’s work reinforces the way that the archive as an analytic category continues to 
structure the relations between knowledge and the body at the turn of the twenty-first 
century. Such operations occur within what Jacques Rancière terms “the distribution of 
the sensible,” a “system of divisions and boundaries that define, among other things, what 
is visible and audible within a particular aesthetico-political regime.”23 This distribution 
of the sensible regulates the terms of visibility and perception and creates a community of 
perceivers—the sensible—in common. Therefore it is within the archive that we must 
operate in order to make visible the imbrications of body and knowledge, itself embodied 
in and as archive. In other words, knowledge takes material form in the archive, even as 
the archive indirectly claims representation of bodies in its status as knowledge 
repository. A figure of difference, Linda creates what may be understood to be an 
improper archive because the archives proffered are not sufficient: they do not nor can 
they contain her. And so the novel invites us to ask, what is it about Linda as a 
synesthetic Asian American woman that requires another mode of memory and of 
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recorded knowledge? And in a more theoretical register, what does the form and function 
of Linda’s deeply embodied synesthetic archive reveal about the naturalized link between 
the body and knowledge in the discourse of the archive? 
Archival Modes of Witness 
A full explanation for the bitter taste of Truong’s title does not come until almost 
halfway through the novel, when Linda writes of her earliest remaining memory with 
uncharacteristic clarity: “When I was seven, I heard a word that made me taste an 
unidentifiable bitter, and I never forgot the flames cutting through the seams of a trailer 
home, the sound of footsteps on gravel, then darkness” (116). Like most of Linda’s 
memories, these exist in a sensual register: along with taste, we have touch (implied in 
the heat of the flames), sound (the footsteps), and sight (darkness). But again the certainty 
of this exposition is immediately subverted:  
The trailer on fire might not have existed. There were no photographs and no 
history, official or anecdotal. There was only my memory: coffee left too long on 
the burner, an uncoated aspirin caught in the throat, how a drop of mercury might 
taste on the tip of the tongue. I have come close to identifying that taste of bitter . 
. . As for the word that triggered it, the usual trailhead of my memories, it remains 
lost to me. (117)  
These analogies increase in import and danger: the banality of burned coffee is 
superseded by pain medication caught in the throat, preventing its efficacy, until finally 
we enter the realm of real physical harm to speculate the way mercury “might” taste. 
Together, these examples demonstrate the increasing threat of the unknown bitter taste 
and emphasize the ways this taste is tied to Linda’s well-being (or lack thereof). Linda 
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remembers the taste but cannot associate it with anything in the world of tastes she has so 
far accumulated and identified. Similarly, she cannot associate the taste with its inciting 
word, and thus unlock the mystery of exactly what was spoken to her the night she is 
rescued from the fire and transferred to the care of Thomas Hammerick and his wife 
DeAnne. 
But the first synesthetic taste encounter described in the novel, notably, is not the 
bitter taste but rather the taste of her adoptive last name. At the end of chapter one, Linda 
retreats to her dorm room and speaks a single word: “I drew out the ‘Ham,’ lingered on 
the ‘me,’ and softened the clip of the ‘rick.’ I repeated the word, and with every slow 
joining of its three syllables, the fizzy taste of sweet licorice with a mild chaser of wood 
smoke flooded my mouth. A phantom swig of Dr. Pepper” (14). This first representation 
of the experience of synesthesia introduces the fraught significance of the Hammerick 
designation for Linda’s sense of identity in the same moment that the novel discloses the 
particular nature of Linda’s condition. The taste of Dr. Pepper, forbidden by Linda’s 
mother but allowed, grudgingly, by her grandmother, reveals the disconnection between a 
word’s taste (familiar, forbidden, comforting) and its denotation, suggesting that Linda’s 
condition resists conventional methods of explication and instead creates its own 
significations. 
In this context, Linda’s synesthesia becomes what Ann Cvetkovich has termed an 
“archival mode of witness,” a method for negotiating trauma that involves the 
compilation of an often unconventional archive to acknowledge and assess trauma’s 
effects retrospectively.24 Cvetkovich’s reorganization of the archive’s parameters comes 
alongside her expansive definition of trauma, which extends Dori Laub’s famous 
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explanation of trauma as “an event without a witness”25 to theorize the various ways an 
event might lack witness. If a traumatic event is one in which “the epistemic crisis of 
trauma is such that even the survivor is not fully present for the event,” then such a 
definition negotiates a place for trauma that arises from the quotidian rather than the 
exceptional.26 Even more important for the present discussion, Cvetkovich’s description 
links trauma not to the black-and-white question of presence or absence of a witness, but 
to the complicated question of presence registered via memory. If, as I explicate in 
chapter four, memory is the mode by which history is accessed, then the trauma 
survivor’s lack of full “presence” in the moment of the traumatic event implies a 
disjuncture between the details of the event in and of itself and how this event will be 
stored in the survivor’s personal history, as is the case, most notably, with the trailer fire. 
The traumas Linda experiences, revealed gradually over the course of the 
narrative and without regard to precise chronology, certainly feature the kinds of discrete 
catastrophic events we usually identify as traumatic: the mysterious fire that eradicates 
her biological family along with her memory of the first seven years of her life; being 
raped as an adolescent by the neighbor boy who mows her lawn; a cancer diagnosis in her 
twenties and subsequent removal of both her ovaries, a procedure that leaves her unable 
to have children. Evidence of these various traumas manifests in the narrative in ways 
readers have come to expect from fictional and filmic representations of post-traumatic 
stress: her rapist’s ghost haunts subsequent consensual sexual experiences, causing 
constriction in her chest and general fearfulness, and she experiences recurring 
nightmares, regular “nights of sleep interrupted by . . . mumbled cries of ‘Fire!’” (177). 
Linda’s doctor invokes the medical origins of trauma to describe the removal of her 
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ovaries necessitated by cancer (likely an effect of the rape), noting that “the removal of 
any vital organs . . . resulted in a trauma that the body could recover from, but afterward 
the body would continue to grieve for what had been taken from it” (212). In the 
language of medical discourse, Truong establishes the body itself as an agent of and for 
grief, augmenting the rigid medicalized terminology with the evocative possibility of the 
body’s own memory of loss.27 
Cvetkovich’s expansion of the scope of trauma yokes its more conventional site, 
the large-scale catastrophic event, to a second space of trauma, that which results from 
long-term “systemic contexts.” This latter purview, favored by Cvetkovich in her analysis 
of trauma and archives that are often excluded from such legitimizing designations, can 
be individual as well as collective, attributed to such “textures of everyday experience” as 
incest, AIDS, and racism.28 Much of Linda’s trauma arises from catastrophic events 
recognizable by Laub’s definition, perhaps suggesting the degree to which Truong is 
anxious to establish Linda in a traumatic context. But I am more compelled by the ways 
Linda’s experiences also fall under Cvetkovich’s interpretation of the concept, 
manifesting in the systemic trauma of racial and familial otherness coupled with her 
awareness of her own synesthetic condition, an awareness corresponding to her adoption 
into the Hammerick family. 
Unsettling conventional notions of trauma in Western modernity concomitantly 
disturbs conventional notions of the archive. As Cvetkovich has argued, unconventional 
trauma requires an unconventional archive “whose materials, in pointing to trauma’s 
ephemerality, are themselves frequently ephemeral.” 29 Cvetkovich’s demarcation of a 
necessarily unusual archive that might account for trauma’s ephemeral traces by virtue of 
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its own ephemerality creates the space for conceiving of Linda’s synesthetic catalog as 
archive. Linda utilizes synesthesia as what Marita Sturken has called a “technology of 
memory”30—a term that understands Foucault’s definition of technologies as “social 
practices that are inevitably implicated in power dynamics” and includes “practices that 
people enact upon themselves.”31 She involuntarily links tastes to words, and words to 
memories, in an attempt to bear witness to both the catastrophic events of the fire that 
destroyed her biological family and the systemic trauma of racial and neurological 
otherness. For what is simultaneously both so physical, and so fleeting, as a taste? 
It is important to note that Linda herself makes a distinction between memory per 
se and the synesthetic catalog of experience that I have designated a synesthetic archive. 
Linda’s archive becomes her method of access, and her memories (at least those after the 
night of the fire, as everything before it has been lost) are readily available via the 
performance of this synesthetic archive. “Memory is a curse,” she writes: 
My memory was sharp. A thorn, a broken water glass, a jellyfish in a wave that 
crashed into me and reached back for more. My secret sense, which I have come 
to understand as my condition, gave me a way to encode information that was 
immediate and long-lasting, an inborn mnemonic device . . . a multicourse meal 
prepared by a mad scientist who knew and cared nothing about food. To revisit 
the dishes and their chaotic juxtaposition of flavors was to recall with precision 
those facts, from the trivial to the significant, that I have acquired, via the spoken 
word, during the course of my life. (115) 
Metaphor upon metaphor accumulates, as the sharpness of nature (the thorn) and 
destruction (broken glass) are attributed to memory, along with the agency to “reach . . . 
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back for more.” Notice her reliance on tactile metaphors in this passage, after having 
remarked a few pages earlier that food and taste metaphors “were of no use to me” (102). 
Linda’s highway to memory is not the mnemonic device of Greek rhetoricians, a walk 
through a city, but instead a multi-course meal that offers precise recollection of spoken 
facts. Here, facts as associated with her condition are valued, but not naively so, as she 
sees their potential to cause pain. Yet within each of these comprehensive claims to 
perfect memory lies, of course, the gaping hole of the trailer fire: “Whoever carried me 
out, his or her face was blank to me. Whoever stayed inside, by force or by choice, 
became strangers to me. The years of my life with them, the life before this life, had been 
erased or, rather, my memories of them had been erased by my benevolent brain. The last 
word that this man or this woman had said to me was the only thing that remained” (279). 
Thus the end of Truong’s novel centers on the failure of Linda’s archive to produce the 
details of her lost memory, on its lack that is also construed as a positive fact of 
protection, the act of a “benevolent brain.” If, as Derrida suggests above, the archive 
exists at the moment of memory’s breakdown, can the archive be a more hospitable, 
productive site than that of memory? Perhaps we should read Linda’s archive not just as a 
coping mechanism, which the phrase “benevolent brain” might suggest, but as a fulcrum 
for an epistemological relation to the world that accounts for the trauma of otherness and 
violence but is not in turn accountable to it. 
In contrast to the singular events of physical and emotional trauma, the long-term 
systemic trauma that Linda experiences in this novel centers around two facets of her 
identity: her Vietnamese racial heritage (specifically her otherness in the post-Vietnam 
War American South) and her auditory-gustatory synesthesia. Each fundamentally 
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structures her ways of knowing and being in the world, resulting in a figure highly keyed 
to her own bodily difference. Paradoxically, Linda’s bodily difference is registered most 
fully in her sense of invisibility. Speculating about the near-universal reaction generated 
in her homogenous hometown following her adoption by the Hammericks, Linda 
concludes: 
They vowed to make themselves color-blind on my behalf. That didn’t happen. 
What did happen was that I became a blind spot in their otherwise 20-20 field of 
vision. They heard my voice—it helped that I came to them already speaking 
English with a southern accent, which was the best and only clue that I had about 
my whereabouts before Boiling Springs—but they learned never to see me . . . 
Instead of invisibility, Boiling Springs made an open secret of me. I was the 
town’s pariah, but no one was allowed to tell me so. (170-71) 
Linda appears here as disappearing, the postidentity poster child whose invisibility resists 
representation and archivization. The blind spot of Linda’s race, a gap in the sight not 
only of Boiling Springs residents but of Truong’s readers, is only brought to visibility at 
the conclusion of Part One, with an offhand revelation of Linda’s given name—Linh-Dao 
Nguyen Hammerick—as it is spoken aloud at her graduation ceremony, a revelation 
framed to suggest that it is Truong’s withholding rather than Linda’s. Dissecting the 
politics of naming in Truong’s first novel, The Book of Salt, David Eng suggests that 
Truong’s refusal to name the character of the Man on the Bridge by his historical 
moniker, Ho Chi Minh, reveals her insistence on “a consideration of how the politics of 
naming and misnaming works to stabilize—indeed, to justify—the historical order of 
things.”32 Instead of creating an appropriate ethnic literary project—recuperation and 
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rewriting to make visible “the rest of the story”—Truong “shifts our attention from the 
problem of the real to the politics of our lack of knowledge,” Eng argues. In similar ways, 
Truong plays with the politics of naming in Bitter in the Mouth, withholding Linda’s 
given name that would signal her racial heritage to the reader. Here, again, Truong 
refuses the expectations placed upon U.S. ethnic texts to “perform what is ‘missing’ in 
history and to represent otherwise unrepresented communities.”33 
Considering Bitter in the Mouth in conversation with Truong’s first novel, we can 
identify a pattern of resistance in which Truong refuses neoliberal multiculturalism’s 
demand for authenticity via visible racial difference. The stakes of this decision become 
clearer when we consider Melamed’s claim that neoliberal multiculturalism “produc[es] 
difference as a valorized domain of knowledge and then ideologically correlate[es] 
ethical, moral, technical, and political stances toward difference with what benefits 
neoliberal agendas.”34 In other words, Truong refuses the expectations placed upon 
literary texts such as Bitter in the Mouth to function as historical archives for U.S. ethnic 
experience, expectations linked under neoliberal multiculturalism to the agendas of 
global capitalism. 
This refusal becomes especially clear when we consider the novel’s relationship 
to the Vietnam War.35 Though the centrality of Vietnam’s civil war to Linda’s arrival in 
the United States is eventually detailed in the novel’s final pages (a scene to which I will 
return), the war makes very few appearances in the rest of the narrative. The facts of 
Vietnam—“Ho Chi Minh, Hanoi, the Tet Offensive, the fall of Saigon”—become just 
another set of playing cards “filed . . . away” but lacking the satisfaction of embodied 
knowledge offered by synesthesia (216). One war reference does accompany Linda’s 
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consideration of her status as a blind spot, but the “selective blindness” considered in this 
passage is sexualized and not limited to the conflict in Vietnam: “If they saw my 
unformed breasts, the twigs that were my arms and legs, the hands and feet small enough 
to fit inside their mouths, how many of the men would remember the young female 
bodies that they bought by the half hour while wearing their country’s uniform in the 
Philippines, Thailand, South Korea, or South Vietnam?” (171). This is not a 
consideration of the exceptional situation of Vietnamese (refugee) immigrants but an 
indictment of the widespread victimization enacted via U.S. military intervention across 
Asia. 
Visibility is further foregrounded by Linda’s resistance to the narratives of 
identity proffered by her white community and later by her Boston Brahmin fiancé Leo, 
as she distinguishes between the “being” and “looking” aspects of racial identity. This 
distinction is crucial to apprehending Linda’s particular ontological and epistemological 
world relation: “I was often asked by complete strangers what it was like to grow up 
being Asian in the South. You mean what it was like to grow up looking Asian in the 
South, I would say back to them with the southern accent that had revealed to them the 
particulars of my biography” (169). What does it mean that Linda rejects the designation 
of “being” Asian? In dissociating “looking” from “being,” Linda undermines the primacy 
of vision as a mode of apprehension and comprehension in the world. Though to others 
she may “look” Asian, this has nothing to do with the question of who she is, of her 
identity. 
Linda does elaborate slightly while describing a conversation about race with Leo, 
who has asserted that the racial prejudice evinced by her classmates means that she has 
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indeed experienced “being” Asian in the South. Linda counters, but only in an aside to 
the reader: “No, Leo, I knew what it was like being hated in the South . . . I believed, and 
still do, that this state of being that I was trying to understand had content and substance 
separate and apart from what Boiling Springs had taught me” (173). Thus, Linda claims, 
“being” is not something that can be assigned externally. Even more importantly, it is not 
something she believes she has learned from her fellow Boiling Springs inhabitants, for 
how could those who do not know what it means to “be” Asian teach her? Here, again, 
visibility as a mode of being is deprivileged to make way for the archive as an alternate 
episteme and ontology that allows Linda to separate “being” from “looking” and instead 
to couple it with a mode of sensation which is uniquely her own. Rejecting the 
significance of vision in comprehension—as the text itself does by withholding the 
physical description of our protagonist that would reveal the protagonist’s racialized 
otherness—Linda relies instead on taste affiliated with spoken language through the 
mysterious processes of synesthesia, a condition that remains at the limits of scientific 
and medical knowledge. 
Sensing the Synesthetic Archive 
What does Truong achieve by making her protagonist a synesthete? An 
examination of the research on synesthesia reveals several characteristics of the condition 
that reinforce Linda’s position as an inappropriate subject with a unique epistemological 
relation to the world. In a key and still influential 1990s study, synesthesia is defined as 
occurring “when stimulation of one sensory modality [taste, touch, etc] automatically 
triggers a perception in a second modality, in the absence of any direct stimulation to this 
second modality.”36 This sensory imbrication can take multiple forms, of which Linda’s 
130 
 
form, auditory-gustatory, is an extremely rare manifestation of an already rare diagnosis. 
The onset of synesthesia is believed to generally occur by age four, and scientists theorize 
that it is passed from parent to child.37 As Linda learns upon viewing a PBS documentary 
on synesthesia and repeatedly reviewing its transcript, it is most likely that her 
synesthesia is a physical legacy from her biological parents, probably—because 
synesthesia is much more common in women—her mother. 
Close attention to the moment of Linda’s accidental encounter with the PBS 
documentary, one of the novel’s less deft expositional moments, reinforces the 
significance of this inheritance. Smoking her third cigarette to quell what she terms the 
“incomings,” Linda absorbs the details of her disorder: “The voiceover returned to say 
that synesthesia was hereditary and could be passed along via either the maternal or the 
paternal side of the family. The condition, according to the voiceover, was most often 
found in women. There was the sound of a key turning a lock. Leo was home” (222-23). 
Linda has dreaded Leo’s imminent return, as she has concealed her condition from him, 
and so the “sound of the key turning in a lock” functions literally to alert her that she 
must turn off the television. Yet, following Truong’s lead in representing and 
interrogating sensual overlap, it seems we are meant to read the direct juxtaposition of 
information about synesthesia’s inherited nature to the “sound of a key turning in the 
lock” as a crucial moment of inner unlocking for Linda.38 Synesthesia, which has isolated 
her from her adoptive family, community and fiancé, provides a direct, physical link to 
the biological family and racial heritage of which she has no memory.39 
In his analysis of synesthesia, neurologist Richard Cytowic foregrounds the 
embodied theoretical possibilities evoked by the syndrome. The stakes for understanding 
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this condition, he writes, are directly related to the way synesthesia gestures to questions 
of “consciousness, the nature of reality, and the relationship between reason and 
emotion”40—the same questions which the archive is conventionally understood to 
manage. Synesthesia complicates easy designations of what is real, in that synesthetes 
experience these cross-sensory stimulations with the same strength as ordinary sense 
stimulation and yet science thus far lacks any method for verifying these experiences or 
transmitting them to another. In this way, Bitter in the Mouth foregrounds the question of 
the real by complicating representations of perception: synesthesia is, for Linda our 
narrator, utterly real—powerful, consistent, evocative—and readers experience it as such 
through her focalization. Yet no other character experiences Linda’s incomings as real, 
even those like Kelly who believe her descriptions. The question of what is “real,” what 
counts as knowledge, what can—and should—be perceived, is at the forefront from the 
novel’s opening pages. 
The novel’s distinctive hermeneutics comprise not only regular instances of the 
destabilization of factual claims but also the tricky negotiation of language and literary 
form required to represent the moment of synesthetic apprehension. Truong frequently 
reinforces the unreal quality of Linda’s synesthesia for those around her and the political 
and cultural sanctions on identity formation operating outside the boundaries of visibility. 
Though her condition becomes the centerpiece for her epistemological relation to the 
world, facilitating a specialized relationship to memory and allowing for the construction 
of an utterly personal archive, this relation comes at a cost: Linda’s synesthesia 




The resonances of Linda’s childhood experience with synesthesia are most 
apparent in a conversation between young Linda and DeAnne, which is made particularly 
difficult to apprehend by Truong’s decision to represent the experience of auditory-
gustatory synesthesia in dialogue. The day before Linda is raped, her mother’s new 
haircut and surprisingly pleasant demeanor inspire Linda to attempt disclosure. Linda’s 
confessions and DeAnne’s rebuffs are painful in their vulnerability and their rendering: 
“Momchocolatemilk, youcannedgreenbeans knowgrapejelly 
whatgrahamcracker tastes like a walnuthamsteaksugar-cured? Godwalnut tastes 
like a walnuthamsteaksugar-cured. The wordlicorice Godwalnut, I meanraisin, 
and the wordlicorice tastes—” 
“Lindamint, pleaselemonjuice don’t talkcornchips like a crazy-heavycream 
persongarlicpower.” 
Linda’s second attempt at disclosure elicits a final response from DeAnne: “Lindamint. 
Stopcannedcorn it! I can handleFruitStripegum a lot of thingstomato. Godwalnut 
knowsgrapejelly I have had to with youcannedgreenbeans. But I won’t 
handleFruitStripegum crazyheavycream. I won’t have it in my familycannedbeets” (107). 
This extended representation of auditory-gustatory synesthesia registers several curious 
aspects of the word-taste correlation. DeAnne’s epithet, “crazy,” is heavy cream: it 
catches in Linda’s throat, too full and rich to absorb other flavors that would mitigate its 
cloying tendencies, a taste the garlic powder of “person” is ill-equipped to make palatable 
when the two are joined with a hyphen. Notably, while “you” tastes of canned green 
beans and “Linda” tastes of mint, “I” is not associated with any taste. As such, it implies 
an unmarked subject, universal in that it is untouched by synesthetic production, and also 
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establishes the subject as a fluid conception that cannot be stabilized, even by the process 
of synesthetic sensation. 
Mercifully returned from such dialogue to Linda’s narration, we read her 
interpretation of the brief scene: “I know what my mom meant. If you want to be one of 
us, Linda, you hush your mouth” (108). Resorting to a common convention of rendering 
unspoken thought in italics, Truong also reinforces the subtextual level of their dialogue. 
Just as Linda tastes the words she and her mother speak, those tastes undergirding every 
sentence, so Linda can similarly discern the subtext of her mother’s claim that she “won’t 
handle crazy,” “won’t have it in [her] family.” Linda understands that her status as a 
member of the Hammerick family is dependent on suppressing her synesthetic 
condition—that is, her difference. 
The Archival Subject 
Bitter in the Mouth opens with the description of two people, a “quiet child” and a 
formerly quiet child, both “always folding ourselves into smaller pieces” (3). These 
figures are our narrator Linda and her uncle, Baby Harper. Though we do not yet know 
the details of her interloper status, the narrative consistently reinforces that Linda is an 
improper representative of her family and community. Taking her place as a fourth 
generation Hammerick at Yale, Linda is “a modern, slightly modified representative of 
the family” (13)—a representative that her grandmother Iris discounts, Linda suspects, 
because they do not resemble one another. She explains: “I now know that it is no 
coincidence that the word ‘favor’ is used to denote physical resemblance. I favor you 
(your eyes, your chin). You favor me (with love and attention). Favor is a reciprocity 
based on a biological imperative” (133). Unfortunately for the possibility of her own 
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happiness as a member of the Hammerick family, Linda physically favors her 
Vietnamese biological mother, Mai-Dao, in a household where mentioning Mai-Dao has 
been forbidden. Linda has “eyes the shape of hickory nuts” (33), skin the same color as 
the Florida tan of her childhood neighbor, and hair longer than the salon’s suggested 
“China Chop” (105), but these ambiguous details are all that Truong provides before the 
revelation of Linda’s full name in the Yale graduation scene. The fact of her race, kept 
secret, indicates the role of the unspoken in identity constitution, even as it facilitates the 
foregrounding of Linda’s synesthesia. These everyday realities of Linda’s otherness set 
the terms for larger-scale moments of recognition and identity formation. 
Thus far I have advocated reading Truong’s fictional narrative in the terms 
Cvetkovich claims for quotidian traumas: as incommensurate but nonetheless conversant 
with large-scale historical trauma, in that they present “lives whose very ordinariness 
makes them historically meaningful.” To do so enables us to “redefine the connections 
between memory and history, private experience and public life, and individual loss and 
collective trauma.”41 Bitter in the Mouth explicitly addresses these questions of the 
imbrication of private and public, individual and collective histories, in the context of two 
contrasting episodes that illustrate recognition and its lack. The first, when Linda is 
fourteen and has begun to cultivate the identity of a disembodied smart girl, describes her 
initial encounter with “the unpronounceable part” of her name, Nguyen, in reference to 
the President of South Vietnam from 1967 to 1975, Nguyen Van Thieu. Linda continues 
to feel the odd pull of barely-familiar unfamiliarity: 
I learned that the war was still in progress in 1968, the year of my birth, and that it 
ended for the Vietnamese in 1975, the year of my second birth at the 
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[Hammericks’] blue and gray ranch house. I filed these facts away. They were 
connected to me, but I wasn’t connected to them. This pattern would repeat itself 
as I learned more about Vietnam. Ho Chi Minh, Hanoi, the Tet Offensive, the fall 
of Saigon. I filed these facts away too. All that I learned about Vietnam had to do 
with war and death and dying. At the time, I had no body, which meant that I was 
impervious and had no use for such information. (216) 
Once again, Linda erodes her own relationship to facts: while they might be connected to 
her by virtue of her Vietnamese middle name, she feels no reciprocating connection, in 
explicit contrast to the connection she experiences through her taste sensations. Though 
she narrates the facts of her country of origin explicitly in tandem with the events of her 
own life—the year of her birth, the year of her relocation to the Hammerick home—to do 
so only reinforces the lack of connection. These are once again the jumbled “facts” on 
which we cannot anchor Linda’s story.42 
Linda’s lack of “proper” recognition for the country and name of her birth is 
immediately juxtaposed with a second scene of recognition: her encounter with the PBS 
program on synesthesia that finally offers, in contrast to any history textbook or family 
album, “what I wanted to know about myself” (216). Tuning in during an interview with 
a British man in his late thirties who also “suffers” (Linda bristles at the term) from 
auditory-gustatory synesthesia, Linda has “an in-another-body experience,” a feat 
facilitated indirectly by her condition that manufactures of a sense of fellow-feeling or 
kinship: “Everything but this man and me faded into darkness . . . I had never 
experienced recognition in this pure, undiluted form. It was a mirroring. It was a fact. It 
was a cord pulled taut between us. Most of all, it was no longer a secret” (217). Linda’s 
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synesthetic archive, rather than her name or racialized body, facilitates a recognition that 
is nonetheless specifically figured in bodily terms—to know or recognize another person 
via this condition is, for Linda, to inhabit the body of another. Once again knowledge (via 
the archive) is imagined in terms of embodiment and facilitated along the lines of bodily 
“disorder,” raising the possibility of a community through difference, recoded as 
sameness. 
Truong’s choice of an atypical form of synesthesia for her protagonist disrupts the 
representational hierarchy that produces the universal unmarked subject. Taste is 
extremely rare in synesthesia as either a trigger or a response;43 hence readers cannot 
even relegate Linda’s experiences to the realm of a “typical” synesthete. More 
significant, though, is the place of taste in a hierarchy of perception and representation, as 
delineated by David Lloyd in his analysis of the relationship between aesthetics and 
racial formation. Lloyd traces the hierarchy of aesthetic apprehension as established by 
Immanuel Kant and Friedrich Schiller, noting that aesthetics privileges distance over 
closeness and active rather than passive reception of the sensed object. Taste, intimate 
and embodied, gets us closer than a “disinterested” and “active” sense like vision, 
intended to be deployed by an unmarked “subject without properties.”44 Yet Linda’s 
synesthetic mode of apprehension incorporates both the highest form of aesthetic 
encounter—utterly distant from the object itself and equally mediated by the 
apprehending subject—and also the lowest and the closest. Just as her synesthesia 
uniquely yokes the heard word with a taste, so it unites opposing poles of aesthetic 
apprehension in the sensing figure of Linda as minority subject. 
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This union is crucial because of the way apprehension, particularly aesthetic 
apprehension, undergirds modern racial formations and racism. According to Lloyd, 
racism is culturally determined: it arises from the structure of Western aesthetic culture 
and proceeds out of the disinterested perceiving subject (the “subject without properties”) 
that emerges from and is the goal of aesthetic culture. The developmental narrative of the 
senses described by Lloyd indexes the developmental history within which races are 
determined to be civilized or primitive. By this, he suggests that such determinations 
arise out of a minority subject’s perceived ability (or lack of ability) to embody the 
universal(izing) subject without properties.45 This unmarked embodiment is the 
prerequisite for participation in aesthetic judgments and for existence in “identity with 
‘every one else,’ that is, with the subject in general.” This existence is, in turn necessary 
to “provide the conditions for the universal accord of a common or public sense”—the 
creation of Kant’s sensus communus. 46 
But synesthesia as represented in Truong’s novel disrupts this sensual hierarchy 
and prevents a subject without properties from coalescing. Without an unmarked subject, 
the structures of culture out of which racism arises are themselves disrupted, and the 
sensus communus cannot achieve the state of universal validity to which it aspires. 
Synesthesia especially complicates the Kantian privileging of vision as the highest sense. 
Linda’s synesthetic experience collapses this developmental hierarchy of the senses, in 
that she is both distant from the object of apprehension (the experiential taste, which is 
not “really” conjured in her mouth) and utterly present to it, as she nevertheless tastes it 
on her tongue. In this way, she counters the conditions necessary for the formation of 
common sense and the public sphere: she is not disinterested but rather intensely 
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interested, not property-less but marked by her race and her synesthetic condition. She 
cannot judge as the subject without properties because her judgment, apprehension and 
understanding are fundamentally conditioned by synesthesia. 
The key to understanding how Linda disrupts the racist racial formations that 
Lloyd attributes to aesthetic culture is to recognize precisely what racism is. Discourses 
of racism are constituted not by “the antagonistic recognition of difference,” as we often 
think, but instead by “the subordination of difference to the demands of identity.”47 In 
other words, the demand of identity can only either exclude on the basis of difference or 
require sameness in the form of assimilation. Truong’s description of Linda’s putative 
disembodiment, and the initial suppression of her Vietnamese heritage, play with the 
expectation of universal subjectivity characterizing the modern systems of aesthetics and 
archive, establishing Linda as a potentially unmarked figure, at least initially. 
Yet for the entirety of the text, Linda’s properties are those of sensation, one 
aspect of the body that resists representation and thus resists the archive as well. 
Sensation is affect grounded in the body. It is fleeting, yet intensely registered by the 
perceiving subject; it is utterly personal, yet collective in that it is common to all human 
experience. Individuated and non-empirical, Linda’s synesthesia colors her apprehension 
of the world and works to undermine hierarchical ways of perceiving, knowing and 
doing, such as those advocated by reference to the Reasonable Man and DeAnne’s 
emphasis on propriety. Therefore I posit that Linda is not, and can never be, the subject 
formalized into identity with “every one else,” the subject without properties. Instead, she 
is a residual subject. I craft this term from Lloyd’s theorization of “residue” as the 
difference that remains after assimilation. In the process of assimilation and the creation 
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of residue, differences come to signify negatively in a culture that privileges identity. As 
a result, racial discriminations come to “make sense.”48 In Linda’s case, however, we see 
the representation of an atypical synesthetic subject whose subjectivity exists in residue 
and remainder, suggesting that such a literary subject might disrupt racist racial 
formations arising from aesthetic culture. 
Another crucial characteristic of Linda’s archive is its need for and use of 
language, an effect of Truong’s choice of the auditory-gustatory manifestation of 
synesthesia. The words Linda experiences as taste cannot mean conventionally, so they 
must mean differently, reinforcing her inappropriate relationship to language. Though 
“experiential flavors had to come first,” a link that reinforces her archive’s dependence 
on material reality, in that she cannot taste a word whose taste she has not yet 
experienced on her tongue, Linda finds that both denotative and connotative meanings 
only interfere with her synesthetic experience: 
I . . . had to disregard the meanings of the words if I wanted to enjoy what the 
words could offer me. At first, the letting go of meaning was a difficult step for 
me to take, like loosening my fingers from the side of a swimming pool for the 
very first time. The world suddenly became vast and fluid. Anything could 
happen to me as I drifted toward the deep end of the pool. But without words, 
resourceful and revealing, who would know of the dangers that I faced? I would 
be defenseless. I would drown. Maybe all children felt this way. We grabbed on 
to words because we thought they could save us. (74) 
This acceptance of risk and overcoming of fear, framed metaphorically in an act of 
growing up—the process of children learning to swim—might seem at first to decenter 
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the sideways growth that often characterizes Linda’s narrative. Yet the strangely passive, 
even literally sideways movement evoked by the words “fluid” and “drift” indicates that 
the movement from the constraints of conventional denotation to being immersed in the 
taste sensations of synesthesia would be better understood as itself resistant to the process 
of growing up. To be passively carried by water, to risk bodily harm—these are not the 
modes by which we enter adulthood. Further, to uncouple from dependence on words, 
those “resourceful and revealing” tools by which we are taught to engage the world, 
Linda risks the loss of meaning, of linguistic structures by which the world is organized 
and upon which children in need of salvation rely. She characterizes this process as one 
of powerlessness, yet she finds power in her “incomings”—to counter the blandness of 
her mother’s cooking, to harness the elusive power of memory on her behalf. 
This decoupling of words from their meanings, a process that results in words 
being imbued with new, alternate meanings—their tastes—is characterized as a deliberate 
choice on Linda’s part. She cannot choose (not) to experience her incomings, but she can 
choose to exploit the complex pleasure those incomings can provide, so long as she is not 
shackled by linguistic conventions or negative connotations. Yet the pool passage, even 
as it emphasizes her singularity, also links her own fear with that experienced by non-
synesthetic children, those elusive “normal” beings who nonetheless grasp at the power 
they intrinsically understand language to possess. 
Considering Linda’s synesthesia as a technology of memory that allows for the 
construction of an archive requires attention to the “practices that surround [its] 
production and reception.”49 In other words, to the moments when we see not only 
archival production (the tasted word, remembered for the future) but archival access and, 
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to an extent, transfer—the other characteristics that determine an archive. Traditional 
archives seek reconciliation with the state in the aftermath of trauma, as Rodrigo Lazo 
reinforces in his analysis of the mutually constitutive relationship between the archive 
and the nation. But Linda’s archive enables not “recovery,” which often becomes coded 
as a “healthy” practice that nonetheless always takes the form of the reconciliation named 
above, but rather survival—a “living on” like the one David Lloyd imagines for 
traumatized postcolonial subjects that holds the potential for “producing and reproducing 
a life that lies athwart modernity.”50 Unlike conventional archives, Linda’s archive of 
tastes is characterized by two primary practices or affective entanglements: unwillingness 
and desire. Much of the narrative is consumed with Linda’s attempts to dull the 
incomings, whether by smoking, consuming alcohol, or having sex. Yet this 
unwillingness is frequently coupled with or overturned by desire for a particular taste or 
combination of tastes evoked by spoken language. 
The clearest example of Linda’s performance of her archive comes when she first 
discovers the power of synesthetic tastes to counter the terrible taste of her mother’s 
cooking. Locking herself in the bathroom, Linda says aloud, “Not again,” and is 
overwhelmed by the taste of pancake on her tongue: “Each repetition . . . was a 
revelation. The faster I said it, the more intense and mouth-filling the taste became” (75). 
Speaking a word aloud repeatedly and experiencing its pleasure, Linda engages in an act 
she claims is analogous to more conventional childhood explorations of one’s own body: 
“How old were you when you first touched yourself for the sake of pleasure?  . . . We all 
have to learn how to use what we were born with for something other than the functional 
and the obvious. All of our bodies hold within them secret chambers and cells” (75). 
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Speaking the words to herself, feeling the flood of tastes, Linda enacts the second half of 
archival engagement: the accessing and performance of the archive.51 Though Linda can 
perform her archive on her own, a deeper sense of taste satisfaction becomes available 
when others speak the words to her. Sometimes, craving a word while drifting off to 
sleep, Linda wakes with an increased desire, fed by the “appreciable distinction between 
hearing the word said and saying it for [herself], though both would produce the same 
incomings” (102). Thus Linda’s archive is most satisfying when it involves moments of 
transfer or access between herself and another, even if this occurs without the other’s 
knowledge. This archive is embodied to the point of giving pleasure in its contradiction 
of Linda’s knowledge of the world as a painful place. 
In Linda’s experience, every conversation involves an auditory-gustatory 
connection, regardless of the conversation’s relative significance or unimportance in 
terms of content. Thus Linda avoids the television in favor of books, requires a heavy 
smoking habit to make it through the school day, and clings to Baby Harper because his 
peculiar talk-singing does not trigger the incomings. Yet only at certain moments in 
Truong’s narrative is the experience of synesthesia performed for the reader; only certain 
conversations are relayed in dialogue with the tastes each word evokes attached to the 
words themselves in the closest approximation to what it might mean to share Linda’s 
condition. Certainly this choice relates to the very cumbersome negotiation necessary to 
write Linda’s experience of a conversation, to the attachment of italics that disrupts a 
sentence’s visual flow and its meaningfulness as a tool of literary representation. Yet this 
representative choice calls into relief those moments when Linda’s conversations are 
communicated in the fullness of their synesthetic experience, as when she first speaks 
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aloud her adoptive last name, when she confesses to DeAnne, and when she receives 
telephone calls, years apart, notifying her of the death of her grandmother Iris and then 
Baby Harper. These scenes, and the attendant cumbersome but evocative experience of 
reading them, gesture to the inappropriateness of literature, and of representation more 
generally, to effectively render the experience of sensation. Sensation is that which 
evades representation and the archive—the highly embodied, personal and ephemeral 
aspect of lived experience. Thus these passages make visible the inadequacy of literary 
representation even as they offer a mode of minority representation that might allow us to 
better understand the political and aesthetic implications of Linda’s synesthetic archive. 
As in the writings of Kincaid and Lahiri discussed in chapter one, Truong’s novel 
presents forms of literariness that call attention to their own limits and the breaking of 
their frames. 
Linda’s synesthesia unites embodiment and the archive. Her archive of tastes is 
stable in that words always taste the same, no matter who speaks them. Synesthesia offers 
her the kind of connection to the past that we associate with the archive, an ahistorical 
persistence of memory that does not change with the passage of time or shifts in 
interpretation. Linda’s archive both endures and is ephemeral; the stability of the 
word/taste correlation points to the archival nature of her response to her experience, 
even while the tastes fade until re-spoken into being once again in the performance of her 
archive. Like a figure combing through drawers or documents, Linda sifts through the 
tastes she experiences, always measuring them against the elusive bitter taste that might 
give her a last word from her lost family, always noting their combination of sweet, sour, 
salty and cataloging them in terms of her experiential tastes. 
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The Archive and the Outside 
The role of performance in Linda’s synesthetic archive requires that we engage 
with what Derrida identifies as the central concern of the archive: “Where does the 
outside commence?”52 The question of boundaries haunts Archive Fever, coming up over 
and over again as Derrida makes emphatic claims that there can be “no archive without 
outside” and yet struggles to determine just how and why the physical body complicates 
such claims—a paradox that ultimately leads him to conclude the archive’s impossibility. 
The question of the outside is also central to trauma, which is why designations of trauma 
like Cvetkovich’s systemic notion that expand the concept beyond a clearly demarcated 
event often generate critical discomfort. Truong’s novel both attends to and ultimately 
subverts the division between inner and outer, leaving open the question of what Linda 
does, exactly, when she experiences a word as taste, assigns a known taste to that word, 
and then—most fundamentally—evaluates whether the taste corresponds to the bitterness 
she remembers from the night of the fire but for which she has no name or word. For 
Derrida, the difficulty lies in the many instantiations of “inscription”; for readers of Bitter 
in the Mouth, it lies in synesthesia. 
Returning to the fundamentals of synesthesia both complicates this question of the 
outside and crucially undermines the very distinction between inside and outside. In 
synesthesia, the inducer or trigger—that which appeals to the first sense to be 
stimulated—generally exists outside the body, often a word in a book, or a strain of 
music, or a phrase spoken by another. Peter Grossenbacher writes that “sights, sounds, 
smells, tastes and touches have all been reported as synesthetic inducers,” and also notes 
that inducers tend to be human-generated: a majority are “words or music, stimuli 
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generated by fellow humans and designed to convey meaning.”53 Thus, in making Linda 
a synesthete, Truong has created a character who cannot stop the influence of the outside 
world’s attempts at meaning-making on her body and lived experience. In this way, 
Linda’s archive implicitly critiques Derrida’s formulation, which relies on the continuing 
existence (even if indeterminable) of an outside. In Linda’s archive, inner and outer are 
productively muddled, signaled first by the collapsing of representation and sensation, the 
heard word and the experienced taste. 
In Linda’s case, at the same time that synesthesia breaks down the archival 
boundaries between inner and outer, it also calls into question clear distinctions of bodily 
inside and outside. It is this thin-boundedness that returns us to questions of propriety and 
the power of the improper archive, to Puar’s observation that “the dispersion of the 
boundaries of bodies forces a completely chaotic challenge to normative conventions of 
gender, sexuality, and race, disobeying normative conventions of ‘appropriate’ bodily 
practices and the sanctity of the able body.” Puar suggests that reading such inappropriate 
bodies as queer assemblages “allows for a scrambling of sides that is illegible to state 
practices of surveillance, control, banishment, and extermination.”54 Though Puar’s 
emphasis is on the oppressive apparatus itself, rather than the inappropriate body’s 
response to such an apparatus, she attests to the way that propriety is always about 
boundaries. Her claim implies that the disruption of boundaries might itself enable the 
creation of positive illegibility. In Linda’s case, synesthesia allows her to be illegible to 
others but legible, at least in part, to herself. It provides a link to the past, but not one that 
can be reduced to physical difference or cultural practices. 
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One further conventional distinction displaced by the unwieldy condition of 
synesthesia is that of stable temporality. A mnemonic device, Linda’s synesthesia 
registers memory but also constantly gestures to the future day that she might taste the 
mysterious bitterness and come to knowledge of the word she seeks. Thus Linda’s 
archive is, as Derrida notes for all archives, as much about the future as about the past. 
(As chapter four explores, this is also true for conceptions of the present.) The archive 
itself determines its own future content: it “is not only the place for stocking and for 
consuming an archivable content of the past which would exist in any case . . . the 
technical structure of the archiving archive also determines the structure of the archivable 
content even in its very coming into existence and in its relationship to the future. The 
archivization produces as much as it records the event.”55 Linda’s identification of her 
catalog of tastes as that which might eventually signify her lost past in turn transforms 
each auditory-gustatory connection she experiences into that-which-will-be-archived, into 
the moment of experience coupled with the moment of catalogue, and into something 
more than a taste—potentially the taste she seeks. Her taste archive thus determines her 
apprehension of all synesthetic as well as non-synesthetic tastes, in that the experiential 
flavors she encounters lay the foundations for new word-taste correlations. 
Fundamentally, this archive determines her epistemological relation to the world around 
her. Linda experiences tastes and the words associated with those tastes primarily in 
relation to the potential of those word-taste correlations to illuminate the missing 




In the novel’s final pages, we learn that Linda’s mother first came to the United 
States to study at Barnard after the partitioning of North and South Vietnam. Thomas 
Hammerick, a law student at Columbia, fell in love with Mai-Dao “right there on the 
steps of Low Memorial Library” (268). After Mai-Dao returns to her fiancé in Vietnam, 
Thomas absorbs news coverage of the increasing hostilities with her in mind: 
Over the years, as the name of Mai-Dao’s country became a household word even 
in Boiling Springs, Thomas couldn’t see the news of her country’s civil war, the 
deployment of U.S. troops there, and the body bags that returned without thinking 
of her. In 1968, the year that she gave birth to me, though he didn’t know that 
back then, he thought of her as he watched her hometown—it was the southern 
capitol [sic], so he thought that it would keep her safe—exploding on his 
television set. (268-69) 
Later, from letters that Thomas had promised to destroy but never does, DeAnne and then 
Linda learn that Mai-Dao had returned to the United States in 1974, bringing her 
daughter to join her husband at his postdoctoral fellowship at the University of North 
Carolina. 
These are the most overt references to the Vietnam War—and its impact on the 
collective U.S. political imaginary—in the novel. Yet in this final scene, the backstory of 
Linda’s family and her ties to Vietnam continue to be subordinated to the conditions of 
synesthetic knowledge. DeAnne’s method of telling Linda’s family history—“very 
slowly, pausing in between words, stopping in midsentence”—activates and heightens the 
operations of Linda’s synesthetic archive: “The incomings, given such a cadence, were 
acute and more assertive than usual, as if the tastes triggered by the words literally had 
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more time to sink in” (272). Desperate to quell the incomings, Linda procures a bottle of 
bourbon, and the story continues without interruption until “[t]he bottle of bourbon was 
bone dry” and “[t]he afternoon was almost gone” (279). 
Conclusion 
Why does Linda need to remember? This question gestures to fundamental ideas 
about what ethnic literatures are trying to do and how they resonate differently for 
different readers. My analysis suggests that she needs to remember because her sense of 
identity is deeply tied to a sense of origins that is discursively reinforced at the level of 
individuals, families, communities, and the nation. Think of how there is no one in 
Boiling Springs who Linda feels can teach her what it means to “be” Asian. Of how her 
community extends partial acceptance based on her southern accent. Of the painful sense 
that she has no image or memory of the family she favors. Linda has been raised in 
exclusion. There is also the violence of the loss, the unexplained and inexplicable 
destruction of her family. The search for the bitter taste is a search for legacy, for 
genealogy. To the extent that Bitter in the Mouth accepts its representative status as an 
example of ethnic literature, it is in portraying the deep imbrication between history and 
individual subject formation. This history is both personal—an individual loss—and not, 
in that Linda has no memory of life before the loss. The violence of this erasure haunts 
her, and it cannot be assuaged by her relentless archive fever. It cannot even be silenced, 
only approached, by the embodied archive she creates. Specifically, Linda does not—or 
not only—want to remember her lost family. She wants the answer to the question of the 
bitter taste—the taste itself and the word that inspired it. This is a discursive recovery 
project as well as a historical one. 
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In the context of my larger project, this chapter reinforces how propriety attaches 
to bodies, occupying the vacuum left by race in a postracial era. Propriety accrues around 
bodies, designates bodies as proper or improper in the context of turn-of-the-century 
neoliberal multiculturalism, becomes the arbiter for bodies that will and will not matter. 
Queer bodies, disabled bodies, racialized bodies—all are inappropriate bodies that, by 
virtue of their difference, disrupt assimilation into institutionalized neoliberal 
multiculturalism. Inappropriate bodies existing in the gaps and failures of 
multiculturalism become the sites of inappropriate subjects who must somehow negotiate 
their exclusion. This chapter asks after the fate of these inappropriate bodies, examining 
moments when such bodies concomitantly attract the normative designation of 
“improper” while also enabling a way of living inappropriately. What responses do 
minoritized subjects evince in the face of their “inappropriateness” that allow for the 
creation of alternate epistemes? My readings illuminate the contingent, provisional ways 
that minority subjects negotiate the archive, suggesting how an improper(ly) embodied 
archive allows characters to confront the relentless discipline of propriety upon racialized 
and otherwise improper subjects. Taking the figuration of the body-as-archive as a point 
of entry for thinking through the problem of contemporary minority identity, this chapter 
has attended to literary texts that stage such an improper relation to the United States at 
the turn of the century to explore potential rehabilitations of the designation of 
“difference.” 
The end of Truong’s novel declines to provide any definite answers to questions 
of memory, trauma and the role of the archive. Following DeAnne’s disclosure of the 
identity of Linda’s birth family as well as letters between her mother and Thomas 
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Hammerick, Linda reflects in the novel’s final passage on the gaps in history that remain 
(even DeAnne knows no details of the trailer fire) and the significance of the revelations: 
“I had thought, in between our sips of bourbon, that she could be making this all up. I 
decided that it didn’t matter. At least it was a story, I thought. We all need a story of 
where we came from and how we got here. Otherwise, how could we ever put down our 
tender roots and stay” (282). Crucially, what the plot suggests but the narrative does not 
otherwise acknowledge is that Linda purposely renders her archive inoperable in this 
final scene. With the bourbon, Linda suppresses her incomings for this extended 
conversation about the lost details of her past, a decision that means that even if DeAnne 
speaks the word that would evoke the bitter taste in Linda’s mouth, Linda will not 
recognize it. She purposely deactivates the archive she has so assiduously compiled, 
choosing instead an indeterminacy of story and relationships based not in origins but in 
the possibility of present-day decisions to “put down” roots “and stay.” This suggests, 
ultimately, that Linda’s story cannot be contained, even in such an unconventional 
archive as her catalog of tastes. She is a figure who resists any totalizing impulses of the 
archive, in the end preferring aesthetic representation—the “story of where we came from 
and how we got here”—in place of any archiving impulse that might produce factual 
truths. The archive exhausted—the archivist herself exhausted—aesthetic representation 
explicitly uncoupled from truth claims becomes the preferred mode of self-
understanding. 
At the risk of proffering the “illusion of understanding” Linda cautions against in 
the search for a word-taste that would “match” the bitterness she remembers, I want to 
return briefly to Truong’s first novel. The Book of Salt suggests an intriguing intertextual 
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possibility for the bitter taste at the center of Linda’s synesthetic archive. In one of that 
novel’s key scenes, Bình, a Vietnamese chef working for Gertrude Stein and Alice B. 
Toklas, meets a fellow countryman in Paris—the man on the bridge the novel neglects to 
identify as the historical Ho Chi Minh. Before a sexual encounter that becomes one of the 
defining moments of Bình’s life, they share a meal fit for kings described in explicitly 
sensual terms. Framing their erotic exchange is description of this meal and the 
conversation it engenders, centered on their mutual culinary expertise. Bình inquires 
repeatedly about the ingredients of each exquisite dish: morel mushrooms, brown butter, 
sea salt. One exchange dominates, however: Bình’s brief question, “Watercress?” 
following a bite of the dish that most defies his expectations and activates his culinary 
curiosity because of the unexpected presence of fleur de sel. 
But Bình is quick to clarify—he is asking about the preparation of watercress, not 
its identification as an ingredient, for “watercress is unmistakable, bitter in the mouth, 
cooling in the body, greens that any Vietnamese could identify with his eyes closed. I 
know this dish well” (97). I do not wish to undermine Monique Truong’s decision to 
leave the bitterness of Linda’s formative taste unidentified within the pages of Bitter in 
the Mouth, but rather to consider what Bình’s brief comment illuminates in the context of 
Linda’s synesthetic archive. What would it mean if the taste Linda seeks is that of 
watercress? This scene from the earlier novel employs the exact same diction to describe 
a taste that is not only “bitter in the mouth” but also associated with an explicitly ethnic 
palate: “any Vietnamese,” Bình believes, would recognize the specific bitterness of 
watercress. In this reading, Linda’s unsettled status as a racialized subject is once again 
brought to the forefront—she is not “any Vietnamese,” but rather a complexly embodied 
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figure who unsettles expectations about the performance of race and the formation of 
appropriate citizen-subjects. More importantly, though, this “answer” to the implicit 
question of Bitter in the Mouth does not actually encompass or fully negotiate the loss 
signified in the elusive bitter taste, for watercress is never mentioned in Linda’s narrative. 
In other words, the question of “the word that triggered it” remains conspicuously 
unanswered. The synesthetic archive remains open. 
Derrida characterizes the archive as “a token of the future,” which refers to the 
fact that “what is no longer archived in the same way is no longer lived in the same way.” 
Further, he argues that the archive is a perpetually open system: “the archivist produces 
more archive, and that is why the archive is never closed. It opens out of the future.”56 
What this means for Linda, of course, and for readers, is an indeterminacy forever linked 
to futurity, the ultimate contingency of the epistemic mode under discussion. Bitter in the 
Mouth ends with the same undermining of “facts” that has characterized the rest of the 
work but extends this to gesture to the power of story, of representation, when coupled 
with the sensational power of synesthetic taste. The end of the novel suggests that the 
archive itself might allow for indeterminacy. Indeed, perhaps it is the archive which 
enables the conditions of this indeterminate conclusion, having taught Linda and 
Truong’s readers how to read the world. As Derrida claims of the archive, “if we want to 
know what it will have meant, we will only know in times to come. Perhaps.”57 
This novel’s hermeneutics of difference is an exemplary instance of the subjective 
and epistemological inappropriateness this project delineates. The contingency of taste 
and value it models reinforces the centrality of aesthetics to racialization, even as the 
emphasis on embodied modes of knowing suggests the possibilities for knowledge 
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production through difference. As neoliberalism dematerializes categories of difference, 
flattening them into commensurate claims of difference-as-sameness to populate a 
colorblind nation and globe, Truong’s novel counters with the insistent performance of 
difference as difference. The next chapter examines a novel that represents what happens 
when the colorblindness of the neoliberal United States begins to show its seams. 
Following a model citizen who internalizes imperial and exceptional narratives of 
propriety, property ownership, and multicultural belonging, Chang-rae Lee’s A Gesture 
Life illuminates the violence required by and obscured in such performances and 
theorizes the agency available to minoritized subjects in an era of propriety. 
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Chapter Three: Adopting National Identity: The Necessary 
Gestures of Proper Citizen-Subjects 
Midway through Chang-rae Lee’s novel A Gesture Life (1999), protagonist 
Franklin Hata engages in a telling conversation with two acquaintances regarding the 
state of race and racism in their small town. When his Indian American friend criticizes 
the racial politics of Bedley Run, New York, “Good Doc Hata”—neither an actual doctor, 
nor, as we learn over the course of the novel, a straightforwardly good man—comes to its 
defense. Renny Bannerjee, ten years into his residence in the small New York suburb, 
tells Hata he has “had a few displeasing experiences around town in the last few weeks” 
(134). At first, he characterizes these interactions as merely “annoying comments,” but 
eventually concludes, “It seems everyone has completely forgotten who I am” (134). Old 
men who haunt the local smoke shop casually mention “the Third World” and expect 
Renny to respond; mothers at the duck pond look over their strollers at him in suspicion; 
prominent citizens make offhand remarks about the “direction” in which the town is 
headed when Renny is in earshot. When Renny’s white girlfriend, Liv, accuses him of 
being overdramatic, he appeals to Hata as a member of another racial minority: “I know 
you’ve always been happy here but at least you can partly understand what I’m 
describing, yes?” (135). Ostensibly of Japanese ethnicity, Hata will, Renny expects, 
understand the plight of the minoritized figure in white suburban America at the turn of 
the twenty-first century. 
Hata’s response is as measured and cautious as we have come to expect from 
Lee’s protagonist by this point in the novel: “I believe I do,” he begins. But before Hata 
can expand on his assessment of Bedley Run’s troubled multiculturalism, the car in 
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which the three are traveling passes Sunny Medical Supply, Hata’s former business. 
Though it was a successful medical supply shop when Hata sold it to retire just three 
years earlier, the store named after his adopted daughter is now on the verge of 
bankruptcy. The crucial symbol of Hata’s successful engagement with the American 
Dream, as an immigrant turned entrepreneur and property owner, is fading into obscurity, 
“its windows hazy and unlighted, with nary a glint of activity” (135). In the shadow of 
the small business that symbolizes Hata’s striving for success and assimilation, he finally 
elaborates on his answer to Renny’s query: 
“It’s true that at times I have felt somewhat uneasy in certain situations, though 
probably it was not anyone’s fault but my own. You may not agree with this, 
Renny, but I’ve always believed that the predominant burden is mine, if it is a 
question of feeling at home in a place. Why should it be another’s? How can it? 
So I do what is necessary in being complimentary, as a citizen and colleague and 
partner. This is almost never too onerous. If people say things, I try not to listen. 
In the end, I have learned I must make whatever peace and solace of my own.” 
(135) 
Here, Hata takes the “burden” of “feeling at home” in small-town U.S.A. upon himself as 
a relative newcomer, though he has resided in Bedley Run for thirty years. Something he 
has “always” believed, this obligation extends backward to the years before his current 
habitation. Peace and solace, presumably markers of a life unmarred by prejudice and 
discrimination, are the responsibility of the individual, who “makes” them on his own. 
Yet the necessarily relational status Hata would downplay in this formulation nonetheless 
demands certain actions on his part, notably that he be “complimentary.” He understands 
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himself as a colleague and partner (gesturing to the labor and social regimes of life), but 
before anything else he is a citizen—a term that indexes his inhabiting of a particular 
town and the legal recognition of his subjecthood by and to a nation. 
I begin with this passage because it exemplifies the deep imbrication the novel 
stages among citizenship, multiculturalism, and property, and because it hints at the way 
failure in one of these arenas necessitates a kind of failure in the others, at least under the 
conception of life as an Asian immigrant that Hata understands himself to be living. It is 
a life of propriety and property, a life lived according to the dictates of “ought” and 
“should” that, despite Hata’s assertion to the contrary, are almost always too onerous, in 
the sense that they cannot be sustained indefinitely. The novel invites us to situate the 
United States within a global context as we come to realize that Hata’s U.S. citizenship is 
being played out against a failed citizenship elsewhere. In this way, the novel grapples 
with the premises of formulations like neoliberalism and the model minority, prompting 
prompts readers to register neoliberal multiculturalism’s global scale and planetary 
connections through the life of one U.S. immigrant. 
This chapter investigates the price propriety requires of racialized U.S. citizens 
and the way that appropriate multiculturalism coded in neoliberal terms covers over the 
violence necessary to enact such citizenship. It examines A Gesture Life to consider the 
novel’s example of one man whose desperation to accrue the identity of “abstract and 
equal subject”—David Eng’s term for the figures who populate a colorblind nation1—
leads him to a deeply suspect and unsustaining life of gestures, shadows, and ghosts 
which prove to be the residue of his complicity in wartime violence. I argue the 
following: first, that Hata’s noted citizenship drive is intimately connected to adoption, 
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and so it is impossible to understand his desire for national belonging without accounting 
for his own adoption, as well as his decision to adopt Sunny so as to create a recognized, 
normative version of family-as-property. I read propriety as an ideological apparatus, the 
fulcrum upon which both wartime and peacetime subject formation centers and the force 
that structures the relationship between capitalism and adoption staged in this text. 
Second, I suggest that this novel must be understood as a critique of multiculturalism and 
the violence that multiculturalism covers over in its requisite forgetting of race and 
consolidation of normative family and property status.2 Required from a young age to 
“become” someone else via the colonial apparatus of Imperial Japan, adult Hata believes 
that accruing property and performing the pedagogical gestures of U.S. citizenship 
(embodied in the right to property and family) will allow him access to a form of 
legitimate citizenship hitherto denied him. The novel ultimately suggests the extent to 
which such a citizenship is borrowed and fragile, and thus attainable (or unattainable) to 
the racialized other only as shadows and gestures. Finally, I examine the novel’s absent 
moment of migration—its silence about the details of Hata’s immigration or official 
citizenship status—in an attempt to unravel the notions of agency that this work posits are 
available to minoritized subjects under neoliberal multiculturalism. 
An economic project and a project of racialization dating from mid-1990s to the 
present, neoliberal multiculturalism is at once national and global. My introduction 
discusses in greater depth the ways that neoliberal multiculturalism naturalizes processes 
of privilege and stigma by overlaying these processes onto longstanding U.S. racial 
logics. This contemporary economic and racial regime works to “represent a certain set of 
economic policies as multicultural rights, to portray the equality of the free market as the 
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most fundamental expression of equality, and to make the diversity of goods, services, 
and capital flowing across national boundaries stand for the best manifestation of 
multiculturalism.”3 Under this regime, the individual as producer and especially as 
consumer occupies the apex of multiculturalism and is imbued with the freedom to 
choose the greatest good. In A Gesture Life, Hata espouses this flow of capital, as Lee 
makes him the mouthpiece for neoliberal multiculturalism in conversations with Renny 
and Liv and in his narration of life as an immigrant. But the novel proceeds to carefully 
and totally undermine Hata’s stances by gradually revealing their beginnings in violence 
and their inability to provide Hata the home he seeks. The novel’s hermeneutics 
encourage readers to make connections between Hata’s circumscribed small-town 
existence, the ornate philosophies of contemporary life he articulates, and the 
conspicuously withheld details of his immigration. 
The life history Good Doc Hata presents requires us to unravel its non-linear 
temporality and Hata’s circuitous, ambiguous mode of narration. A Gesture Life is the 
story of a boy from an ethnic Korean family, the Ohs, who is adopted in a state-arranged 
transaction into a middle-class Japanese family during Japan’s imperial rule. 
Rechristened Jiro Kurohata, the boy attends school and eventually enlists in the imperial 
army during World War II, working as a medic at a military outpost in Burma. One of his 
primary responsibilities is the medical upkeep of a collection of “comfort women,” 
Koreans forced into sexual slavery to Japanese military officers and servicemen. During 
his service, Kurohata grows attached to a woman named Kkuteah (his narration generally 
shortens her name to K) who recognizes him as ethnically Korean and appeals to him to 
mercy kill her. Jiro refuses, dreaming that she will survive her wartime duties, allowing 
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them to marry and travel the world together. But after K kills the camp doctor, she is 
raped and disemboweled by a group of soldiers. The years following World War II 
constitute a significant absence in the novel, but eventually we learn that Kurohata has 
changed his name to Franklin Hata, found his way to Bedley Run, and adopted an orphan 
from Korea whom he names Sunny. Chafing under his strict parenting and lack of 
demonstrable love, teenage Sunny leaves Bedley Run; at the time the novel opens, Hata 
and Sunny have been estranged for more than a decade, and he learns from a friend that 
she is living in a neighboring town with a young son whom Hata has never met. 
Scholarship on A Gesture Life demonstrates the difficulty of accounting for the 
breadth and depth of the novel’s aesthetico-political investments in the space of a single 
essay or chapter. Even deeply insightful critics generally limit their focus to either 
citizenship or adoption—in the first instance, analyzing Hata’s pursuit of legitimate 
citizenship in the context of his relation to K but leaving aside the significance of his 
American life with Sunny, and in the second, addressing the questions of kinship and 
racial politics raised by transnational adoption without delving into Hata’s precarious 
citizenship.4 Much adoption-focused scholarship thoughtfully addresses Sunny’s 
adoption but neglects Hata’s own adoptive status and the ways Sunny’s adoption is 
conditioned by Hata’s relationship to K and by his understanding of a normative family 
unit as a precursor to citizenship. In the same vein, citizenship-centered methodologies 
often read Sunny reductively, as merely another reiteration of K—Hata’s straightforward 
attempt to re-stage his wartime relation to more positive results. In contrast, I suggest that 
Hata’s understanding of adoption intimately conditions his pursuit of citizenship, and so 
these twin trajectories can only be understood in relation to one another. Most 
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significantly, no analysis of Lee’s novel thus far addresses the work’s curious silence on 
the concrete details of national belonging—the blank spaces where we would expect the 
story of Hata’s immigration to the U.S. or his legal citizenship status to appear. 
In the decade and a half since its publication, A Gesture Life has been broadly 
taken up by Asian American studies. Alone or with other novels about Korean 
immigration, “comfort women,” and adoption, Lee’s second novel is the subject of more 
than a dozen journal articles and book chapters at the time of this writing. The approaches 
modeled in these essays offer some insight into the novel’s significance for Asian 
American studies, suggesting that critics understand the novel as facilitating discussions 
about representations of U.S. imperialism and exceptionalism; about modes of 
assimilation, particularly through the central character’s unapologetic aspirations to 
model-minority status; and about diaspora and transnationalism at the height of their 
disciplinary cachet.5 Yet the myriad research questions that converge on A Gesture Life 
are more suggestive of the effects rather than the cause of academic interest in the novel. 
What prompts Asian Americanists to return repeatedly to this text? 
I posit that the prestige and prevalence of A Gesture Life in Asian American 
studies has to do with the way the novel affords us a mode of grappling with the present 
in the context of the past. In the language of my fourth chapter, this literary text illustrates 
the ways possible futures that existed in particular moments of the past are no longer 
available to contemporary subjects, whether to imagine or inhabit.6 Hata’s story spatially 
and temporally occupies a wide swath of twentieth-century history, in its movement from 
pre-World War II Imperial Japan to the contemporary United States over the course of his 
life, which spans nearly three quarters of the twentieth century.7 In many ways, Hata’s 
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history tracks the political history of the United States as a nascent global superpower. 
Like the U.S., Hata comes to maturity during World War II, and he migrates to the 
United States just two years before the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 
dramatically expanded immigration from East and South Asia, a legal precursor to the 
creation of the strategic political category of “Asian America.” Finally, Hata attempts to 
establish and embrace a stable, coherent American identity (over and against former 
global powers like Japan and emerging competitors like the Soviet Union). He lives as a 
minoritized citizen in the U.S. through the Civil Rights era, the rise of identity politics 
and the turn to post-identity multiculturalism that plays such a crucial role (as the 
introduction details) in the hegemonic ascendance of neoliberalism. In this way, Hata as 
protagonist, narrating in a form that transitions between present day and flashbacks to the 
past, effectively pulls the entirety of the twentieth century forward into the present 
moment. 
Published in 1999, A Gesture Life’s emphasis on the historical continuity between 
the post-World War II era and the neoliberal present seems prescient. To examine the 
constitution of the neoliberal subject under economic disparities exacerbated by 
globalization, to disentangle the indefinite conflation between times of war and times of 
peace, and to analyze the production of the present requires what Lauren Berlant calls the 
“historical sense” of “conceiving of a contemporary moment from within that moment.”8 
This effort at the level of academic discourse and political economy corresponds to the 
textual project A Gesture Life stages—the project of its dissembling narrator. The sense 
of history suggested by Lee’s novel is one also advanced by scholars like Jodi Kim, who 
investigates the “protracted afterlife” of the Cold War to critique our sense of that 
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conflict’s end. Kim argues that we fail to see how cold war logics and rhetorics are 
reinscribed in post-9/11 military and domestic efforts like the “War on Terror,” an 
indefinite conflict “waged . . . through explicit comparisons to and as an extension of the 
Cold War.”9 In order to understand the way “the present” as an epoch is produced and 
reproduced under neoliberalism, we must attempt both the ambitious historicization 
modeled by Berlant and the critical continuity advocated by Kim. Lee’s novel offers a 
textual and aesthetic stage from which to grapple with the condition of the neoliberal at 
the turn of the twenty-first century. 
The much-analyzed opening paragraphs of the novel situate Good Doc Hata as a 
figure of paradoxical visibility and invisibility: finally established after decades of 
residence as a “familiar sight to the eyes,” he is no longer the object of “a lingering or 
vacant stare” (1)—the first presumably an effect of Hata’s racialization, the second 
referring to the lack of recognition afforded to a stranger. In fact, he tells us, over the 
course of his Bedley Run life, his longevity and his Japanese name become “both odd and 
delightful” to his fellow residents, “somehow town-affirming” (2). Hata’s description 
demonstrates a kind of casual and self-congratulatory diversity, as if its multicultural 
mettle is proven daily by the delight the town takes, collectively and anonymously, in his 
“odd” name and face. We learn next that Hata chose Bedley Run (then a less prosperous 
village going by the inauspicious name Bedleyville) based on “a brief slice-of-life article 
with a picture of a meadow that had been completely cleared for new suburban-style 
homes” in the newspaper, an article that highlighted the “peaceful pace of life” in the 
outlying suburb of New York City (2). When Hata first arrives, he tells us, his neighbors 
made sure to emphasize that he was “not unwelcome,” though he suspects their motives 
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were economic, in that he represented a potential “addition to the census and tax base” 
(3). But eventually the “question of [his] status” evaporates to the multicultural, 
colorblind “almost nothing” of the present day (4). Even in this early moment, a careful 
reader detects the traces of unnecessarily weighty protestation. 
Initial episodes of intimidation that Hata characterizes as the activities of 
mischievous boys lessen in frequency as those boys grow into men who often consult him 
on medical questions when visiting his store. Hata did not expect the “condition of 
transparence” he develops as “a walking case of others’ certitude,” he claims, but it 
nonetheless becomes increasingly unsettling (21). The novel’s opening pages admit: “I 
don’t know how or when it happened, or if it is truly happening but I’m sure something is 
afoot, for I keep stepping outside my house, walking its grounds, peering at the highly 
angled shape of its roofs, the warm color and time-textured façade, looking at it as though 
I were doing so for the very first time, when I wondered if I would ever in my life call 
such a house my home” (22). But though Hata admits a sense of unease in the opening 
pages, a return to certain early feelings of American Dream-based anxiety, he cannot 
acknowledge this feeling to Renny or affirm the latter’s impression that the town is 
undergoing a significant and disturbing change in tenor. For Renny is not satisfied to 
leave the source of his impressions ambiguous; he does not hesitate the name this shift as 
racially motivated, as the economically inflected diversity of neoliberal multiculturalism 
begins to show its seams. “The mood has changed around here,” he tells Hata. “I don’t 
know if it’s this recession and that people are feeling insecure and threatened . . . The 
worst part is that I’m beginning to think I should have realized this long ago, and that I’ve 
been living for years inside an ugly cloud” (135). 
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Franklin “Doc” Hata is concerned twice over with being the proper subject of the 
nation, as his pursuit of proper U.S. citizenship unfolds against the backdrop of an earlier 
failed citizenship. Given up for adoption by his working class Korean family to a middle 
class Japanese family, Hata strives for the entirety of his early life to be the proper 
Japanese citizen, defined against what he understands to be Korean, and then a proper 
soldier in the imperial army. After his adoption, he successfully “passes” as Japanese—
only a superior officer and K seem aware of his Korean ethnicity. Upon immigrating to 
the U.S. and settling in New York state in 1963, he minimizes any ethnic specificity, a 
“generic Asian American”10 in the eyes of his fellow residents who can be neatly 
incorporated into post-Civil Rights multiculturalism and appear—or so he believes—a 
non-racialized U.S. citizen. But as tensions arise within multiculturalism’s diversity 
regime and repressed histories of racism bubble over in Bedley Run, Hata’s past returns 
to haunt him. Thus this chapter investigates what must be covered over or concealed for 
the figure of the proper citizen-subject to be maintained. 
The suppressed violence that I identify as integral to the ways appropriate 
multicultural citizen-subjects come into being takes two different but related valances, 
both considered in this chapter. Though he might deny it, Hata is the object of the first 
kind of violence, to which Renny alludes: the violence of a requisite life of gestures, of 
the processes of disembodiment and disavowal necessary to produce abstract and equal 
subjects who can enact the promise of multicultural U.S. citizenship. This violence 
experienced by Hata is complicated by another form—the violence Hata perpetrates in 
his pursuit of proper citizenship. In the novel, this second form of  violence occurs in two 
waves, first against a “comfort woman” in his care during his time as a medic in World 
167 
 
War II and then against his adopted daughter Sunny. The escalating scenes of violence to 
which Hata admits complicity, most notably a series of compelled sexual encounters and 
a coerced late-term abortion, belie the atmosphere of pastoral contentment conjured in 
Hata’s early descriptions. 
As part of a larger project that investigates the workings of propriety and 
inappropriate responses to these workings in the contemporary United States, this chapter 
asks, how does propriety become a necessary quality for the creation of the citizen-
subject? Propriety, I argue, is an effective mode of regulation precisely because, as an 
ideological apparatus of neoliberalism, it is self-perpetuating.11 An aspect of hegemony 
that works in conjunction with other neoliberal apparatuses, propriety manufactures a 
civil society that “operates without ‘sanctions’ or compulsory ‘obligations,’ but 
nevertheless asserts a collective pressure and obtains objective results in the form of an 
evolution of customs, ways of thinking and acting, morality, etc.”12 Once a subject 
instills in him- or herself the value of appropriateness and its gatekeeping role as a 
precursor to the privileges of citizenship—recognition, property ownership, 
enfranchisement, stable economic/political/social status—the system closes and its 
continued functioning becomes nearly automatic. As Hata’s life story implies, even 
episodes of trauma or violence are not necessarily sufficient to unsettle this attachment. 
Such episodes may even reinforce this attachment, in that coercive violence complements 
the work of consent-based ideological apparatuses like propriety.13 More so even than the 
regulation of bodies or forms discussed in this dissertation’s earlier chapters, the 
production and regulation of appropriate subjects can be passed down from generation to 
generation (from father to daughter, as we see Hata attempt with Sunny). And yet 
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propriety is powerful enough to supersede kinship ties, splitting families by framing a 
rogue member’s inappropriateness as a threat to the proper order embodied by everyone 
else. Propriety’s flexibility owes much to its alliance in public discourse with what are 
perceived as honorable normative values: family, community, faith, moral integrity. 
Therefore, to discipline oneself and one’s family along the lines of propriety can be 
understood as honorable, aligned with but less maligned in the public imagination as, for 
example, racial uplift or the politics of respectability. 
Citizenship is one of the forms propriety takes, one of the modes by which 
propriety operates on the lives of those who aspire to appropriateness. To be a citizen is 
to be a fully enfranchised, recognized subject of the nation. But as seminal work by 
Lauren Berlant and Lisa Lowe reminds us, to be a racialized citizen in the era of 
neoliberal multiculturalism entails particular commitments and responsibilities. In the 
mid-1990s, Berlant identified a shift toward what she terms “the privatization of U.S. 
citizenship” that corresponded to the rise of Reagan-era economic and culture wars but 
continues beyond the Reagan presidency.14 Here “privatization” refers not only to a 
spatial shift, as the prerequisites for citizenship transitioned from the public sphere to the 
realm of the private, intimate, and quotidian, but also to the move toward personalized, 
subjective modes for the measurement of outsider or “minoritized” status. In this 
“intimate public sphere of the U.S. present tense,” citizenship becomes “a condition of 
social membership produced by personal acts and values, especially acts originating in or 
directed toward the family sphere.”15 It may seem odd that this chapter foregrounds 
citizenship as one of its central concerns, considering that a primary focus of this analysis 
is the absence in A Gesture Life of any concrete or historical details about Hata’s legal 
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citizenship status. It is also true that this novel unsettles particular conventions of the U.S. 
immigrant narrative in substantive ways, notably in its extended narration of the global 
“before” of migration to the United States. Nonetheless, I argue for the centrality of a 
kind of diffused citizenship to A Gesture Life on the foundation Berlant creates when she 
defines contemporary citizenship as a space “on which diverse political demands can be 
made,” a status “whose definitions are always in process,” and “an index for appraising 
domestic national life, and for witnessing the processes of valorization that make 
different populations differently legitimate socially and under the law.”16 The question of 
citizenship is especially trenchant for Asian American subjects, Lisa Lowe argues, in that 
“the genealogy of the legal exclusion, disenfranchisement, and restricted enfranchisement 
of Asian immigrants” is in fact “a genealogy of the American institution of citizenship.”17 
Thus to consider Hata as a figure with uncertain access to U.S. citizenship is to consider 
the larger histories and absences of the institution itself. 
In the first half of the novel, Hata positions himself as the perfect embodiment of 
appropriateness, assessing his own behavior and the behavior of others by this measure. 
After being welcomed by his new neighbors, Hata “judge[s] the exact scale of what an 
appropriate response should be,” determining it best to limit his reply to “a gracious and 
simple note” (44). When he meets Mary Burns, a widowed neighbor with whom he will 
develop a long-term romantic relationship, he is flattered that she “paid as much attention 
as she appropriately should” to Hata rather than staring at his racialized features or 
speaking as if he has not mastered English, as do his other neighbors (49). Years later, 
when some of his customers remark on Mary’s developing relationship with his adopted 
daughter Sunny, Hata makes certain to tell his reader, “Of course I always thanked them, 
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was appropriately pleased” (56). Here he is not merely pleased as any other parent might 
be; rather, he actually measures his pleasure against a hypothetical parent to ensure it is 
not wanting. Appropriate behavior—the delicate decorum that will gratify his fellow 
citizens and maintain normative relations—becomes a central facet of Hata’s character.18 
This concern for propriety and for discerning and meeting the expectations of 
others pervades even Hata’s first-person storytelling: his pride in ownership takes the 
traditional routes of home and business, as discussed later in this chapter, but ownership 
for Lee’s protagonist also appears to be a mode of aesthetic practice. Always concerned 
with enacting “the polite duty of a host or proprietor” (13), Hata’s opening descriptions 
establish him as a narrator-proprietor, inviting readers into the confines of the narrative 
he has thoughtfully constructed and cultivated. This is reflexive storytelling: Lee writes 
Hata as a figure who pays attention to certain kinds of details, a characteristic that further 
illustrates his exemplary neoliberal subjectivity. As in Truong’s Bitter in the Mouth, it is 
the racial or ethnic outsider who can best tell a family and village story, and best decipher 
the unwritten codes of propriety. Even as Hata muses upon the welcome he felt from the 
town, he references the burden storytelling exerts upon him as a storyteller: “I have long 
felt that I ought to place my energies toward the reckoning of what stands in the here and 
now, especially given my ever-dwindling years, and so this is what I shall do” (5). 
Though he appears as a self-reflexive narrator, in certain moments Hata’s 
narration registers the paradoxical nature of his own attachments, as Lee reminds his 
readers that what we want to believe about ourselves (or imagine about our relations to 
the material world, in Althusser’s terms) conditions our perceptions. In a conversation 
with a police officer friend regarding their shared outlook on life, Hata reveals (making a 
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pun on “outlook”) that he is no longer sure of what he sees when he “looks out”: “if it’s 
real or of my own making or something in between, a widely shared fantasy of what we 
wish life to be and, therefore, have contrived to create. Or perhaps more to the point, 
what ought we see, for best sustenance and contentment and sense of purpose to our 
days?” (80). Though he couples these sentiments with the amplifying phrase “more to the 
point,” they actually express two disquietingly different epistemological orientations. The 
first references the commonality of shared vision necessary for citizenship in the world: 
the way that what “we wish life to be” intimately conditions the world we observe and in 
which we find ourselves, the way that contrived creation of life is a task shared by those 
around us who evince similar attachments to a kind of good life. But this incisive 
investigation of the investments that condition our “outlook”—that structure not only 
how we understand the world but, on a more individual level, what we see each time we 
stop to observe this world—is checked by Hata’s attention to propriety. In the same 
moment that he approaches the question of the “realness” of the good life to which he is 
attached, his psychological investments (obscured even to himself) turn his attention back 
to the possibility that there is something we “ought” to see. This passage articulates the 
belief that such appropriate vision will sustain us, providing a generic sense of purpose 
and an abstract, unattributable contentment. It illustrates a central flaw of neoliberalism, 
the belief that consumption and the market can solve everything, including our inability 
to define (not to mention, possess) the good life. 
Hata’s pervasive pursuit of sustenance and contentment is underscored by the 
novel’s title, taken from teenage Sunny’s charge to her adoptive father that he lives a life 
of gestures rather than substance. In this way, A Gesture Life foregrounds the delicate and 
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tenuous nature of agency and connects it to questions of visibility and abstraction. What 
precisely Hata pursues via his life of gestures is helpfully elucidated by David Eng’s 
work on the way race appears as disappearing in the U.S. context at the turn of the 
twenty-first century. A mode of knowing Eng calls “the logic of colorblindness” has 
taken hold in the ostensibly postidentity politics of the past two decades. This logic 
asserts the triumphant success of diversity and multiculturalism to claim that “racial 
difference has given way to an abstract U.S. community of individualism and merit”19—
precisely the kind of community Hata describes to Renny and the reader, firmly believing 
the fitness of his place in it. Under the politics of colorblindness demanded by this logic, 
race as an identity construction and system of measurement fades away. This diminishing 
of race is not merely an inevitable conclusion but in fact a desired and necessary 
component of postidentitarian thinking. It is this “abstract and equal” citizenship that 
Hata so assiduously pursues in a recurring pattern of upward mobility, as suggested by 
the novel’s many levels of “the erasure of difference in the abstraction of 
representation.”20 Time and time again, Hata forgoes the specificity of race and culture in 
pursuit of an abstraction he believes will guarantee equality. 
Yet Lee’s novel intimates the cost of this relentless orientation to an impossible 
subject position, for this life of appropriate multicultural citizenship comes at a cost. 
When Hata inquires into teenage Sunny’s sexual activities, she responds angrily: “all you 
care about is your reputation in this snotty, shitty town, and how I might hurt it” (95). 
After Hata dismisses this claim as nonsense, Sunny responds pointedly: 
“all I’ve ever seen is how careful you are with everything. With our fancy big 
house and this store and all the customers. How you sweep the sidewalk and nice-
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talk to the other shopkeepers. You make a whole life out of gestures and 
politeness. You’re always having to be the ideal partner and colleague...You 
know what I overheard down at the card shop? How nice it is to have such a 
‘good Charlie’ to organize the garbage and sidewalk-cleaning schedule. That’s 
what they really think of you. It’s become your job to be the number-one citizen.” 
(95) 
Distilling the essence of Hata’s identity to his ownership of property, signified most 
clearly by their large house and his store, Sunny lists the roles that accrue to his life of 
gestures: partner, colleague, citizen. They are the same terms that Hata resurrects proudly 
in his conversation with Renny and Liv about life in Bedley Run, the same roles that have 
led him to believe he can establish a home in this place. Hata’s response to Sunny’s 
charge once more activates the question of adopted citizenship that concerns this chapter: 
“And why not? Firstly, I am Japanese! And then what is so awful about being amenable 
and liked?” (95). Here, he essentializes his amenability, aligning it with a national and 
racial identity that we later learn is one he has adopted, consciously eliding the remnants 
of his racial and cultural heritage. Sunny’s reference to “good Charlie” reminds us of the 
depth of racial anxiety in Hata’s pursuit of propriety, just as his U.S. citizenship is always 
performed in relation to his early life in “twilight” as an ethnic Korean in Japan. 
Sunny’s characterization of Hata’s life as one of gestures is echoed much later in 
the novel, in a flashback to his time as a member of the Japanese Imperial Army during 
World War II. Explaining why Hata will never make a good surgeon, his supervisor 
Captain Ono asserts that, in Hata’s life, “too much depend[s] upon generous fate and 
gesture. There is no internal possession, no embodiment” (266). Perhaps surprisingly, the 
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Captain does not attribute this weakness to Hata’s Korean parentage, mentioning, in what 
might be understood as a precursor to liberal colorblindness, “It’s for the weak and lame-
minded to focus on such things. Blood is only so useful, or hindering” (266). Rather, the 
Captain identifies this lack as something intrinsic and individual to the man himself, a 
position Hata’s emphasis on individual responsibility suggests he has internalized. If we 
accept the Captain’s assessment, a life of gesture is explicitly contrasted with “internal 
possession” and “embodiment,” traits that would convince a soldier like the Captain of 
Hata’s fortitude. We see in this exchange, and in Hata’s impassioned claim to Japanese 
identity while arguing with Sunny, that Hata has been interpellated as a subject long 
before he ever arrives in the U.S. This initial hailing does not prevent but in fact 
facilitates his incorporation into U.S. multiculturalism, as these processes are 
complementary rather than dichotomous. When aligned with Sunny’s eerily similar 
understanding of Hata’s life in the United States, the two conversations suggest that to 
live a life of gestures is to pursue a position of “number-one citizen” that is, curiously and 
conversely, a life of disembodiment: the citizenly gestures that define Hata fade him even 
further into abstraction. 
Though he only once uses the term “gesture” to describe his life, Hata’s narration 
as he grows increasingly forthright with his readers echoes the parameters established by 
Sunny’s accusation. Expressing congratulations to Renny and Liv on their engagement 
late in the text, Hata thinks, “I feel I have not really been living anywhere or anytime, not 
for the future and not in the past and not at all of-the-moment, but rather in the lonely 
dream of an oblivion, the nothing-of-nothing drift from one pulse beat to the next, which 
is really the most bloodless marking-out, automatic and involuntary” (320-21). His life is 
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bloodlessly disembodied; rather than internal possession, his actions and the passage of 
time are governed by a system that is both automated and outside of his control. Hata 
seems to be coming to a kind of realization, in these final chapters, about the 
deterioration that attends the life of gestures and the diffused agency it entails. This 
question of agency conditions Hata’s desire for a feeling of proper citizenship, most 
notably through his accrual of property and family-as-property in pursuit of the good life. 
Modes of Proper Citizenship: Adoption 
Sunny’s accusations about Hata’s dependence upon and cultivation of two sites—
the house and store—establish a two-fold foundation for our understanding of Lee’s 
novel. First, the familiar sites of work and home are places of intimacy and routine, 
where the life of citizenship is acted and reactivated on a quotidian basis. Secondly, in 
Hata’s case as an entrepreneur, both places are sites of property that signify ownership, 
the good life, and prosperity. In fact, family itself functions as a particular subset of 
property: to create and maintain a stable family structure is a form of ownership. We see 
this most clearly in a scene where Hata, attempting to contact an adult Sunny after a long 
period of estrangement, fantasizes about an alternate future in which Bedley Run in 
general and his store in particular had continued to be economically successful. A vital, 
thriving store, this version of Sunny Medical Supply would have been, for him and Sunny 
as his heir, “a place to leave each night and glance back upon and feel sure it would 
contain us” (205). But Hata goes on to make explicit how the store (and his investment in 
its success) signifies only the latest step in a life oriented toward the creation of such a 
containing space: “For isn’t this what I’ve attempted for most all of my life, from 
entering the regular school with my Japanese parents when I was a boy, to enlisting 
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myself in what should have been a glorious war, and then settling in this country and in a 
most respectable town, isn’t this my long folly, my continuous failure?” (205). His 
Japanese adoption and education, his voluntary wartime service, his immigration to the 
suburban U.S.—all are precursors to the establishment of his own small business and his 
adoption of Sunny, whose name he takes for his store. Like Hata, Sunny is the product of 
an adoption designed to officially elevate a child deemed racially inferior to middle-class 
prosperity. 
At the levels of academic discourse and political economy, I suggest that it might 
be generative for Asian American studies and U.S. ethnic studies more broadly to take up 
adoption as a trope for minoritized citizenship in the U.S. Adoption is intimate, even 
familial, yet it registers the complexities of race, gender and migration that attend to 
ethnic subjects. Adoption as presented in A Gesture Life productively indexes the 
questions of agency and the violence of consent considered in this chapter. In this way, 
adoption illuminates the nexus of official and unofficial relations inherent in propriety 
and reminds us of the ideological apparatus’s scope and power. Yet it might also 
facilitate a rethinking of concepts of “assimilation” or “incorporation” as they have been 
theorized in the past five decades as modes of minoritized citizenship, particularly with 
regard to Asian Americans, a group that since the 1960s has been widely presented as a 
“model minority” over and against other minoritized groups.21 These loaded terms have a 
tendency to uncritically restage the assessments of authenticity to which minoritized 
citizens and minority cultural productions have too long been subjected, first in the 
culture wars of the post-Civil Rights era and then during the rise of institutionalized 
multiculturalism.22 What if instead of the conventional tropes of assimilation and 
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incorporation, burdened with legacies of model minority ideologies and intraethnic 
conflict, we considered adoption as a mode of understanding the complex ways subjects 
choose and are chosen to be national citizens? 
This is not to overlook the ways that adoption-as-citizenship might just as easily 
facilitate the reproduction of a sense of “native” citizenship as a more genuine form of 
belonging in comparison to the figure of the adopted citizen. It is true that contemporary 
adoption discourse still battles with implicit hierarchies that distinguish between 
biological and adopted children, and so to adopt this trope might strengthen the 
hierarchies of U.S. citizenship that already fall too readily along racial lines. Nonetheless, 
to press this concept even further to conceive of adoption as a model of citizenship for 
marked and unmarked U.S. subjects more broadly might unsettle such pervasive 
biological essentialism, in that to choose—to be chosen—foregrounds bonds of agency 
and attachment in place of blood or biology. 
Conceptualized in this way, adoption clarifies the role of the family in 
determining and modeling citizenship. David Palumbo-Liu’s recent work on literature’s 
function as a delivery system for otherness emphasizes the ways the family structure 
conditions the development of the subject. He writes, “in these microcommunal spaces 
we are formed and act as subjects: ‘family values’ are persistently alluded to for . . . the 
assumed transparence they evoke between two scales of social organization—what goes 
on the family is a smaller version of our national sense of belonging.”23 Even if it is 
merely a product of “assumed transparence,” this correlation between the family as 
microcosm and the nation as macrocosm suggestively situates adoption and citizenship in 
conversation. In this sense, then, adoption is a term that registers the affective valences of 
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multicultural citizenship—the expected love for adopted country and the resolute 
attachments adoptive citizens are pressed to evince. 
I posit in this chapter that the life of the appropriate multicultural citizen is 
defined by what Berlant has termed “cruel optimism,” which exists “when something you 
desire is actually an obstacle to your flourishing.”24 Attachment to fantasies of the good 
life—fantasies that became increasingly less achievable under the ascendance of 
neoliberalism—prompt contemporary subjects to make political, economic, and social 
choices that fall on a spectrum between counterintuitive, unproductive, and overtly 
destructive. Such attachments are a mode of capitalism’s reproduction that is related, 
though not identical, to the good life promised to a young Jiro Kurohata as a colonial 
subject. Optimism under this formulation refers not to a positive feeling but to an 
underlying, sometimes automatic orientation to future prosperity or pleasure, the 
negotiation of encounters and choices that evinces a kind of hope. Citizenship 
attachments demonstrate a particular form of cruel optimism, Berlant argues: “Much 
contemporary theory defines citizenship as an amalgam of the legal and commercial 
activity of states and business and individual acts of participation and consumption,” she 
writes, “but . . . in its formal and informal senses of social belonging, [it] is also an 
affective state where attachments that matter take shape.”25 In other words, Berlant’s 
work and my concern here includes those activities, performances and encounters that not 
only encompass the formal, legal ramifications of citizenship but also reveal what 
citizenship feels like—what it feels like to pursue the version of the good life tied up in 
this legal, commercial, and social identity. To understand U.S. minoritized citizenship as 
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an adoptive relation is to recover structures of feeling that are elided by terms like 
assimilation. 
Hata’s belief in the correlation between family and nation is made clear with 
respect to his own adoption; such a correlation is implied as well in his efforts to procure 
a child. The circumstances of Hata’s adoption by a Japanese middle-class family are 
disclosed in the course of an early conversation when K, the “comfort woman” to whom 
Hata becomes attached, challenges him to admit his Korean ancestry. Although his 
familiarity with the Korean language leads K to identify him as Korean, Hata denies it, 
first outright and then with the fact of imperialism: “I have lived in Japan since I was 
born” (234). She reveals her Korean name to him and presses him to reveal his own, 
which he refuses to do. At this point, the narrative digresses to note that even his birth 
family rarely used his Korean name; his parents, “it must be said, wished as much as I 
that I become wholly and thoroughly Japanese. They had of course agreed to give me up 
to the office of the children’s authority, which in turn placed me with the family 
Kurohata, and the day the administrator came for me was the last time I heard their 
tanners’ raspy voices, and their birth-name for me” (235-6).26 Hata’s story announces that 
his adoption is initiated formally at the level of colonial authority, which demands that 
parents “agree” to the relocation and re-education of their children far from the Korean 
ghettos of the Japanese imperial project.27 
Hata narrates his adoption as the true beginning of his life, the moment when he 
“first appreciated the comforts of real personhood, and its attendant secrets, among which 
is the harmonious relation between a self and his society. There is a mutualism that at its 
ideal is both powerful and liberating” (72). Analyzing this claim, Anne Anlin Cheng 
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suggests that “[w]hat is startling about this confession is not the insight that assimilation 
for a disenfranchised person can provide material advantages but rather its revelation into 
the unseen, ontological dividends afforded by such assimilation . . . the reward for ‘fitting 
in’ promises nothing less than personhood itself.”28 Yet Kandice Chuh observes that the 
novel as a whole resists Hata’s description of a seamless social personhood, modeling 
instead the “lurching, sometimes irascible processes of subject formation that directly 
undermines the unilateral seamlessness of the immigration narratives forwarded by U.S. 
nationalism.”29 Understood in this way, the novel’s portrayal of subjecthood stages not 
only the ineluctable appeal and rewards of the good life of citizenship, but at the same 
time the impossibility of such a culmination—even in the official yet intimate context of 
adoptive relation. 
Just as Hata’s U.S. citizenship is enacted upon the screen of his Japanese identity, 
so his own adoption provides a foundation from which we should understand his decision 
to adopt Sunny. Hata’s desire for a child is even more complex than the confluence of 
empire, class, and ethnicity that contributes to his adoption. Nonetheless, key elements of 
Hata’s state-initiated adoption follow him in his immigration to the United States—a 
migration that is presumably self-initiated, though the novel confirms nothing about this 
process. Situated, as we eventually learn, in the context of K’s violent death and her 
haunting of his Japanese and U.S. existence, Sunny is meant to be a revision, an erasure 
of the past. Yet she is also the figure Hata hopes will facilitate his full incorporation into 
appropriate twentieth-century U.S. citizenship, an incorporation begun by his successful 
assimilation as a multicultural subject.30 The novel offers his role as primary citizen as 
first enabled and then threatened by Sunny’s public appearance and disappearance. 
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Hata and Sunny discuss the circumstances of her adoption near the novel’s end, 
while visiting Renny in the hospital after he experiences a heart attack, during a tentative 
rapprochement. The revelations—that Sunny was not “put up for adoption” but in fact 
abandoned at what she describes as a kind of “halfway house”—come in the context of 
her rejection of the careful life of property and ownership that Hata has gathered around 
himself. Revealing that she shares her son’s dislike of hospitals, Sunny discloses, “That’s 
why I didn’t like being around the store, either . . . All those depressing devices. Before I 
came to you they had me in a place like this [hospital], but much worse, of course” (335). 
When Hata finds himself speaking to Sunny in the same “lawyerly and justifying way” he 
knows he used during her childhood, he attempts to soften his approach, “suddenly” 
admitting, “You probably wish you had never had to come live with me” (335). Sunny 
allows that she once felt that way, and then cuts to the heart of Hata’s constructed 
multicultural identity: “I thought this even when I was very young, why you would ever 
want a child, me or anyone else. You seemed to prefer being alone, in the house you so 
carefully set up, your yard and your pool. You could have married someone nice, like 
Mary Burns. You could have had an instant, solid family, in your fine neighborhood, in 
your fine town. But you didn’t. You just had me. And I always wondered why” (335). 
As it re-enacts and revises Hata’s own adoption by his Japanese family, Sunny’s 
adoption underscores the novel’s concern with the modes of citizenship available to 
minoritized subjects. In The Feeling of Kinship, David Eng studies what he terms “queer 
liberalism,” the selective incorporation of LGBT subjects into U.S. national identity on 
the basis of homonormative attachments and aspirations. Such subjects, once stigmatized, 
transition into the realm of privilege on the basis of three factors: economic 
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empowerment, the forgetting of race, and the construction of recognizable family units. 
Eng elucidates the role of transnational adoption in this emergence of queer subjects of 
privilege, describing it as “a practice in which infants are entangled in transnational flows 
of human capital . . . a post-World War II phenomenon associated with American 
liberalism, post-war prosperity, and Cold War politics.”31 In the past two decades, Eng 
notes, the practice has gained popularity as a method for “(re)consolidat[ing] 
conventional structures of family and kinship” available not only to heterosexual couples 
but increasingly to homosexual couples and people who are single.32 As it facilitates the 
construction of recognizable family units, transnational adoption also serves as a 
contemporary example of overt racial forgetting, as the racialized adoptee is incorporated 
into the white American family.33 Sunny the transnational adoptee indeed functions as a 
figure of value, “a special kind of property straddling both subjecthood and objecthood, 
both capital and labor.”34 But Sunny’s adoption, I argue, is also a process that ultimately 
prevents such racial forgetting, as the surprise appearance of her differently racialized 
body complicates her adoptive father’s quest to attain a position of privilege despite his 
status as a minoritized citizen. 
Hata’s impulse to adopt makes sense in light of the constraints of modern U.S. 
citizenship; certainly “the possession of a child, whether biological or adopted, has today 
become the sign of guarantee both for family and for full and robust citizenship, for being 
a fully realized political, economic, and social subject in American life.”35 His aspiration 
to the traditional ideals associated with the nuclear family demonstrates a desire for social 
respectability and value, of which family life is the primary indicator. While it is true that 
Hata’s desire to adopt is motivated in part by his feelings of guilt over K, it is significant 
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that he looks to replace K not with a substitute wife but with a child. His impulse to adopt 
centers on the fact of his own adoption, which he suggests was not the work of a single 
family (the Kurohatas are only mentioned briefly) but a nation—the “purposeful society” 
that rears him. His hopes for Sunny seem focused on the marked improvement in her 
economic status such an adoption would provide: “My Sunny, I thought, would . . . [n]ot 
be so thankful or beholden to me, necessarily, but at least she’d be somewhat appreciative 
of the providence of institutions that brought her from the squalor of the orphanage—the 
best of which can be only so happy—to an orderly, welcoming suburban home in 
America, with a hopeful father of like-enough race and sufficient means” (73). Yet, as we 
shall see, Sunny’s race is not “like-enough,” and the “necessarily” that qualifies his 
expectations for Sunny’s beholdenness reminds us of the disingenuous tenor of so much 
of Hata’s reflection: he may not formally require such submission and gratitude (if such a 
thing were possible), but he certainly expects it. 
Hata’s pursuit of a child who will confer respectability and normativity upon him 
as head of a family unit is motivated by his desire for recognition as an appropriate 
citizen-subject. Yet the details of that quest, we learn, violate those same principles of 
appropriateness. Seeking to procure a daughter through adoption, Hata encounters 
policies that prevent single men from adopting. Nonetheless, he pursues and obtains a 
face-to-face interview where he bribes the agency representative with a large donation to 
the agency and a gift for the woman herself. He explains the latter gesture to the recipient 
as “a most proper gift in [his] former homeland” but admits to his reader, “This wasn’t 
actually proper, however” and attributes his lapse in propriety to “desire for a child so 
paramount as to cloud my good judgment” (73). As that episode suggests, the road to 
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propriety paved by an adopted child will not be smooth. Hata’s relationship to Sunny 
disrupts the affective norms of adoption discourse, as Mary Burns observes when she 
suggests that the obligation Hata feels toward Sunny is unnatural and ought to be 
reversed.36 As Sunny is to be “both the beneficiary of Hata’s success and the token of 
it,”37 she occupies an untenable position of multicultural transracial adoptee who is meant 
to bridge past, present, and future. Hamilton Carroll argues: 
Caught between Hata’s desire to rewrite his past and his need to constitute 
himself as an American citizen, Sunny is both a daughter who solidifies his 
patriarchal (and paternal) presence and an abstractable figure of purity who 
‘needs’ protecting from the ills of society and through whom Hata can assimilate 
to the order logics of US cultural nationalism. For Hata, Sunny is to be both a 
body he can police and a litmus test of the success of his own assimilation.38 
Yet Sunny’s abstractability—her very blankness on which Hata means to write and 
solidify his position as an abstract and equal subject—is compromised by the evidence of 
her specific racial minoritization. 
Hata’s narration makes clear that he hopes an Asian daughter will enable the 
project of eliding or forgetting his racialization that he enacted by settling in Bedley Run. 
After being notified by the adoption agency that no Japanese children are available, Hata 
lowers his expectations to accept any child of “like-enough race,” relaxing his racial 
parameters in the face of “harmony and balance,” the “unitary bond of a daughter and 
father” of which he speaks to the agency representative. This attitude lasts only as long as 
his first introduction to Sunny, “a skinny, jointy young girl, with thick, wavy black hair 
and dark-hued skin” (204). Hata is disappointed: “the agency had promised a child from a 
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hardworking, if squarely humble, Korean family who had gone down on their luck” 
(204)—a family like his own, an adoption like his own that will transform the child into a 
Japanese(-American) subject. Such a child, Hata believes, would have helped him “make 
[his] own family, and if by necessity the single-parent kind then at least one that would 
soon be well reputed and happily known, the Hatas of Bedley Run” (204). The fantasy he 
describes here is of a family defined by its communal citizenship: “colleagues and 
associates and neighbors, though knowing her to be adopted, would have little trouble 
quickly accepting [their] being of a single kind and blood.” Such a fantasy, it is important 
to recognize, is based in knowledge of Bedley Run’s rudimentary understanding of 
racialization: community members do not recognize the nuances in distinguishing 
difference but rely instead upon “like enough.” Nevertheless, Hata’s dream of a 
Japanese(-enough) family is disrupted by the “less dignified circumstance[s]” of Sunny’s 
likely origins as the child of an African-American GI and a Korean prostitute. In fact, 
“her hair, her skin, were there to see, self-evident, and it was obvious how some other 
color (or colors) ran deep within her” (204).39 Sze Wei Ang’s work on Hata as a model 
minority figure emphasizes his difficulty with negotiating racialized bodies, noting his 
“anxieties over the body and how raced bodies appear in the landscape of the United 
States” and the fact that “Sunny’s body constantly breaks into Hata’s repressions of the 
very idea of race” while “her absence allows him to resolve that dissonance back into 
beliefs about citizenship qua individual propriety.”40 But this understanding of Hata’s 
racial forgetting as “repression” is imprecise, or at least it does not function at the level of 
individual belief; his statements reveal that he has simply accepted the promise of racial 
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forgetting first extended by his state-sponsored Japanese adoption and then re-articulated 
by U.S. multiculturalism in a post-Civil Rights era. 
Modes of Proper Citizenship: Ownership 
In many cases, the good life offered to minoritized citizen-subjects is presented as 
accessible via “the proper life that capitalism offers”—of employment, even 
entrepreneurship, and a nuclear family to welcome the worker home at the end of labor.41 
Though capitalism would occlude the functions of race in the work and home spaces, the 
process Eng terms “the racialization of intimacy” situates kinship and family as the new 
space for the management of race, racism, and property in the United States now that 
racial discourse in the public domain is circumscribed by doctrines of colorblindness and 
multiculturalism. His study usefully outlines the relationship between property and 
citizenship under neoliberal multiculturalism to argue that “under the neoliberal mandates 
of the ‘ownership’ society, political and economic rights—citizenship and property—are 
increasingly conflated.”42 The inevitable result of this conflation is that problems of a 
political nature are widely understood to have economic solutions: universal human 
ideals like emancipation and equality are narrowed and narrowed still further until they 
encompass only the ability to possess, to own, and to work. 
It is worth noting that Berlant cautions scholars mapping the contours of 
neoliberalism and global capitalism to be measured in the critique of this desire for the 
proper life as imagined and enabled via capitalist enterprise. The “fantasy of being 
deserving” of the good life is deeply related to “practices of intimacy” that take place at 
home, at work, and as a consumer. She encourages us to see normativity “as something 
other than a synonym for privilege . . . as aspirational and as an evolving and incoherent 
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cluster of hegemonic promises about the present and future experience of social 
belonging.”43 Even in the moment that we identify the desire for proper citizenship as an 
attachment of cruel optimism—one not generally available to minoritized subjects and 
that actually prevents the instantiation of other possible versions of the good life—we 
must be cautious of minimizing normativity’s appeal for minoritized subjects. Berlant 
asks, what can we learn about the desire for normativity when we stop equating it with 
privilege? 
In A Gesture Life, this conflation of citizenship and property centers on Hata’s 
reputation as a genial and successful businessman, as well as on his possession of a 
highly desirable home. He has built a reputation as “Good Doc Hata,” the proprietor of a 
medical supply store who sweeps the sidewalk, regularly updates his display window, 
and freely dispenses medical advice to his patrons. As the novel opens, Hata laments 
somewhat blandly that the New York City couple who purchased Sunny Medical Supply 
in its entirety have let the storefront get “weatherworn,” the sign’s gold-leaf lettering 
“now quite chipped and dull” (5). Indeed, the storefront display is three years old, the 
final arrangement Hata created before selling the store. In the hopelessly outdated Easter 
scene assembled to attractively present “bedpans and insulin kits,” we can read a 
metaphor for the life Hata has constructed and now narratively confronts. His efforts at 
creating “a window that is almost pleasing to look at” (5) have been invalidated by 
neglect and disrepair, as the display has been plundered of saleable items that have yet to 
be replaced. The once carefully cultivated window is, Hata is forced to admit, “a sad sight 
for the eyes. Everything’s been ruined by time and light” (6). 
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Still in control of his home, Hata has allowed no such decay to creep in. In fact, 
his friendship with Liv Crawford, a real estate agent, is based in large part on her breezy, 
aggressive manner toward him as a potential client. She compliments his landscaping, 
sends him gift baskets, and arrives at his door without an appointment, hopeful home-
buyers squeezed into her convertible and eager for a glimpse of the interior. Hata reflects 
on the satisfaction of ownership in the silence that settles following his disagreement with 
Renny about the racial tensions of Bedley Run: 
Liv is perfectly right in describing to Renny what store of happy goods I possess, 
my house and property being the crown pieces. And though it does occur to me as 
somewhat unfortunate that this should be so strictly true, I cannot help but feel 
blessed that I have as much as I do, even if it is in the form of box hedge and 
brick and paving stone. There is, I think, a most simple majesty in this, that in 
regarding one’s own house or car or boat one can discover the discretionary 
pleasures of ownership—not at all conspicuous or competitive—and thus have 
another way of seeing the shape of one’s life, how it has transformed and, with 
any luck, multiplied and grown. (137) 
Hata’s philosophy, then, is to read the course of his life in the accumulation of goods—
not, if we take him at his word, in a rapacious or competitive way, but in a sense of the 
intangible being made tangible. His language here, in describing his home and the land it 
sits upon as “crown pieces” and the sense of accomplishment as “simple majesty,” is 
aspirational, reaching for nobility and implying a kind of honor that possession confers. 
The possibility of racial tension raised by Renny’s objections, of the gradual collapse of 
the premises of multiculturalism, threatens this. 
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It is significant, then, that the most overt threat to the well-tended state of Hata’s 
property comes from Hata himself. Early in the novel, Hata uncharacteristically 
determines to start a fire to warm himself after a regular swim in his backyard pool. An 
absentminded arranging of kindling progresses to the impulse to burn “the decades-old 
files and papers and other expired and useless documents” related to the upkeep of the 
house that Hata has assiduously and, he finds, needlessly compiled (24). Feeding 
canceled checks, mortgage paperwork, and bank documents into the fire to keep it steady, 
he finds himself attracted to the “purity in the startling heat, its crave and intent” (25). 
Finally, he burns a set of insurance photographs, a visual record of the store and its 
inventory, of home improvement renovations and a lifetime of car ownership, “the 
catalog of my life, my being’s fill of good fortune” that speaks to the centrality of 
ownership and (self-)improvement that guides his days (25). Distracted by memories of 
Sunny, Hata does not notice as the fire burns out of control, escaping the constraints of 
the fireplace and putting Hata in the hospital with smoke inhalation. 
In light of Hata’s long-term economic prosperity, it might at first feel 
counterintuitive to classify his attachments to entrepreneurship, property, and family as 
ones of cruel optimism—as fantasies that impede his flourishing. Such attachments are 
the very stuff of the American Dream, “[a] popular form of political optimism [that] fuses 
private fortune with that of the nation.”44 Certainly a central characteristic of cruel 
optimism is its tendency to register most powerfully precisely in moments like the past 
two decades when such economic goals prove especially difficult to achieve. But A 
Gesture Life tells the story of how even a most appropriate minoritized subject who 
pursues the good life via the proper life of capitalism still encounters fundamental 
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impediments to his flourishing that are structurally yoked to the shape of his attachments. 
In Hata’s case, such impediments include a counterintuitive and unvoiced impulse to 
destroy the material proofs of economic success; a sense of obligation to an adopted 
daughter as atonement for past crimes that results only in mutual distance and disdain; 
and a literal haunting of the site of one’s family pride by the figure of past shame and 
death. The external threat of multiculturalism’s failure is coupled by the internal 
possibility that manifestations of cruel optimism—the actions that characterize a life of 
gestures—might undermine the life of propriety Hata works to establish and propagate. 
Property ownership structures Hata’s understanding of his obligations to his 
community. He is connected to his neighbors not, as some are to each other, by carpools 
or holiday parties, but by “an unwritten covenant of conduct” that “governs” all (44). 
Riding home in Liv’s car from the hospital after the house fire, he is struck again by his 
affinity for his adopted home town: “I know again why I favor it so much here, how I 
esteem the hush of this suburban foliage in every season, the surprising naturalness of its 
studied, human plan, how the privying hills and vales and dead-end lanes make one feel 
this indeed is the good and decent living, a cloister for those of us who are modest and 
unspecial” (130). The forethought, planning, and structure necessary to create a cloister 
of normativity reach their fullest potential in this suburb, manifested in an appealing and 
artificial sense of naturalness. No mere “unspecial” resident, however, Hata serves a 
crucial role for the imagined community of Bedley Run, a role he can rarely 
acknowledge, even to himself. He tells us in the first paragraphs of the text that his 
Japanese surname is “somehow town-affirming” (2), but it is not until we have 
experienced flashbacks to his time in World War II and his struggle to adopt and raise 
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Sunny (culminating in her departure) that he “aw[akes] to the notion” that he is “perfectly 
suited” to the town—that he “had steadily become, oddly and unofficially, its primary 
citizen, the living, breathing expression of what people here wanted—privacy and 
decorum and the quietude of hard-earned privilege” (275).45 What he has characterized as 
“an almost Oriental veneration” in the opening paragraphs of his narration is revealed not 
as the abstraction and equality of prominent citizenship, but tokenism. Significantly, the 
fact of his fitness to serve as the town’s primary citizen occurs to him only “during 
Sunny’s absence” (275), which suggests that her presence provides not the normative 
respectability of family (or, more darkly, the opportunity to revisit and revise past 
mistakes) but in fact a visible, racialized reminder of war, imperialism, and difference. 
Wartime Agency and the Adopted Subject 
As the scene in which Hata meets Sunny makes clear, he immediately recognizes 
Sunny as a racialized subject, but his story gives no hint that he recognizes himself as 
such. The “self-evident” facts of race he reads in the hair and skin of his adopted 
daughter find no correlation in any physical description of himself. There is no question 
that the Japanese-ification begun by colonial authorities in the moment of his adoption is 
anything but a complete success—no question, that is, except those raised by his wartime 
encounters with K. Eng argues that rights conferred by transnational adoption are 
“ghosted” by queer and diasporic subjects who remain outside the adoptive citizenship 
machine.46 Drawing upon and extending Eng’s analysis, I want to consider the ways 
Lee’s novel literalizes this process, by envisioning Sunny’s adoption and her 
estrangement from Hata to be ghosted by the figure of K. Examining the Lt. Jiro 
Kurohata’s relationship with K will help us understand the connection the novel 
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illuminates between adoption and violence.47 In the same moment that Sunny embodies 
Hata’s hope for a kind of redemption, her presence compromises Hata’s attempts to 
forget his past violent actions. Thus the stakes of Sunny’s adoption encompass more than 
the simple happiness of an abandoned Korean-American girl and her reticent, distant 
father: Hata apparently intends Sunny to provide a second chance to form a meaningful, 
non-coerced relationship with a woman. 
Later sections of the novel locate Hata’s obsession with propriety to a time and 
space that precedes his setting foot on American soil. Once Hata begins the slow 
narrative process of divulging his wartime complicity in the Japanese military machine, 
particularly in the maintenance of the “comfort women” conscripted into service, readers 
can see Hata as narrator strain to contextualize his interactions with the comfort women 
in relation to propriety. After Captain Ono informs Lieutenant Kurohata that he will be 
responsible for maintaining the “readiness” of these enslaved prostitutes, he thinks to 
himself, “As I was the paramedical officer—field-trained but not formally educated—it 
would be more than appropriate for me to handle their care” (166). The captain expects 
fighting to resume soon, and his attention will be required elsewhere; thus “maintaining 
the readiness of the girls” falls to Hata. The implication, Hata tells us here, is that their 
state of relative good health is bound to decline once they are subject to regular visits 
from officers and enlisted men. This is, essentially, a promotion for Hata, one he attempts 
to justify as “more than appropriate” given his training and readiness for the “difficult 
challenges” of propping up women increasingly abused, mistreated and used up in the 
course of performing their function. 
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Further details of Hata’s wartime experience emerge in the midst of his attempt to 
contextualize his fears of teenage Sunny’s vulnerability. In a flashback to 1944, Hata 
remembers the camp’s low morale due to the death of Admiral Yamamoto, the increasing 
frequency of Allied bombers, and a general lack of supplies. Two hundred soldiers live 
under “a deepening atmosphere of malaise and fear” that manifests itself, to medic 
Kurohata, in the prevalence of skin rashes and infections such that “the whole 
encampment [seems] afflicted” (158). Against these and other psychological 
manifestations of anxiety, Hata sets himself as the emissary of protocol, reminding a 
young Corporal Endo that “it is our way of life we’re struggling for, and so it behooves 
each one of us to carry himself with dignity, in whatever he does” (162). But Hata’s 
bracing words do not prevent Endo from developing an obsession with the “comfort 
women” newly introduced to camp; ultimately, the corporal kills one of the Korean 
woman and is executed. Following these deaths, Hata fears his own susceptibility to the 
malaise, worrying that to succumb would result in a failure of obligation that would be, 
like Endo’s murder of the woman, “not one of ego or self but of an obligation public and 
total—and one resulting in the burdening of the entire society of his peers” (229). Ever 
the proper soldier and citizen, Hata realizes that this fear is not specific to wartime but 
has actually been present all his life, “from the day I was adopted by the family Kurohata 
to my induction into the Imperial Army to even the grand opening of Sunny Medical 
Supply, through the initial hours of which I was nearly paralyzed with the dread of 
dishonoring my fellow merchants” (229). And so his striving in Bedley Run results in the 
creation of “Good Doc Hata,” the kind and knowledgeable Japanese medical man who 
becomes the town’s primary citizen. 
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Yet no matter how he would deny it, as the novel progresses Hata’s fear of 
dishonor crystallizes around the figures of the “comfort women” he has been assigned to 
care for—especially the woman he refers to as K.48 She represents the Korean identity 
from which he has exiled himself, and the dream of a future from which he has absented 
himself.49 As his attachment to K deepens, Hata schemes how to shield her from the 
caprice of Captain Ono and the violence of the comfort house but nonetheless engineers 
two coercive sexual encounters between them. Finally, he refuses her central request: that 
he kill her, as Corporal Endo killed her sister, and save her from the life ahead. 
Eventually K takes matters into her own hands, killing the captain and ensuring her own 
brutal death. Hata’s failure to acquiesce to K’s only request becomes, we realize, the 
central obsession of his life, the crime which he covers over again and again, only to have 
K reappear in his dreams. 
A Gesture Life suggests the lengths propriety must go to in order to cover over its 
origins in and continuing relation to violence. Hata’s concern with a kind of medicalized 
propriety becomes more evident as the novel progresses further into his army experience. 
Significantly, these concerns are often articulated in nationalist and even racial terms, as 
essentially Japanese traits that Hata identifies and then claims for and about himself. He 
invokes the Japanese sense of self-respect, glossing the term as having “little to do with 
pride or one’s rights but with the efforts a person should make to be viewed well by his 
comrades” (237). Self-respect does not, then, refer to one’s respect for oneself, except in 
the sense that one could not respect oneself if the respect of one’s colleagues were 
lacking. In fact, a primary source of Hata’s discomfort with his assignment to care for the 
“comfort women” in general and for K, set aside for the Captain’s mysterious and 
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particular purpose, is that there is “no protocol [he] could pattern [him]self by” (233). 
Finally he determines a kind of pseudo-protocol, that his “care” of the “comfort women” 
will be conducted with the same intent as care of the average soldier: to return the 
individual to a state from which his or her duties can once again be performed. 
Delineating the standards of “appropriate” care in a later section, Hata characterizes army 
policies as natural and binding: “as the doctor had already pointed out to me, it was a 
matter of standards, in this case to apply the level of treatment that was most appropriate 
for the situation, and for whom . . . All this was inviolable, like any set of natural laws” 
(227). Here, Hata’s description registers the ways attention to appropriateness serves a 
pernicious function—distinguishing between who merits treatment, and how much, and 
for what purpose. The natural law of wartime medical propriety enables and maintains a 
hierarchy of value of persons. 
Though perhaps more evident in times of conflict, the necessary violence of such 
a hierarchy attends the workings of propriety in civilian life as surely as it does in 
wartime.  Hata is painfully aware of the harsh edges and subtleties of hierarchy from an 
early age, living under Japanese colonialism. Leaving behind his community of “hide 
tanners and renderers,” ethnic Koreans who “spoke and lived as Japanese, if ones in 
twilight,” Hata takes the name and station of a childless Japanese couple (72). His 
relation to his adoptive parents is respectful but distant. Though he claims to “think of 
them most warmly,” as he does his biological parents, he maintains that he was raised 
and formed in the most fundamental sense not by either family but by the nation—that 
“purposeful society . . . and really nothing and no one else” (73). Hata’s painful 
consciousness, from an early age, of the stigma of life lived in “twilight” joins with his 
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nationally-orchestrated adoption to consolidate his reliance on received knowledge and 
his veneration for wealth, education, and position. He resolves at age twelve that he will 
“always give [him]self over to [society’s] vigilance, entrusting to its care everything [he] 
could know or ever hope for” (73). 
Hata writes of his military service in terms that consistently register his adoption 
and national identity. His training as a medic prepares him “to aid and sustain my 
comrades, to save them whenever possible, fulfilling my duty for Nation and Emperor”; 
he finds himself hopeful that battle would manifest his “truest mettle,” his “essential, 
inner spirit” and the “worthiness of raising [him] away from the lowly quarters of [his] 
kin” (120). For Hata, the nation is thus constituted through adoption, colonialism and 
war. The novel’s first reference to Hata’s wartime experiences comes after his house fire, 
as his interaction with a young Bedley Run candy striper leads him to contemplate his 
solitary status and the difficulties attendant to raising a child. In this moment, Hata claims 
to understand himself best in a solitary state (unlike those who understand themselves in 
relation to family or community), and contrasts his solitary present-day self with the 
communal self of the war: “there was a time when I held my own associations quite close 
to who I was, in the years leading up to and during the Pacific war, when in the course of 
events one naturally accepted the wartime culture of shared sacrifice and military codes 
of conduct. But then I eventually relinquished those ties for the relative freedoms of 
everyday, civilian life, and then finally decided to leave Japan altogether, for the 
relative—though very different—liberties of America” (68). But readers of this passage 
who continue through the novel realize the disingenuous basis on which such claims rest, 
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as Hata attempts to demonstrate that he has left behind an emphasis on codes of conduct 
in favor of freedoms and liberties that such codes might constrict.50 
Significantly, this brief and ambiguous passage contains the novel’s only 
reference to the “lost years” of Hata’s life—the time between K’s brutal, gruesome death 
at the hands of two dozen Japanese soldiers and his careful construction of home, 
business, and family in Bedley Run. Thus this short, obscure assessment of that period 
merits further examination. To begin, what does Hata mean when he claims, “I held my 
own associations quite close to who I was”? Earlier in that paragraph, Hata has suggested 
that “a surprising number of people prefer to imagine themselves through a filter of 
associations and links” (68), and so “associations” seems to reference the relationships 
and affiliations that structure an interior sense of self. This passage acknowledges the 
centrality of affiliation, most crucially to an adopted nation, in young Jiro Kurohata’s 
identity construction. The “natural” acceptance of a “wartime culture of shared sacrifice 
and military codes of conduct” became, Hata suggests, the foundation upon which his 
subject formation proceeded, with a sense of national loyalty and military propriety 
(reinforced, of course, by military justice) superseding all. Hata’s description here 
attempts to engage a kind of agency—he “relinquishe[s]” such ties, “eventually,” 
experiencing civilian life in Japan before the United States. What is most striking about 
this passage is the extreme language of qualification on a grammatical level: though he 
once “naturally” accepted wartime culture, he “eventually” leaves the military for the 
“relative” freedom of civilian existence, before “finally” emigrating from Japan in search 
of other “relative” (though different) civilian freedoms. 
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The uncertainty that surrounds this period of Hata’s life is most central, for the 
project of this chapter, in relation to what Kandice Chuh briefly identifies as the novel’s 
refusal “to offer origins, genetic or geographic, as the grounds for conceptualizing 
identity.”51 As Chuh suggests, “Adoption itself metaphorically subordinates the 
importance of origins to identity . . . And none of the other characters peopling this world 
have distinctly identifiable births, either literal or metaphoric.”52 She explains this 
aesthetic choice as a demonstration of the novel’s commitment to the circumstantiality of 
knowledge. But I want to rest for a moment in this question of the novel’s notable 
absences, to consider not only what the lack of origins leaves open but also to explicate 
the kind of citizenship that such absences theorize. In doing so, I hope to rectify what I 
identify as the most significant lack in existing criticism of this novel. 
It is important to consider the historical specificity of Franklin Hata’s Asian 
immigrant status, particularly in light of Lisa Lowe’s foundational work on the ways 
legal genealogies of Asian immigrants constitute the meaning of U.S. citizenship more 
broadly. If, as Lowe argues, “the life conditions, choices, and expressions of Asian 
Americans have been significantly determined by the U.S. state through the apparatus of 
immigration laws and policies, through the enfranchisements denied or extended . . .  and 
through the process of naturalization and citizenship,”53 why leave such details of Hata’s 
life experience outside the parameters of A Gesture Life? Lowe’s work suggests a 
possible answer, as she argues that “being represented as a citizen within the political 
sphere” requires that “the subject [be] ‘split off’ from the unrepresentable histories of 
situated embodiment that contradict the abstract form of citizenship” by which 
individuals are established as formally and legally equivalent.54 In other words, the 
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process of transforming an alien into a citizen concretizes a disavowal of racialized 
capitalism, sidestepping bodies defined by race and labor in the pursuit of the freedom 
that citizenship is understood to confer. 
If, as Lowe suggests, to be politically represented as an abstract and equal citizen 
requires a kind of violent, ahistorical disembodiment—the disfigurement Brian Glavey 
identifies that accompanies public representation discussed in chapter one—perhaps A 
Gesture Life works to resist a similar trajectory at the level of aesthetic representation. 
The “contemporary modes through which the liberal state discriminates, surveys, and 
produces immigrant identities”55—the binary designations of legal and illegal, citizen and 
non-citizen, and native-born and permanent resident—cannot gain traction in the case of 
this novel, which refuses to articulate the trajectory and history of such designations in 
the life of its main character. At the level of the text and the political economy, A Gesture 
Life leaves open the details of Hata’s migration from Japan as well as the question of his 
status in the eyes of the U.S. government. This decision redirects our focus away from the 
details of a legally inflected subjecthood to the questions of imperialism, family and 
adoption the text foregrounds instead. Such a decision also relentlessly begins and ends 
the question of agency not with the kind of agential citizenship conferred by the nation-
state but rather with the relational agency of a single man. 
What does agency mean, at the complicated nexus of imperialism, nationalism, 
and racism created in A Gesture Life? Looking back on the scene of the captain’s death, 
Hata as narrator claims, “All I wished for was to be part (if but a millionth) of the 
massing, and that I pass through with something more than a life of gestures. And yet, I 
see now, I was in fact a critical part of events . . . Indeed the horror of it was how central 
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we were, how ingenuously and not we comprised the larger processes, feeding ourselves 
and one another to the all-consuming engine of the war” (299). The shift from the 
singular “I” to the plural “we” suggests a kind of grammatical distancing. Even so, this 
passage raises a key question about the balance between participation and responsibility, 
about the relationship between what passes for a life of gestures and deep moral 
complicity. 
This passage ultimately suggests a question of agency deeply rooted in adoptive 
identity. In her discussion of this novel, Anne Anlin Cheng critiques formations of the 
ethics of recognition that are founded on liberal subject-centered notions of agency 
because they cannot account for moments when questions of consent and choice are 
compromised by minoritization. For example, Cheng suggests that the ways imperial 
discourse designates “comfort women” as “volunteers” calls into question Hata’s own 
“choice” to enlist in the Japanese Imperial Army, along with the ways we define agency 
for minoritized subjects more generally.56 To answer the questions A Gesture Life raises 
about the privilege of choice during crises of consent, Cheng suggests a triangular 
relationship of Lacanian visibility that would account for not only a subject and an object 
but also the gaze, “an agent without agency” that “serves precisely as a critique of our 
agency, our illusion of subjective and visual mastery.”57 In contrast, I suggest that the 
center of Hata’s agency or lack thereof rests not (or not only) in the question of visibility 
with which Cheng frames her study but rather with the question of attachment and how it 
complicates our understanding of agency. Berlant’s careful theorization of “lateral 
agency”—agency that we often do not recognize as agency because it does not articulate 
to our vision of the sovereign liberal subject—requires that we expand our notions of how 
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agency might appear or what it might accomplish outside the context of cognitive will: 
“Most of what we do, after all, involves not being purposive but inhabiting agency 
differently in small vacations from the will itself . . . [Such moments] can be seen as 
interrupting the liberal and capitalist subject called to consciousness, intentionality, and 
effective will.”58 In this sense, then, adjacent agencies are “a relief, a reprieve, not a 
repair”59—efforts that perhaps do not fully undermine the destructive attachments of 
cruel optimism but that might prevent the politico-aesthetic forms of capitalism from 
running quite so smoothly. 
Hata’s description of his own life considered earlier—a “nothing-of nothing drift 
from one pulse beat to the next . . . the most bloodless marking-out, automatic and 
involuntary”—suggestively frames a life of gestures as a life without what we would 
conventionally identify as agency. Understood in this way, Hata’s pursuit of an 
appropriate multicultural citizenship precludes the kind of sovereignty we associate with 
the citizen-subject. But as Berlant reminds us, “Sovereignty, after all, is a fantasy 
misrecognized as an objective state: an aspirational position of personal and institutional 
self-legitimating . . . But it is inadequate for talking about agency outside . . . acts in 
proximity to certain performances of law, like executions and pardons.”60 In other words, 
sovereignty is not an actual state but an aspirational orientation. It allows individuals and 
institutions to perform as sovereigns and feel in control of their actions—a desire that 
manifests the twin valences of physical and psychic violence this chapter traces, 
suggesting that Hata focuses on his own guilt because it is a recognizable form of agency. 
We can see Hata’s self-legitimating performativity in the figure of “Good Doc Hata” that 
he presents to his fellow citizens and his audience of readers, and in his affective sense of 
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control in the “lawyerly” way he speaks to his adopted daughter. He must perform 
control of Sunny because such performances satisfy his need to feel power over his own 
life. In this sense, the conventional understanding of sovereignty that forms the 
foundation for so much political and social critique is not illuminating but occluding—it 
gets in our way. In order to understand the form of agency that Hata enacts—not, notably, 
the one he imagines himself enacting—we need a different formulation. 
As much as Hata works to divorce his Bedley Run existence from the horrors he 
experiences and participates in during the war, his later emphasis on property and 
prosperity is dependent upon, and indeed framed by, the violence of war. A shocking 
transition between the end of chapter nine and the beginning of chapter ten underscores 
this most poignantly. After Corporal Endo, the unstable officer Hata has been mentoring, 
takes K’s sister into the forest and executes her before the commencement of her duties 
as a “comfort woman,” Endo is charged with treason (not murder) and sentenced to 
death. The description of both deaths is delicate and beautiful in its horror: her blood 
pools beneath her body, “the dry red earth turned a rich hue of brown” (188), while Endo 
cannot bring himself to commit ritual suicide on demand and so is beheaded, after which 
“his headless body pitched forward lightly, his delicate hands oddly outstretched, as if to 
break his fall” (189). Swiftly and terribly, these two figures are dispatched with no 
description of Hata’s reaction to their deaths. Immediately the next chapter returns us to 
the present, the monotonous propriety of Bedley Run: 
On any Saturday morning in the Village of Bedley Run, one can see everywhere 
the prosperity and spirit and subtle industry of its citizens. There are the running, 
double-parked cars in front of Sammy’s Bagel Nook, where inside the store 
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middle-aged fathers line up along the foggy glass case of salads and schmears . . . 
the as-if-competing pairs of lady walkers, neon-headbanded and sweat-suited . . . 
the well-dressed young families, many with prams . . . all over the village is the 
bracing air of insistence, this lifting breeze of accomplishment, and whether the 
people are happy or not in their lives, they have learned to keep steadily moving, 
moving all the time. (190-91) 
Quotidian, hard-working, wealthy, the citizenry of Hata’s adopted town and the banal 
normalcy of their weekend routines follows the images of death. Insistence, 
accomplishment, and most of all motion provide the atmosphere in which these 
individuals and families strive and acquire. But this quotidian scene is ghosted for Hata’s 
readers by the abrupt killings of Endo and the Korean woman, implying a strange and 
serious relationship between the scene of the past and the scene of the present that 
remains uncommented upon by our genteel narrator. 
After teenage Sunny returns to Bedley Run in the final stages of a pregnancy, 
Hata daydreams of ways to resolve their tortured relationship, imagining unbuckling his 
seatbelt and allowing the car to slide heavily into a stone wall bordering a sharp turn in 
the roadway. “If only once,” he thinks in the midst of the flashback, “I could cease 
imagining the various motions, and instead of conjurings and dummy musings that leave 
one subtly affected, take hold of some moment and fully acquit myself to it, whether 
decently or ignobly” (340). Hata’s dream here is that his agency would, for once, 
manifest itself as suitable for a sovereign subject: that he would act in such a way as to 
determine for himself his freedom or demise. Nonetheless, even in his fantasy, Hata’s 
agency is undermined. His actions are those of inaction: he would refrain from guiding 
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the car through the turn and submit to the hurtling forward of inertia and its inevitable 
consequences. 
When his agency does assert itself in ways we might recognize as sovereign, it 
destructively impinges on the sovereignty of others. Hata’s desire for agency, that he 
would “cease imagining the various motions” and act, “whether decently or ignobly,” 
finds its opportunity when his journey with a pregnant and unseatbelted Sunny reaches its 
termination: a local abortion clinic. Just a few days after Hata makes “several discrete 
contacts” following a panicked phone call about what he terms “her difficulty,” Sunny 
arrives from New York City much further along in her pregnancy than Hata expected 
(339, 338). The morning of her appointment for a requisite preliminary examination, 
Sunny tells Hata “she wasn’t sure anymore about going ahead”; in reply, he dissembles, 
reminding her that the first appointment is only an exam, not the procedure (341). When 
the doctor refuses to perform the abortion, Hata intimates that his decision will send 
Sunny to someone less skilled, where she will “no doubt suffer terrible injuries” (342). 
Reviving the adoption agency bribe by which Sunny was first procured, Hata suggests 
that the complications of such an operation might make it “much more costly than usual” 
but that he is “willing to do everything [he] can” to obtain the doctor’s assistance (343). 
Soothing the doctor’s concerns that Sunny herself seems “unsure” and that his nurse will 
not agree to assist in the procedure, Hata volunteers himself: “I’ll stand in for her . . . I 
was trained, once, in surgical methods and nursing. A long time ago, during the world 
war” (343). Once the doctor reluctantly agrees, Hata presents his final request: “that she 
[Sunny] be heavily sedated . . . so that she wouldn’t realize I was there, or much 
remember anything of what was done” (344). If Sunny were to ask in the present day, 
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Hata states that he would not admit his role in the abortion, that he would “have to lie” 
(345), a need he attributes to the extreme difficulty of the late-term procedure and the 
persistence of his memories: “what I saw that evening at the clinic endures, remaining 
unaltered, preserved” (345). 
Here the violence upon which appropriate multiculturalism is necessarily built 
comes to the forefront. This violence is not only the violence of minoritized subjectivity 
as it seeks to conform to the requirements of multiculturalism—the “nothing-of-nothing 
drift from one pulse beat to the next . . . automatic and involuntary” (320-21)—but 
physical violence enacted upon the coerced body of a pregnant woman. Hata’s desire to 
obtain Sunny’s abortion is explicitly coded in terms of his community-based shame: his 
first thought, when she emerges from the train, is that “it was a Sunday and quiet, when 
there was hardly anyone about . . . I ought to spirit her to the private clinic and to Dr. 
Anastasia as quickly as possible” (339). Though he resists this impulse, driving them 
home instead to await the appointed hour, Hata becomes obsessed with the physicality of 
Sunny’s pregnancy; in the fullness of her body he sees “a most sickening vision . . . the 
clearest picture of my defeats, familial and otherwise” (341). His determination to 
eradicate evidence of these defeats, by violent means if necessary, suggests the 
underlying violence by which propriety ensures its continued hegemony. 
Conclusion 
Late in the novel, we learn that Hata has been regularly visited by the specter of K 
in his thirty years in Bedley Run. Her final visitation comes near the end of the text, and 
this time her presence, Hata asserts, is “absolutely, unquestionably real, a once-
personhood come wholly into being” (286).61 She asks, “Will we be going away soon, 
206 
 
Lieutenant?” (287). With her question, K lays claim to a promise made by a young medic 
to a “comfort woman” who requested that he end her life: the promise that they would 
travel the world together after the war’s end. Tersely, present-day Hata answers K’s 
request with an appeal to the pleasure of ownership and established personhood which 
anchors him: “We have an impressive house and property in the best town in the area, 
where we are happily known and respected. We have ample time and quiet and means. I 
have tried as hard as I can to provide these things, and we have been welcomed as 
warmly as anyone can expect. Everything is in delicate harmony” (287). But K 
understands their mutual situation quite differently: the “delicate harmony” constructed 
and maintained by Hata’s life of gestures has in fact prevented K, once again, from dying 
and leaving Hata alone. The trappings of economic prosperity are literally a “penultimate 
trap of living, sustaining her beyond the pale” (287). History is being repeated, as Hata’s 
cautious and appropriate execution of his responsibilities to care for K prevent him from 
acquiescing to her central request—that he allow her to die. 
K’s resistance to Hata’s framework of home and property makes him realize that 
her question is not new. It is, rather, “a daily conversation we have . . . we have gone over 
this ground before, and before” (287). And it ends, on this night like all the others, with 
K’s fatigued acceptance of Hata’s refusal. After she joins him in bed, he falls asleep 
satisfied that K will remain with him, but wakes alone and steps outside, anxious for a 
trace of her: “When I looked back across the precious, stately landscape of my property, 
it seemed I had traveled far miles to the place I was standing, as if I had gone round and 
round the earth in an endless junket, the broad lawn a continent, the pool a whole ocean, 
the house the darkened museum of a one-man civilization, whose latent history, if I could 
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so will it, would be left always unspoken, unsung” (289). Here the ultimate expanse 
opened up by ownership is revealed: the bounded spaces of Hata’s property become a 
continent, an ocean, a one-man civilization of its very own that guarantees citizenship for 
its monarch and sole subject, even as it binds the ghostly spirit in whose honor it has been 
constructed. 
In the dark light of dawn, Hata returns to his house and draws a bath for himself 
in the bathroom once assigned to Sunny. The scalding water makes him feel as if his 
flesh were dissolving, enacting “the sensation of near-perfect lightness, of being in a 
place and not being there”—the “chronic condition” of Hata’s entire life, he admits (289-
90). In this disembodied state that unites presence and absence, Hata wishes for 
“erasure.” But this is a wish that calls up once again the specter of what he ought to do, 
think, feel: 
a man like me should be craving every last bit and tatter of his memory. He 
should consider the character of all his times whether pleasurable or tragic or sad. 
He should at last appreciate the serendipity and circumstance and ironical mien of 
events, and their often necessary befalling. He should, some god willing, take firm 
hold of all these and call himself among the fortunate, that he should have 
survived such riches of experience, and consider himself made over again for it, 
gently refitted for his slow stroll to the edge. But all I seem to think of doing is to 
stop, or turn around, or else dig in for a sprint, a stiffened, perambling, old-man 
leap off the precipice. And if I could just clear the first jutting ledges and simply 




It is significant that appropriateness here refers to the story a person will tell himself 
about the past, about the necessity of events, about his good fortune. Here, for the first 
time in the novel, Hata acknowledges the “should” of expectation but does not force his 
inclinations into direct alignment with it. Unlike the narration that has come before, 
where expressions of brief dissent or allusions to emotions or events that might disrupt 
the life of propriety he has built are quickly stifled by a re-articulation of duty, obligation, 
and proper action, in this scene Hata allows himself to dream inappropriately. 
But only for a moment. “[P]erhaps rightly, there is none of that for me,” the 
narrative resumes, transporting us back to the final day of K’s life, revealing Hata’s 
sexual desire for her, its violent culmination, her request once again that he kill her, and 
finally the utter violence of the demise she orchestrates. Reviewing the events of that day, 
Hata realizes that what K most hoped to escape was not just “the ever-imminent misery 
and horror” of her enforced role but in fact the desperate weakness Hata displays, as 
“someone heroic enough to act only upon his own trembling desire” (295). Seeking out 
the site of K’s slaughter, Hata gathers her remains and the figure of her unborn fetus, 
ripped from her body, claiming, “I could not know what I was doing, or remember any 
part” (305). Once again the next chapter returns us to the idyll of Bedley Run: an outing 
to the town pool with Sunny’s son, Thomas, which turns threatening when Thomas 
disappears in the water and Renny experiences a heart attack. And then the final 
revelation: that Hata not only orchestrated a late term abortion for Sunny after she 
returned to Bedley Run, but that he in fact assisted the doctor in performing the 
procedure. Here the sense of what is proper is out of joint: 
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[I]f in my life I’ve witnessed the most terrible of things, if I’ve seen what 
no decent being should ever look upon and have to hold in close remembrance, 
perhaps it means I should be left to the cold device of history, my likeness 
festooning the ramparts of every house and town and district of man. 
But it is not. And I do not live in broad infamy, nor hide from righteous 
pursuers or seekers of the truth. I do not mask my face or screen my doings of 
each day. I have not yet been banished from this earth. And though nearly every 
soul I’ve closely known has come to some dread or grave misfortune, I instead 
persist, with warmth and privilege accruing to me unabated, ever securing my 
good station here, the last place I will belong. (345-46) 
Propriety demands his humiliation, his dissociation. The forces of decency would transfer 
Hata’s personhood from contemporary life to the domain of history, adopting his face as 
a warning in a reinvention of the black flag that is his namesake. Propriety is revealed, in 
these final pages, to be not a path to citizenship but in fact that force that would demand 
Hata’s destruction. And it is only by escaping the regime of propriety, through a loophole 
this passage cannot identify, that Hata’s “fortune” and “good stations” remain intact. 
Ultimately, the novel ends with Hata reinforcing the way personhood (as he puts 
it, “to be”) is enacted via the complication that is family: his adopted mixed-race 
daughter and her fatherless son, conceived in circumstances outside Hata’s knowledge. It 
is an “unpredictable, richly evolving” form of subjectivity, which occupies a void that 
nothing else can fill: “For what else but this sort of complication will prove my actually 
having been here, or there? What else will mark me, besides the never-to-be-known 
annals of the rest?” (334). In these final pages, family and house are finally disentangled, 
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the one proof of his existence, the other a site that must be left behind, because it is there 
that “warmth and privilege accrue[es] to [him] unabated” (345). 
Only in the context of these observations can Hata discern what is false about his 
home and property, that with all its “double steeples and bluish leaded panes, and the 
crossed beaming of the stuccoed Tudor style,” it is in fact “a lovely, standing forgery” 
(352). He has instructed Liv to generate a bidding war that will fund his final plans: to 
purchase Sunny Medical Supply back for his daughter and her son, along with the 
apartments above it; to fund the hospital stay for Patrick Hickey, son of the couple who 
purchased his store and ran it aground amid their son’s wait for a heart transplant. And 
finally, to leave, seeking not “destiny or fate” but instead an existence apart: “Let me 
simply bear my flesh, and blood, and bones. I will fly a flag. Tomorrow, when this house 
is alive and full, I will be outside looking in. I will be already on a walk someplace, in 
this town or the next or one five thousand miles away. I will circle round and arrive 
again. Come almost home” (356). 
Critics disagree quite strongly about the meaning of these final lines.62 Certainly 
the ending registers once again the novel’s preoccupation with time (the gesture to 
tomorrow), adoption (what does it mean to “come almost home”?), and the flesh, blood 
and bones of racialized bodies. But these lines must be contextualized in light of the 
novel’s final flashback, to a conversation in which Hata and Mary Burns part for the last 
time. Their brief discussion about inheritance is incited by an unpleasant phone call from 
her daughter, whose eagerness to determine the amount she can expect to receive upon 
the death of her mother leaves Mary Burns somber. Mary Burns resumes the conversation 
with Hata the next day while swimming laps in his pool, observing that she imagines 
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Hata will leave his home and property to Sunny. Hata quickly agrees, but the reality of 
his complicated relationship with a then-fifteen-year-old Sunny immediately intrudes: 
It was then I understood better what had upset Mary Burns about her daughter’s 
phone call. There is a need for the belief—even if illusory—that despite the ever-
obvious evidence of familial messiness and complication, one’s child will always 
hold the most unconditional regard for her parent . . . We wish it somehow pure, 
this thing, we wish it unmixed, unalloyed with human hope or piety or fear or 
maybe even love. For we wish it not to be ornate. 
And yet it always is. (351) 
Hata’s use of the term “ornate” initially activates images of elaborate decoration, artfully 
wrought or perhaps even overwrought. But the adjectival form of “ornate” is also that 
which is seemly, decorous, and dignified.63 It is a term more suited to Hata’s Tudor-style 
home than his descriptions of “familial messiness,” and yet upon further reflection 
perhaps “ornate” is the perfect descriptor of Hata’s life of gestures. What he ultimately 
finds himself wishing for—what his decision to sell his home, leave the store to Sunny, 
and leave Bedley Run behind suggests—is in fact a way out of the seemly, decorous, 
dignified citizenship he has (perhaps unofficially) established for himself, and the alibi it 
provides for both the subject and object of the violence of neoliberal multiculturalism. 
From the deceptive dignity of a model citizen whose attempts to embody 
propriety occlude the violence of minoritized citizenship, this dissertation’s final chapter 
moves to two novels that forcefully embody inappropriateness at the level of language 
and literariness. Presenting the contemporary novel as an open system of textual and 
paratextual commentary that gathers together past, present and future in a way similar to 
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A Gesture Life’s enfolding of the twentieth century, two works by Sherman Alexie and 
Junot Díaz theorize the ways historical racialized violence begets present violence. 
Experimenting with an alternative conception of memory—not Hata’s rehearsed 
repository of individual sins but a mode of knowing that partners with forgetting—these 
novels present a form of empathetic relationality, grounded in difference, that this project 
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with the not ‘unwelcoming’ house of America upon Hata’s arrival in 1963 (3-4, 135-36), the ambivalent 
year of civil rights hope and violence” (7).  
51 Imagine Otherwise 102. 
52 Ibid. 103. 
53 Immigrant Acts 7 
54 Ibid. 2. 
55 Ibid. 19. 
56 “Passing, Natural Selection, and Love’s Failure: Ethics of Survival from Chang-rae Lee to Jacques 
Lacan” 560. 
57 Ibid. 567. 
58 Cruel Optimism 116. Berlant’s study emphasizes moments of pleasure as relief or reprieve—her most 
notable example is the pleasure of fast food consumption. Hata’s “pleasures” (for example, his romantic 
relationship with Mary Burns) take up very little space in A Gesture Life, and they are always subordinated 
to his social anxieties and private individualism (as the end of that relationship seems to suggest).  
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59 Ibid. 117. 
60 Ibid. 97-98. 
61 Scholars of A Gesture Life are divided on the significance and material realness of K as late-in-life visitor 
to Hata’s home. Perhaps most intriguingly, Christopher Lee reads the scene of K’s return as an exception to 
the novel’s realist materiality, in which her unexplained presence authorizes her as a source of objective 
truth (102). Though Hata’s recourse to narrative establishes and sustains what Lee terms K’s “aesthetic 
afterlife,” this recourse to aesthetics obscures the violence of the sexual enslavement that frames their 
meeting (105). Nonetheless, he understands K’s very powerlessness in the historico-political reality of the 
Imperial Japanese Army as in fact transformed into the power to narrate historical truth—a power withheld 
from Hata as complicit prevaricator of his life’s actions and story (106). 
62 Christopher Lee reads the ending as Hata refusing a future of kinship or community, choosing instead “a 
future that consists chiefly of the unstoppable movement of time, a future, in other words, that is a function 
of the novel’s linear temporality rather than a product of his agency” (109). Contrasting the final lines with 
the novel’s opening, Mark C. Jerng suggests that “Doc Hata narrates himself as the example of the good, 
assimilated immigrant whose quest for recognition and belonging has been fulfilled. But this process of 
assimilation is complicated by the ambivalences of the adoption narrative, captured by the latter phrase, 
‘come almost home’” (62). In other words, Lee’s novel is “resistant to the narrative closures that mark the 
search narratives and roots narratives of adoption discourse to the very end…forc[ing] us to dwell in the 
uncomfortable space of being ‘almost home’” (63). Anne Anlin Cheng argues that the ending demonstrates 
Hata’s “choice for active passivity in the most earnest sense: not the passive aggression that motivated 
much of Hata’s actions in the past…but instead an active refusal to act any further in bad faith” (571, 
emphasis original). Consequently, Cheng suggests that this active refusal results in “a refiguring of the very 
notion of gesture as the form of desire” (572), an acknowledgement that counteracts Hata’s many past acts 
of blind desire with an act of knowing desire. Chuh emphasizes the way the end of the novel leaves Hata’s 
plans unsettled: “The subject, I, has disappeared altogether in this final sentence, leaving it to read 
ambiguously as imperative and declaration both. It is a conclusion that is not a closure, the infinity of the 
circle having replaced the definitude of linear narration” (106). 
63 “ornate, adj.” Oxford English Dictionary.  
216 
 
Chapter Four: Making Literary History: The Improper Accounts of 
The Brief Wondrous Life of Oscar Wao and Flight 
At the end of this project—its final chapter—I want to begin with beginnings: the 
epigraphs of two novels, both published in 2007, which claim the space of the literary as 
an appropriate space for conducting the business of history. These epigraphs invoke 
questions of historicism, value, unspeakability, and witness. At the same time, they insert 
their respective texts—a Native American novel and a Hispanic Caribbean American 
novel—into particular literary histories, citing the irreverence of postmodern American 
literature, the galactic scale of comic book science fiction, and the racialized poetics of 
the Caribbean canon. Attention to these paratextual elements—the thresholds of the 
novels—reveals how these contemporary works theorize their respective historical 
projects as situated in a present that is always conditioned by particular pasts and that 
anticipates a specific form of futurity.1 
Sherman Alexie’s Flight takes its epigraph from Kurt Vonnegut’s 
Slaughterhouse-Five (1969), a firsthand account of the firebombing of Dresden that tells 
the story of a World War II veteran named Billy Pilgrim who becomes “unstuck” in time. 
The novel’s refrain, and Flight’s epigraph, is the commentary of a bird who witnesses 
Pilgrim’s time travel, the aftermath of wartime atrocities on Pilgrim’s apparently 
“normal” middle-class American life, and finally the Dresden massacre itself. The bird’s 
response—“Poo-tee-weet?”—ends the novel, dramatizing the essential unspeakability the 
text ascribes to the bombing by leaving the last word to a bird. Alexie’s choice of 
epigraph indicates that his novel will grapple with questions of historical unspeakability 
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via the perspective of an unsuitable witness—in the case of Flight, a half-Indian foster 
kid whose mass shooting sparks his own journey through time.2 
Junot Díaz precedes The Brief Wondrous Life of Oscar Wao with two epigraphs. 
The first, from a 1966 volume of Stan Lee’s Fantastic Four, asks, “Of what import are 
brief, nameless lives. . .to Galactus??” The second is an excerpt from the first section of 
Derek Walcott’s poem “The Schooner Flight” (1980). The speaker, Shabine, ends the 
epigraph portion of the poem by claiming, “I’m just a red nigger who love the sea, / I had 
a sound colonial education, / I have Dutch, nigger, and English in me, / and either I’m 
nobody, or I’m a nation.” Together, Díaz’s epigraphs establish his novel as involved in a 
historical project, one that stages two primary concerns. The first is a question of scale 
and of value—of whether “brief, nameless lives” possess any importance in the face of 
massive but non-equivalent destructive forces that seem to hold modern life in thrall: 
neoliberalism, late capitalism more broadly, globalization, poverty, the consolidation of 
wealth, racism, perpetual war. Value is evoked in the second epigraph by the suggestive 
linguistic impossibility that “I’m nobody”—that a speaking subject might in some sense 
possess no recognized subjectivity. 
The second historical concern of these epigraphs, Díaz’s novel, and this chapter is 
the paradoxical multiplicity of modern subjectivity—the plurality of brief lives that 
cohere in the face of immense power, and the desperate risk evoked by the gesture to 
twin poles of being: “either I’m nobody, or I’m a nation.”3 Walcott’s poem injects these 
concerns of value and multiplicity with a racial inflection; in other words, it is precisely 
because the speaker is of mixed race, the poem suggests, that he must be either “nobody” 
or “a nation.” The analytical apparatus that leads him to make such an assessment, his 
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“sound colonial education,” does not leave space for imagining a sustainable identity 
independent from the form of the nation. And so the epigraph reminds us of the 
constitutive nature of race in minority subject formation and neoliberal nation formation. 
Together, these two epigraphs reconnect race and material conditions by invoking the 
ways the situated perceiver (in the first case, Galactus; in the second, Shabine) represents 
the state of being valuable as inextricable from imperial subjectification and racialization. 
To be recognized as valuable (and worthy of protection) in the twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries requires that subjects achieve a particular racialized legibility to distinguish 
themselves from the mass of brief, nameless lives that inhabit our global neoliberal 
present. 
As projects of contemporary history by way of the literary, The Brief Wondrous 
Life of Oscar Wao and Flight adopt the hazards and motivations of their epigraphs. Oscar 
Wao risks the collapsing of scale implied in the invocation of a galactic dismissal of 
nameless lives and the possibility that some body could be a nation, could contain 
multitudes. It locates the science fictional universe of the Fantastic Four and the poetic 
Caribbean as the appropriate sites from which to embark on a history of America and of 
the “New World” more broadly. (As Oscar asks and the narrator Yunior repeats, “What 
more sci-fi than the Santo Domingo? What more fantasy than the Antilles?” (6)). 
Similarly, the historical literariness of Flight sends its narrator-protagonist back in time to 
witness firsthand the cycles of violence, dispossession and betrayal that thickly condition 
white-minority relations in the contemporary U.S. Asked how he feels in the midst of his 
first time-travel episode, a 1970s altercation between Native Americans and the FBI, Zits 
concludes, “Fucked by time, I think, and fucked by memory” (54). 
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Analyzing the histories presented in these literary texts, I examine the mutually 
constitutive dynamic between memory and forgetting that they deploy. In this final 
chapter, the concerns and critiques of the chapters that precede it are combined and 
extended: the Marxist-inflected forms of chapter one, the embodied archive of chapter 
two, and the affective citizenship of chapter three are expanded to the level of the 
historical archive to consider the relationship between the affective event and modes of 
historicization. I again invoke the trope of adoption and the related notion of fostering in 
order to consider ways of living in minoritized relation to the nation-state. Mindful of the 
different discourses of minoritization in which Flight as a Native American text and 
Oscar Wao as a Caribbean American text participate, I suggest that their related but 
incommensurate efforts to write history in the realm of the literary register the ways that 
history as literary strategy can be deployed to underwrite and undermine the political 
regime of neoliberal multiculturalism. Further, I posit that the prevalence of this 
historico-literary project in work by writers of diverse ethnic and Native literatures 
illuminates the exigence of projects of inappropriateness as a whole—the way that 
inappropriateness as an aesthetic mode operates to counter propriety’s perceived 
hegemony. 
Though Oscar Wao is an irreverent epic and Flight is generally characterized as a 
young adult novel, both works feature adolescent protagonists whose lives are shaped (as 
Hata’s life is shaped in A Gesture Life) by multivalent violence: the violence of diaspora 
and dispossession, of familial and kinship destruction, of conquest and colonialism. Zits, 
the narrator of Flight, and Oscar, the titular protagonist of Oscar Wao, share a series of 
characteristics and interests. Unattractive and largely unloved (even self-loathing), these 
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characters’ alienation cannot only be attributed to racial and ethnic difference. Both 
teenage boys lack social savvy and instead immerse themselves in the world of media: for 
Zits, books (especially histories) and television; for Oscar, books (especially science 
fiction) and role playing games. Each is uncomfortable with his living situation and 
attuned to the rejection, physical abuse, and hypocrisy enacted by family members, by 
authority figures (like police officers and psychiatrists) and by the nation-states in which 
he resides. These tangled characteristics and investments result in the creation of 
subjectivities that “lie athwart modernity”4: neither children nor adults, Zits and Oscar do 
not embody the possibilities of the future or possess the authority that maturity conveys. 
Their mutual obsession with genre—whether science fiction and fantasy or the 
conventions and expectations of genre more broadly—underscores each text’s 
deployment of histories that critique the parameters of “real” (official) history and the 
seriousness of institutionalized knowledges generally ascribed to history, as is hinted in 
the epigraphs. Most importantly, these texts foreground character development—
physical, mental, emotional—as a way to register and critique history’s own 
developmental teleologies. In each of these novels, Oscar and Zits “grow up” into family, 
into experienced sexuality, and into a sense of their identity and individual worth. These 
processes are represented as engaging with but also troubling tidy narratives of human 
development, whether individual and formal—as in the genre of the bildungsroman—or 
collective and historical—as in the teleology of progress that separates civilized from 
primitive. In place of any such teleological narratives, Flight and Oscar Wao present 
affective histories that engage with the historical events, institutions, and norms of 
neoliberal multiculturalism relationally, emotionally, and imaginatively. 
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History and Neoliberalism 
To understand how these texts concomitantly trouble history and neoliberalism, 
we must consider: what does history come to mean under neoliberalism? To paraphrase 
historian David Scott, how does the demand for a certain kind of (neoliberal) future 
oblige its histories to produce certain kinds of pasts?5 A brief analysis of major legislative 
and judicial decisions of the past two decades reveals how history is deployed in key 
sectors of public discourse. We see the claims neoliberalism makes upon history at such 
documentary sites as the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996, 
which presents a history of “out-of-wedlock” births since 1965 as justification for 
congressional welfare-to-work “reform.”6 Such histories are even more significant in 
jurisprudence, where the role of history intersects with juridical concern for precedent. 
Appeals to precedent are meant to ensure continuity of outcomes, and yet certain judicial 
narratives step outside legal precedent to engage with extralegal histories. This process 
crystalizes, for example, in the 2013 U.S. Supreme Court decision that struck down the 
section of the 1965 Voting Rights Act (reauthorized by Congress most recently in 2006) 
requiring federal “pre-clearance” for electoral changes in states and counties known for 
egregious voter suppression. Authoring the majority opinion and presenting a history of 
U.S. electoral process dating from the 1870 Fifteenth Amendment, Chief Justice John 
Roberts suggests that “[n]early 50 years [after the Voting Rights Act], things have 
changed dramatically,” “in large part because of the Voting Rights Act.”7 As evidence, 
Roberts specifically cites 1964 and 1965 electoral violence in Philadelphia, Mississippi, 
and Selma, Alabama, before noting triumphantly that both towns are now governed by 
African American mayors. “[O]ur Nation has made great strides,” the opinion concludes, 
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and thus “the conditions that originally justified these measures no longer characterize 
voting in the covered jurisdictions.”8 
To frame the significance of history under neoliberalism as the obligation for 
histories to produce certain pasts is meant to indicate that such production is not total or 
hegemonic but flexible and dependent. This project has adopted Jodi Melamed’s 
definition of neoliberalism as “a world-historical configuration of economy, governance, 
and biological and social life.”9 In Melamed’s crucial formulation, neoliberalism is 
“more than just an economic theory”: 
it encompasses the entire complex of social, political, and cultural norms and 
knowledges that organize contemporary regimes of rule and becomes a name for 
the differentiated experience of citizenship that ensures that governments protect 
those who are valuable to capital, whether formally citizens or not, and that they 
render vulnerable those who are not valuable within circuits of capital, whether 
formally citizens or not.10 
In other words, neoliberalism is a regime of late capitalism that activates a complex 
system of epistemological and ontological norms to categorize and motivate 
contemporary global and national subjects. Like Alexie’s and Díaz’s epigraphs, this 
definition centralizes questions of value to underline the precarity that accompanies 
differentiated citizenship. 
Under neoliberalism, history comes to mean teleology: moving in a linear fashion 
from a defined past to a clear present, setting the developmental stage for an anticipated 
future that can be understood in light of the past. Conceptualized in this way, the histories 
of the present must stage the failures of the past and explain the successes of the present 
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as progress. Neoliberal histories naturalize the austere present, producing the present as 
the rational and inevitable outlay of U.S. nationalism and global capitalism. To do this, 
such histories must characterize racial, class-based, gender and sexual inequalities as 
regrettable effects of past political and cultural systems that preceded neoliberalism, as 
remnants of the past’s failures that will be remedied by neoliberalism’s emphasis on 
individual (economic) freedoms. 
In particular, neoliberal histories produce the present as an exceptional moment, 
such that the “crisis ordinariness” (to use Lauren Berlant’s term) of perpetual war appears 
as commonsensical national and global existence.11 Neoliberal histories perform 
transparency, offering themselves as comprehensive. As Lisa Lowe says of the work of 
recovery scholarship, neoliberal histories “supplement forgetting with new narratives of 
affirmation and presence” and reproduce “the violence of affirmation and forgetting” in 
such a way that it does not appear as violence.12 Thus in asking its histories to render the 
past entirely knowable, neoliberalism effectively, affectively, asks them to exhaust us—
to preemptively render our efforts to register what has been forgotten, the what-could-
have-been, unnecessary. In other words, histories that operate to uphold and maintain 
neoliberalism must convey the sense of a self-evident and comprehensive past in order to 
disenfranchise other potentially subversive histories.13 
Under neoliberal multiculturalism, a particular instantiation of neoliberalism 
assigned to deal with difference, “history” comes to mean a reliable mode of accounting 
for difference. Melamed defines neoliberal multiculturalism as a dimension of racial 
formation that creates “new privileged subjects, racializing the beneficiaries of 
neoliberalism as worthy multicultural citizens and racializing the losers as unworthy and 
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excludable on the basis of monoculturalism, deviance, inflexibility, criminality, and other 
historic-cultural deficiencies.”14 In this sense, multicultural histories stage the failure of 
old ways of understanding (and valuing) difference, colonizing white supremacy and 
legalized racism as the purview of a misguided past. Such histories facilitate the collapse 
of difference—understood as an outmoded form of identity politics no longer useful or 
necessary in a post-Civil Rights United States—into the regime of difference-as-
sameness that goes by the term “diversity.” They dissolve race into “ethnicity” and 
universalize ethnicity as the possession of every U.S. subject in a nation of immigrants. 
Finally, under neoliberal multiculturalism, “history” comes to mean a disconnection of 
race from material conditions, the elevation of individual rather than racially collective 
positions and freedoms, and the obscuring of economic and racialized systems that 
discipline minoritized subjects—notably, ideological apparatuses like propriety. 
In this vein, inappropriate histories like those narratives I trace in this chapter are 
histories that fail. Such histories compromise rather than uphold neoliberal ideologies. Of 
course, neoliberal discourse does not register these failed histories so straightforwardly—
they are denigrated instead as improperly subjective or aesthetically compromised; as 
monocultural or regressive; as shallow or glib.15 But I use the term “failure” to evoke the 
ways that such histories call forth the vulnerabilities of neoliberalism. In The Queer Art 
of Failure, a treatise on the circumstances, effects and affects that coalesce around what 
we mark as failure, Jack Halberstam investigates the “rewards” of failure—the ways it 
might circumvent business as usual under racialized late capitalism: “Under certain 
circumstances failing, losing, forgetting, unmaking, undoing, unbecoming, not knowing 
may in fact offer more creative, more cooperative, more surprising ways of being in the 
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world.”16 Halberstam explores how we might find new ways of being in the world not 
only in relation to political discourse but also academic discourse, which conventionally 
advocates knowledge, mastery, recovery, and management of the archive as appropriate 
scholarly aspirations. In response, Halberstam encourages us to “master the art of staying 
lost” in order to conduct “a detour around ‘proper’ knowledge.”17 Such an art also, 
Halberstam’s work suggests, offers a detour around neoliberalism’s pervasive scope, for 
“failure’s byways are all the spaces in between the superhighways of capital.”18 Thus 
failure is an improper affective, discursive, economic and political endeavor. 
The histories examined in this project are those that fail to sufficiently encompass 
the past and make it knowable, that fail to naturalize the present. Oscar Wao and Flight 
do not straightforwardly substitute presence for absence; they in fact privilege forgetting 
as an equal partner to memory. They fail to consign inequality and injustice to the past, to 
safely cordon off violence and racism from the present. Such histories, produced in 
literariness, conduct what I term an aesthetic betrayal, in that they resist the identity 
politics of representation attached to them by academic and cultural discourses. These 
histories do not merely elevate subjugated knowledges to the status of official 
knowledge—they blend and negotiate official and unofficial knowledges to illuminate 
their continual interplay in the lives of formal and informal subjects of the United States. 
Forgetting in the Present 
My larger project is a history of the present—a history of the ways that propriety 
functions as an ideological apparatus to discipline U.S. subjects at the turn of the twenty-
first century, especially subjects who are re-hierarchized and re-racialized under the terms 
of racial minoritization.19 In Cruel Optimism, Lauren Berlant asks after “a historicism 
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that takes seriously the form or aesthetics of the affective event” to consider what such a 
historicism “might have to attend to, in relation to the institutions, events, and norms that 
are already deemed history’s proper evidence.”20 To write a history (especially one of the 
historical present) requires attention to institutions, events, and norms—what Berlant 
calls history’s proper evidence. But what about the affective realm, Berlant’s work asks, 
and the affective events that occur alongside such events that meet the criteria of proper 
evidence? 
This chapter, then, is about literary histories—temporally situated 
representations—and propriety as an ideological apparatus that regulates history-telling 
in our historical present. Riffing on Frederic Jameson’s claim in The Political 
Unconscious that “history is what hurts,” Berlant states: “History hurts, but not only. It 
also engenders optimism in response to the oppressive presence of what dominates or is 
taken for granted.”21 In this context, optimism means a hopeful attachment that can itself 
be dark (or cruel). Yet to suggest that history can respond to the dominant, the taken-for-
granted, with a generative force (what Berlant calls “political emotions”) is to suggest 
that history possesses the ability to register these elided hegemonic forces in the first 
place and then to engage them. For this reason, this chapter considers the discerning and 
generative powers of inappropriate histories. At the level of text, I examine how literary 
texts perform history: how they formulate historical knowledge and modes of knowing; 
how they communicate the relationship between past, present, and future; how they 
support or disrupt narratives of human development. I also interrogate historical knowing 
at the level of academic discourse, considering how histories like those by Alexie and 
Díaz impact disciplinary conventions and how our structuring disciplinary expectations 
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determine the histories we recover and those we work to repress. Finally, at the level of 
political economy, I ask how disentangling the contemporary processes of neoliberal 
history-making exposes the vulnerabilities of neoliberal racial formations. When we mark 
the ways our contemporary present is constituted by experience and expectation—
Reinhart Koselleck’s terms for the “present past,” the part of the past incorporated into 
the present, and the “future made present,” our affective desiring relationship to the not-
yet22—we can see the contours of alternate futurities that neoliberal histories occlude. 
On the surface, both novels under study have met with generally positive critical 
reception; the inappropriateness I identify does not stem from their place in academic or 
popular discourse, though each has its critics, too. The New York Times characterized The 
Brief Wondrous Life of Oscar Wao as “Mario Vargas Llosa meets ‘Star Trek’ meets 
David Foster Wallace meets Kanye West,” and suggests that it “decisively establishes 
[Junot Díaz] as one of contemporary fiction’s most distinctive and irresistible new 
voices.”23 A Washington Post reviewer goes so far as to claim that “Junot Díaz has the 
cure for [the] woeful myopia” afflicting many Americans who know the Dominican 
Republic only for its many contributions to Major League Baseball.24 Implicitly 
reflecting the concerns with cultural authenticity that attend most (if not all) productions 
by minoritized writers, a New York Times review of Flight calls Alexie’s work “raw and 
vital . . . there isn’t a false word in it”25—an assessment that Alexie’s publisher chose to 
feature on the front cover of the paperback printing. In scholarly criticism, the charges 
against each seem to rest in the vividness of their broad cultural brushstrokes. While 
acknowledging the “seminal” role Alexie plays in contemporary American literature as a 
writer “who complicates simple prescriptions of national identity,” Steven Salaita charges 
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that “Alexie’s fiction is tacitly reliant on the normative categories he challenges in terms 
of aesthetics, politics, and marketing.”26 Elena Machado Sáez describes Oscar Wao as “a 
seductive novel that probably didn’t need the 2008 Pulitzer Prize to endear it to the 
academy” because “the novel is responsive to the values of an academic readership” in its 
appealing deployment of hybrid, polyvocal, diasporic identity. Yet Sáez argues that the 
work presents a narrator, Yunior, who “dictates” the heteronormative terms on which 
authentic diasporic identity must be enacted.27 
This chapter presents for comparison two works arising from different, though 
related, political contexts. In reading The Brief Wondrous Life of Oscar Wao together 
with Flight, I do not wish to collapse diasporic ethnicity and indigeneity into a defanged 
category of general U.S. racialization—such is, in fact, the very project of neoliberal 
multiculturalism that this study interrogates. In When Did Indians Become Straight? 
Mark Rifkin cogently articulates what happens when indigeneity is reduced to race or 
ethnicity: “While the exertion of authority over native peoples certainly has relied on 
racialization,” he acknowledges, “viewing all ‘subjects of color’ as members of ‘minority 
cultures’ . . . reinstalls the nation-state as the sole way of framing geopolitical identity 
rather than acknowledging the existence of competing forms of sovereignty and self-
determination.”28 To understand “Native American” as a racial category is to evacuate 
native peoples of their status as political entities and characterize their modes of 
governance and cultural structures as forms outside the realm of proper politics. 
Such an evacuation consolidates the nation-state as embodiment, performer and 
arbiter of proper politics; it is also a crucial tool of neoliberal multiculturalism’s efforts to 
populate a pluralistic United States with appropriate national and global citizens. 
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Melamed attributes this orientation to “the multicultural understanding of culture as 
aesthetics and identity—unmoored from materialism and the natural world” that has 
particularly and violently impacted indigenous peoples worldwide: “By portraying all the 
world as the potential property of global multicultural citizens and treating indigenous 
people as ethnic minorities at best, neoliberal multiculturalism has made the 
appropriation of indigenous lands, territories, and resources by state governments and 
corporations appear democratic and fair.”29 Conventional multicultural discourse treats 
American Indians as ethnic minorities under the confines of cultural pluralism, Melamed 
argues, and in doing so undermines the political independence of tribal governance and 
makes any government-to-government relations between the U.S. and American Indian 
nations seem counterintuitive. 
Native literary criticism and fiction in turn mount a particular challenge to the 
perceived hegemony of neoliberal multiculturalism, in their relative indifference to the 
canon wars, emphasis on tribe- and region-specific sovereignty criticism, and 
commitment to establishing centers for knowledge production that are independent of 
dominant state-oriented epistemologies. For these reasons, Native fiction and poetry 
holds the potential to “stymie[ ] liberal-multicultural reading habits to make difference 
robustly appear as a different episteme.”30 To make difference robustly appear as a 
different episteme might be understood as a central effort of both Flight and Oscar Wao. 
As I discuss with regard to the fiction of Monique Truong, Rodrigo Lazo contends that 
certain minoritized texts contain difference “emphatic enough to prompt a 
reconsideration of the archive’s limits.” 31 Presumably this includes the limits of 
historical and literary-historical archives. Drawing on and unraveling the genres of 
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fantasy, science fiction, history, and magical realism, these novels voiced by angry nerd 
outcasts are obsessed with language—the language of the streets, the language of 
Spanish, foul language, official language, and especially the language of alienation. Such 
linguistic acrobatics formally resist the consolidation of conventional reading habits—as 
with the synesthetic renderings in Bitter in the Mouth—perpetually unsettling the 
middlebrow reading practice with reference to the worlds of science fiction and pop 
culture. They also index a primarily popular rather than academic audience. 
Setting these works in conversation enacts a comparative move that also unsettles 
the terms of neoliberal multiculturalism at the level of academic discourse, undermining 
the category of American literature as it coalesces around or excludes contemporary 
writers of color. In his critique of Alexie’s fiction, Steven Salaita draws attention to the 
way that Native American literature complements and complicates the category of 
“American literature” precisely because “North America’s Indigenous peoples predate 
the taxonomical criteria that underline” the category.32 Junot Díaz similarly seeks to 
unsettle distinctions—academic and especially political—between “America” as a 
synonym for the United States and the Caribbean or Dominican Republic, arguing that 
“America, the United States, what we call the contemporary world, doesn’t make sense 
without the knowledge that the Caribbean bears on its back and in its silences.”33 
The particular purview of this chapter is literature by minoritized writers that 
perform history in inappropriate ways. Nancy Peterson, in a comparative project on 
ethnic women writers in contemporary U.S. literature, suggests that “minority histories 
have never come into full cultural consciousness, because mainstream American history 
is so relentlessly optimistic and teleological that it has become painfully difficult to 
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articulate counterhistories that do not share these values, and because postmodern culture 
works against sustained engagement with memory and commitment to complexity that is 
crucial for these histories.”34 In other words, such histories are inconvenient to a political 
consciousness that would privilege the developmental immigrant narrative and to a 
philosophical orientation that undermines the possibility of unmediated access to 
historical truth. In response, Peterson turns to literature as a site of counter-history, 
arguing that “literature is an unofficial, unauthorized site for writing histories” that can 
“address issues and events that are marginalized or ignored by the rules of safe politics 
and clear evidence that underlie official historical accounts” through the deployment of 
“narrative flexibility” and the eliciting of “willing suspension of disbelief.”35 Peterson’s 
claims about the power of the historicist dimensions of literature to counter the national 
amnesia of the United States align at a foundational level with my desire to examine the 
ways literature does history. Yet I am mindful that minoritized literary histories can serve 
the status quo just as official histories can—especially in the neoliberal multicultural 
moment when stories about difference are asked to serve as stand-ins for difference and 
to authorize the management of difference in the service of late capitalism. 
Much excellent recovery work has been conducted in the disciplines of literary 
studies, cultural studies, and history in the past few decades, particularly by scholars in 
feminist, ethnic and African American literature seeking to expand a patriarchal canon 
and challenge white supremacist narratives of U.S. history. Yet such recovery work at the 
same time reflects an orientation to neoliberal conceptions of history and race that 
privilege filling in gaps over efforts to interrogate the systems that created such gaps in 
the first place. In contrast, Lisa Lowe’s essay “The Intimacies of Four Continents,” a 
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study of the archival traces of “coolie” laborers in the Caribbean following the Haitian 
Revolution, theorizes recovery with a different purpose in mind. Lowe’s piece 
investigates the elision of Asian laborers “not to pursue a single, particularist cultural 
identity, not to ‘fill in the gaps’ or ‘add on’ another transoceanic group, but to explain the 
politics of our lack of knowledge.”36 Resisting the impulse toward immediate recovery or 
recuperation of this “coolie” figure, Lowe instead dwells on the ethics and politics of 
loss, on “the way the humanist archive naturalizes itself and ‘forgets’ the conditions of its 
own making” and on “what it means to supplement forgetting with new narratives of 
affirmation and presence.”37 This distinction lies in the activation of a “past conditional 
temporality” that makes claims to “what could have been”—what Reinhart Koselleck 
calls “futures past,”38 or the possibilities that conventional histories foreclose in favor of 
a fixed emphasis we might term “what was.” In this context, Lowe calls upon scholars of 
history “to act within but think beyond our received humanist tradition and, all the while, 
to imagine a much more complicated set of stories about the emergence of the now, in 
which what is foreclosed as unknowable is forever saturating the ‘what-can-be-
known.’”39 
For this reason, my project foregrounds an approach to history based on the 
relationship between memory and forgetting, understood as failed memory. Attending to 
forgetting as an equal partner to remembering, I consider forgetting as a project and event 
that must itself be marked as it opens up a new mode of historicism to account for 
history’s absences as well as presences. Thus one way to examine the politics of our lack 
of knowledge is to register and fill in not the historical memory that has been lost, but the 
process of forgetting that has been elided. To dwell in forgetting can be productive, 
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Halberstam argues, if we understand it as opposed to (historical) memory. Foucault calls 
memory a disciplinary mechanism, a “ritual of power” that “selects for what is important 
(the histories of triumph)” and “reads a continuous narrative into one full of ruptures and 
contradictions.”40 In contrast, “forgetting becomes a way of resisting the heroic and grand 
logics of recall and unleashes new forms of memory that relate more to spectrality than to 
hard evidence, to lost genealogies than to inheritance, to erasure than to inscription.”41 
Invoking spectrality, lost genealogies and erasure, this question of memory and forgetting 
is intimately connected to the analysis of archives conducted in chapter two. In that 
examination of ephemeral archives and their traces, I articulate the relationship between 
memory and history as one that is triangulated through the archive. Memory is less 
systematic and referential than the archive, and history does not possess the archive’s 
capacity to preserve across time. Yet their mutual relationship is also significant—
memory’s relation to historical knowledge has to do with its capacity as one way 
knowledge is accessed. 
Forgetting arrests narratives of development and progress, and so the art of 
forgetting (of staying lost to memory) “can be a useful tool for jamming the smooth 
operations of the normal and the ordinary.”42 Yet forgetting is not an end in itself (as 
Halberstam acknowledges), and so I do not want to privilege the gap, the aporia, in such 
a way that concern for real knowledge of lost histories and counterhistories holds no 
value. Rather, the concept of forgetting is useful not because it does away entirely with 
memory, or with history, but because “[f]orgetting is also what allows for a new way of 
remembering.”43 In other words, forgetting is not always necessarily an antagonistic 
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counter-narrative to neoliberalism or the regime’s institutionalized histories; it is, 
however, one avenue to enrich discourses of history. 
The role of history in academic discourse, and particularly the histories created in 
the work of analysis, interpretation and recovery, deserves further scrutiny. Examining 
the scholarly histories generated in postcolonial studies, Ann Laura Stoler posits that 
racial histories should themselves be objects of study, suggesting that they too often 
accept and replicate the regimes of truth of the very racial discourses they mean to 
examine. She cautions scholars to consider the founding myths and investments that their 
own histories perpetuate—even histories that appear as vehicles of critique.44 Arguing 
that the critically generated dichotomy between the static nature of old racial discourse 
and the fluidity of new racial discourse dramatically oversimplifies eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-century colonialism, Stoler reminds us that the adaptability of colonial racisms 
was not a weakness but in fact a strength that ensured their continuation. This observation 
must impact how we generate critical histories, for “if racial discourse embraces fixity 
and fluidity and this oscillation is partly where racisms’ resiliency lies, then the new 
histories we write and how we write them . . . too must reckon with the political field in 
which both notions are strategically invoked for scholarly argument.”45 What does this 
observation mean for a racial history of the present, and for this chapter’s investigation of 
inappropriate literary histories? Postracialism is a racial discourse; to reckon with its 
fixity and its fluidity requires us to analyze its stable tenets and its softer places, being 
cautious that what we perceive as postracialism’s vulnerabilities may nonetheless 
reinforce its hegemonic hold on contemporary life. It is precisely for this reason—
postracial fixity and fluidity—that I advocate for the re-examination of works that fail to 
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adopt a properly multicultural perspective. To understand the strategic oscillation 
postracialism practices between advocating and rejecting particular cultural productions 
is to begin to sketch the contours of contemporary racial discourse. And to understand the 
theories of history these novels present as they open out from their historically minded 
epigraphs is to begin identifying a mode of inappropriate historicism. 
History as Curse 
From the start, Oscar Wao’s Oscar de León is the unlikely subject of a historical 
epic. Sensitive, sentimental and sexually rejected, the overweight Dominican son of 
diaspora posts obscure Lord of the Rings jokes above his dorm room. He’s a poor student, 
a copious and aspiring writer. It is from his posthumous archive—“fragmented and 
unfinished books, letters, composition notebooks, and a quartet of space operas” 46—that 
primary narrator Yunior pieces together the novel’s complex story of three generations of 
a Dominican American family: Abelard Cabral, who is arrested by the Trujillato after 
attempting to shield his daughters from the dictator’s voracious appetites; Belicia Cabral, 
Abelard’s daughter and the only surviving family member, who immigrates to New 
Jersey after she is beaten nearly to death following an affair with Trujillo’s brother-in-
law; and Beli’s children, Lola and Oscar de León. While Oscar Wao centers primarily on 
Oscar’s nerdboy fandom and romantic turmoil, it is also from the start an ambitious 
narrative about diaspora and the violent legacy of dictator Rafael Leonidas Trujillo, who 
ruled the Dominican Republic in various official capacities from 1930 to his assassination 
in 1961. Díaz registers the gaps and elisions necessary to the project of historical 
representation in the novel’s distinctive formal choices: its use of extensive historical 
footnotes and multiple narrators (including Lola), the mid-story revelation of a highly 
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subjective primary narrator, and its cobbling together of the stories of three generations of 
the de León family that have been lost to history. What happens, this novel asks, when 
the aesthetic unravels—when the gaps and fissures in a story about the historical past 
threaten to overwhelm the project of representation? 
The novel opens with a much-analyzed seven page introduction that establishes 
the novel’s concern with history via a genealogy of fukú—“generally a curse or a doom 
of some kind; specifically the Curse and the Doom of the New World” (1). Díaz’s 
introduction presents a counterhistory of Columbus’s “discovery” and the arrival of 
Europeans on Hispaniola; of Rafael Trujillo’s brutal twentieth-century Dominican 
dictatorship; and of the assassination of John F. Kennedy and the cause of the Vietnam 
War. But the history of fukú, the narrator is quick to reveal, “ain’t just ancient history” 
(2). What’s more, the history of fukú is not a history of mere superstition, because 
whether or not you believe in it, “fukú believes in you” (5).47 This new form of spectral 
memory is unleashed by particular kinds of forgetting. 
This introductory section situates Díaz’s novel as both within and without history, 
as revising history and revising the parameters within which we understand history to 
operate. “[I]t is believed that the arrival of Europeans on Hispaniola unleashed the fukú 
on the world,” the narrator describes, adopting the passive, objective tone we might 
expect from an official history of the Caribbean. But the sentence continues, dispelling 
this impression with the frank observation that “we’ve all been in the shit ever since” (1). 
Further, this section establishes the literary form by which the novel will engage with 
history, a form characterized by casual slang, self-reflexive references to writing itself, 
metaphorization of history as science fiction, and regular use of footnotes. On the second 
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page, Díaz includes one of what he calls his Melville footnotes—the epic digressions 
from the body of the narrative that fill in, contradict, and playfully elaborate upon the 
body of the narrative, each time dramatizing the push-pull tensions involved in the telling 
of any story, any history. This first footnote is itself about history, in that it annotates the 
novel’s earliest mention of Trujillo and is presented explicitly “[f]or those of you who 
missed your mandatory two seconds of Dominican history” (2n2). Trujillo merits this 
footnote, we are told, not only because of the reader’s presumed ignorance but also 
because of the true scale of Trujillo’s power: “terminal in ways that few historians or 
writers have ever truly captured, or, I would argue, imagined” (2n2). Here we see the 
parameters of the history that will possess this text taking shape. Such a history cannot be 
captured, even in the imagination, without recourse to literariness—without the 
intervention of the aesthetic. 
The history of fukú—and the general understanding of history the novel 
theorizes—incorporates both the public and the private, the large and small scale. Fukú 
tells us the story of Trujillo, of JFK, of Vietnam, but it also operates individually to 
populate the realm of the personal: “Everybody in Santo Domingo has a fukú story 
knocking around in their family . . . [an] uncle in the Cibao who believed that he’d been 
cursed by an old lover never to have male children . . . a tía who believed she’d been 
denied happiness because she’d laughed at a rival’s funeral” (5). The scale of history in 
Oscar Wao encompasses the macro (nations, dictatorships, assassinations, foreign 
relations) and the micro, the family legacies and young life of Oscar de León. What 
qualifies Oscar’s story to be told, the narrator reveals, is not its inherent exceptionalism: 
“I wish I could say it was the best of the lot—fukú number one—but I can’t. Mine ain’t 
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the scariest, the clearest, the most painful, or the most beautiful” (6). Not the “most” 
anything, this story merits historicization only incidentally, as “It just happens to be the 
one that’s got its fingers around my throat” (6). In this way, the introduction theorizes 
history at once as a curse, pervasively dangerous to modern life, and yet so ubiquitous as 
to be unremarkable. 
If history is a quotidian curse, particularly to the teller (this fukú has its fingers 
around Yunior’s throat, not Oscar’s), then how can histories be written in such a way as 
to mitigate that threat? In fact, Yunior theorizes the telling of a history as fukú’s 
opposite—zafa. At the end of the novel’s introduction, Yunior invokes “zafa,” the “only 
surefire counterspell that would keep you and your family safe. Not surprisingly, it was a 
word” (7). Zafa prevents the curse of fukú from cohering, Yunior explains, before 
expanding the power of the single word to comprise the entirety of the novel: “Even now 
as I write these words I wonder if this book ain’t a zafa of sorts. My very own 
counterspell” (7). Despite this invocation of zafaesque storytelling powers to counter 
fukú’s malevolent curse, there remains a particular obsession in Oscar Wao with marking 
the unspeakable or unrepresentable that this chapter investigates. This obsession 
manifests most frequently by reference to the tropes of the lost book and the blank page.  
So, this chapter asks, what is remembered and repurposed as counterspell? What is 
instead aesthetically “forgotten,” and why is it nonetheless important to mark these 
forgettings? 
Since its publication, many scholars have analyzed the hybrid experimental form 
of The Brief Wondrous Life of Oscar Wao. Monica Hanna suggests that the novel is a 
“resistance history” that acts as “an alternative to traditional histories of the Dominican 
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Republic by invoking a multiciplity of narrative modes and genres,” particularly those 
that arise from popular or unofficial origins.48 Ramón Saldívar situates Díaz’s novel 
within a twenty-first century genre he terms “historical fantasy” that merges “historical 
novel, bildungsroman, postmagical realism, sci-fi, fantasy, and super-hero comic 
romance” to address concerns of historical injustice by way of a form created by its own 
fantastical events.49 In contrast to these extant analyses of the novel’s form, my concern 
in this chapter is the way Díaz figuratively repurposes historical facts as aesthetic tropes. 
Rearticulating the infamous “página en blanco” of Dominican dictator Joaquin 
Balaguer—literally, a blank page of Balaguer’s memoir set aside to reveal the identity of 
a murderer widely understood to be Balaguer himself—Díaz transforms the blank page 
into an acknowledgement of representation’s own fundamental inadequacy and a double 
gesture: to past crimes, long-suppressed, and to the future, the “day the páginas en blanco 
finally speak.” Originating as a material piece of the historical archive, Díaz’s blank page 
nonetheless comes to stand for loss itself, for the silences of history that cannot and 
should not be filled. It signifies what is forgotten or lost to history, and theorizes 
forgetting itself as a historical practice. 
Oscar Wao is a novel that arises from the fictional consultation of archives. It 
stages the politics of our lack of knowledge through the narrator Yunior’s project of 
compiling Oscar’s research on his family’s history along with Oscar’s science fiction 
manuscripts, letters, and interviews with other family members. Staging the twin 
processes of research and reading, Díaz’s novel relies for its historical sense upon 
intertextuality and historical footnotes related to the Dominican Republic and diaspora. In 
this context the novel’s blank page operates explicitly in opposition to a disingenuous 
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attempt to fill in the gaps of a historical archive: the memoir of Joaquin Balaguer, Trujillo 
confidant and subsequently Dominican president. Balaguer’s memoir—Memorias de un 
cortesano de la ‘era de Trujillo’—was published in 1989 and included a blank page 
ostensibly for the posthumous identification of the murderer of journalist Oscar Martinez. 
To the right of the blank page, Balaguer inserts a photograph of Oscar Martinez Howley 
and several other journalists at the house of then-Dominican President Juan Bosch. 
Above the photograph, Balaguer presents this explanation, titled “The Case of the 
Journalist Orlando Martínez Howley”: 
This blank page is inserted here. For many years it will remain mute, but one day 
it will speak so that its voice is heard by history. Silent, like a grave whose secret 
voices will rise loudly and accuse, when time permits the raising of the gravestone 
under which the truth is lying. Its content has been left in the hands of a friend 
who for reasons of age is probably going to outlive me and who has been charged 
by me to make it public some years after my death.50 
In fact, our narrator Yunior claims, it is widely known in the Dominican Republic that 
Balaguer himself orchestrated the murder (Oscar 90n9). 
Díaz’s novel takes this disingenuous gesture to the blanks of history and engages 
with the violence Balaguer attempts to conceal through a feint of transparency. Unlike 
Balaguer, the manifestation of the blank page adopted by Díaz and Yunior is not a literal 
blank page but a recurring metaphor that nonetheless registers its origins via a suggestive 
residue of materiality. I trace the novel’s four deployments of the “página en blanco” to 
argue that the novel’s engagement with unrepresentability raises the question of what 
happens when we choose to designate something as forgotten to history. 
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Yunior’s most explicit gesture to a “página en blanco” comes amid the miniature 
history lesson in the novel’s ninth footnote. The footnote details how Balaguer, a Trujillo 
confidante, rose to power after the dictator’s assassination and served three stints as 
president between 1960 and 1996. But the footnote centers primarily on Balaguer’s 
identity as “a Negrophobe, an apologist to genocide, an election thief, and a killer of 
people who wrote better than himself,” presenting a historicized explanation of the blank 
page that reveals disgust not only for the act of killing but, as we will see, for the way 
unrepresentability becomes coded by Balaguer as innocence. The footnote continues: 
“Later, when he wrote his memoirs, he claimed he knew who had done the foul deed (not 
him, of course) and left a blank page, a página en blanco, in the text to be filled in with 
the truth upon his death. (Can you say impunity?) Balaguer died in 2002. The página is 
still blanca” (90n9). In other words, the blank page is invoked here as a space of 
dissembling, of prevarication. Balaguer’s blank page is not the considered refusal to elide 
absence by summarily filling it with presence, but rather the denunciation of widely held 
but nonetheless unofficial knowledge by marshalling the silences of official history to 
preserve the dictatorial status quo. 
All four references to the “página en blanco” find their home in the middle story 
of the de León family, which details Belicia Cabral’s adolescence in the Dominican 
Republic before immigrating to the United States and giving birth to Lola and Oscar. The 
first appearance of a “página en blanco” comes a dozen pages before its explanation in 
the ninth footnote, in the form of a brief parenthetical gesture to the dark events of 
Belicia’s lost childhood: “(Before 1951, our orphaned girl had lived with another foster 
family, monstrous people if the rumors are to be believed, a dark period of her life neither 
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she nor her madre ever referenced. Their very own página en blanco)” (78). In this way, 
the phrase is parenthetically presented within the narrative both as a placeholder for 
purposeful silence—for forgetting—and as the purview of individuals like Beli who have 
not achieved record in official archives. Though Yunior goes on to situate the phrase in 
terms of Balaguer’s memoir, he first presents it without the contextualizing frame of 
history, as if to produce in advance an alternative knowledge to counter the official 
narrative to come. 
That the blank page could serve different ends underscores Balaguer’s troubling 
deployment of it. The next invocation comes in the explanatory Balaguer footnote, while 
the third reference to a página en blanco signals the historical silences surrounding 
Belicia’s lover, a figure known in the text only as the Gangster. Explaining this allusion 
to the blank page, Yunior describes the circumstances of his attempts at research: “Due 
partially to Beli’s silence on the matter and other folks’ lingering unease when it comes 
to talking about the [Trujillo] regime, info on the Gangster is fragmented; I’ll give you 
what I’ve managed to unearth and the rest will have to wait for the day the páginas en 
blanco finally speak” (119). Here, the trope of the blank page is extended toward a future, 
alternate temporality—a moment-to-come when the silences will be reversed, when what 
is forgotten will engender new modes of remembering and, presumably, storytelling. But 
this is not a passive process, in which an outside entity fills in the gaps or writes the 
missing chronicle; rather, such a future is configured as the realm of blank pages that 
themselves “speak.” Yunior’s blank page is not meant to signal the gaps in a physical 
archive—Balaguer has already done so, perniciously—but the limits of knowledge 
inherent to any subject who would seek to interrogate or fill such gaps. 
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The final reference to the blank page appears at the climax of Beli’s story. In what 
we are told will be “the strangest part of our tale,” Oscar’s future mother awakens from a 
brutal beating suffered at the hands of two members of Trujillo’s secret police. This 
beating follows the revelation that the Gangster, by whom she is now pregnant, is married 
to Trujillo’s sister. In this passage, Yunior self-consciously signals that the definitive 
details of this past event evade even the tentative parameters of representation he has thus 
far set out: “Whether what follows was a figment of Beli’s wracked imagination or 
something else altogether I cannot say. Even your Watcher has his silences, his páginas 
en blanco” (149). This blank page opens away from Balaguer and Beli to Yunior. The 
narrator understands himself as a Watcher, a member of the alien race figuring 
prominently in Fantastic Four comics whose philosophy dictates observation of other 
species but always non-interference. Our narrator, the “Watcher” of our tale, possesses an 
omniscience that is nonetheless foiled by particularly significant absences. This paradox 
suggests that the persistent power of historical forgetting might foil even a presumably 
omniscient storyteller—or might serve as one of his crucial tools. It reminds us that 
claims to omniscience still contend with the partiality of our historical knowledge—not 
only of the past, but of futures past—and with the pain of repressed (or recovered) 
memories. 
This dynamic suggested by the choice to conduct history via literature is difficult 
to parse. Monica Hanna argues that Yunior’s narrative acknowledgement of the 
impossibility of recovering any definitive historical account frees him to reject the 
responsibility for such a work in favor of the possibility of aesthetic creation. In Hanna’s 
formulation, the distinction between the stagnating silences of the Trujillo regime and the 
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freeing silences of Yunior’s narrative seems to rest in the aesthetic: in place of 
conventional historiography, Yunior is able to “imagine” his way to the truth.51 In 
contrast to such a formulation, which arguably re-establishes the distinction between 
fiction (coded as “imagination”) and history, I posit that the novel desires to unsettle 
history’s claim to truth value. This unsettling follows the mode of forgetting as historical 
practice the novel sets forth, in which Yunior does not fill in the blanks or address the 
politics of the página en blanco—what Lowe calls “the politics of our lack of 
knowledge.” 
Diaz’s blank page offers an interesting resonance to the gaps and silences 
observed in chapter three in the story of Franklin Hata presented by Chang-rae Lee’s A 
Gesture Life. Each of these novels concerned with twentieth-century histories 
suggestively posits that the value of history lies not, or not only, with its true value—or, 
to enlist the discussion of realism from chapter one, with its truth effects. These literary 
histories instead display the aesthetic work of blanks, elisions, gaps and silences, to 
remind us of the contingency of historical projects and the presence of “futures past” that 
inform the writing and reception of all historico-literary texts. 
So how can we read the strategy of the blank page to symbolize the silence that 
eludes representation’s powerful pull? Like the elided details of Hata’s immigration in A 
Gesture Life or the unrepresented tsunami that kills Kaushik in Lahiri’s “Going Ashore,” 
the blank page confronts the reader with a present absence. The murder of Oscar 
Martinez and the elimination of details that would reveal the true murderer—the creation 
of a historical gap—materialize in the trope of the blank page. The blank page as 
deployed by Balaguer serves as a placeholder, occupying a space that cannot be “filled” 
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even as it eliminates traces of the murder of Orlando Martinez. Díaz draws on this initial 
deployment but crucially transforms the “página en blanco” from a literal, material blank 
page to a metaphorical one that nonetheless registers the traces of materiality. This is why 
the blank page that attends to the elimination of traces, to our lack of knowledge, takes 
place in literature, in the realm of the aesthetic: the metaphorical “página en blanco” 
conjures a literal blank page in the same moment that it is explicitly figurative. In this 
sense, Oscar Wao conducts an aesthetic betrayal of its historical source text by 
resignifying Balaguer’s blank page as exactly the indictment Balaguer’s memoir was 
created to manage. The fluidity of a trope versus the stasis of a physical blank page 
suggests the “what could have been” of Lisa Lowe’s past conditional temporality, 
allowing Yunior the freedom to speculate, producing historical knowledge by way of the 
aesthetic while registering forgetting and memory as equal partners in the historical 
project. 
Human Development 
This chapter’s focus to this point has been on Yunior’s effort, via the deployment 
of the blank page, to recognize what has been elided from historical narratives while 
resisting the urge for straightforward recovery. I consider the ways this move keeps alive 
the future conditional tense theorized by Lowe, in part to understand a form of agential 
forgetting that respects, even as it registers, historical silence. This project of recognizing 
absence and presence is significant not only because it emphasizes the politics of our lack 
of knowledge; it is also related to the disruption of neat, progressive narratives of 
individual and national development. Such narratives are crucial to the historical 
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trajectories necessary for neoliberal multiculturalism’s sustained political, economic and 
cultural traction. 
I shift now to consider Sherman Alexie’s Flight (2007), which opens with another 
allusion that situates the novel in an American literary genealogy: “Call me Zits,” the 
narrator-protagonist begins, echoing Melville’s famous introduction to Moby-Dick. Zits 
quickly details how his American Indian father disappeared after his birth and his Irish 
mother died of cancer when he was six. In the intervening nine years, Zits has lived in 
twenty foster homes and attended twenty-two schools. “I’m a fifteen-year-old foster kid 
with a history of fire setting, time traveling, body shifting, and mass-murder 
contemplation,” he tells us near the end of the novel, after he opens fire on a local bank 
lobby and is shot in the head (173). Though Zits narrates the experience of his own death, 
the shooting instigates a series of time-traveling incidents during which he inhabits the 
bodies of five individuals as “a subject in and through history”52: a white FBI agent 
investigating a fictionalized indigenous rights group in 1970s Idaho; a twelve-year-old 
Native American boy witnessing the Battle of Little Bighorn; a white tracker named Gus 
leading a group of nineteenth-century cavalry soldiers to avenge a native massacre of a 
group of white villagers; Jimmy, a white pilot living in the post-9/11 U.S. who has 
recently been betrayed by a friend-turned-terrorist; and a Native American homeless man 
in the “present” of 2007, who Zits learns is his own father. These five episodes coalesce 
into a “time-travel paradigm” that “creates a ‘bodily epistemology’ that makes traumas of 
the past present for Zits and readers.”53 
One reason I have chosen to analyze Flight and The Brief Wondrous Life of Oscar 
Wao together is that each novel stages a failure to grow up properly—to move from 
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childhood to adolescence, to achieve the milestones (whether academic, familial, or 
sexual) that mark the transition toward adulthood. Shunted through a series of new foster 
homes and schools, Zits purposely provokes the authority figures in each situation as if to 
anticipate their eventual, inevitable rejection of him. His vulnerability translates to 
extreme violence when, early in the novel, he is recruited by a new friend, Justice, to the 
bank shooting that initially results in his own death. While Oscar seems full of unrequited 
love rather than rage, his development is similarly disrupted. While his peers (even other 
geeks) are securing girlfriends and discovering their place in the social spectrums of high 
school and college, Oscar finds himself striking out on both counts, left alone with his 
science fiction and his role-playing games. His first and only reciprocated love interest is 
not a New Jersey girl but an older Dominican woman named Ybón who is already in a 
relationship with a brutal police captain; this relationship culminates in several days of 
sexual intimacy and Oscar’s murder at the hands of the captain’s henchmen. (It’s worth 
noting that both Oscar and Zits experience violent deaths at an untimely age that 
reinforce the failure of development, though Zits finds his own reversed.) 
Each protagonist is also a figure of conspicuous cultural inauthenticity. 
Describing his mixed-race heritage, Zits tells the reader, “I’m not really Irish or Indian. 
I’m a blank sky, a human solar eclipse” (5). Later he emphasizes that he has not been 
registered with any tribe or government bureaucracy, revealing, “I’m not an official 
Indian . . . I’m not a legal Indian” (9) by way of explaining why he has not been placed 
with Native American foster parents under the Indian Child Welfare Act. While Oscar is 
ethnically Dominican, he does not demonstrate the characteristics that would reinforce 
his identity in the eyes of other characters: the narrator Yunior comments repeatedly that 
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Oscar’s poor luck with women is “very un-Dominican of him” (11), while others 
frequently note that his dark skin and curly hair make him appear more Haitian than 
Dominican. Moreover, the extent of his nerdiness guarantees that Oscar “[c]ouldn’t have 
passed for Normal if he’d wanted to” (21). Both Zits and Oscar, faced with a chronic 
inability to perform normality (whether ethnically, behaviorally, or physically), are 
shunted from home to home—Zits through two dozen foster homes, and Oscar back and 
forth between his mother’s home in New Jersey and his great-aunt’s house in the 
Dominican Republic. 
One set of problems with proper histories has to do with the developmental 
teleology they tend to trace and the abstract and equal liberal subject such teleology 
requires and produces. The “dominant historical conception of human development,” 
according to David Lloyd, is “an end that regulates historical method and evaluation, 
from the selection and legitimation of archives and sources to the organizing modes of 
narrative. It bears, moreover, an idea of the human subject which is the product of that 
narrative and the ideal of the discipline [history] itself—the disinterested subject of 
modern civil society.” In this sense, Lloyd goes on to argue, “[t]he legitimacy of any 
given historical utterance is proportional to its coherence with the emergence of such a 
subject.”54 In other words, the ways hegemonic history conditions us to understand 
human development—teleologically—both determines what counts as history and how 
such history will be reckoned, but also what counts as human subjectivity. Then, history 
measures itself against the subject it has created in order to demonstrate and establish its 
ontological and epistemological authenticity. The developmental narratives that Zits and 
Oscar disrupt—to which they fail to adhere—exist to make them knowable, 
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categorizable, and legitimate subjects. 55 Their inappropriateness as representatives of and 
witnesses to history is fundamental to the work of these literary histories. 
Flight is a novel of the historical present told in present tense.56 Though the text 
carefully dates each episode with reference to incidents like Custer’s Last Stand, 
indigenous rights activism of the 1970s and the attacks of September 11th, it is clear from 
the beginning that such attention to detail does not extend to certain aspects of the present 
day. “My real name isn’t important,” Zits states flatly on the first page. Describing his 
American Indian heritage, he tells us, “My father was an Indian. From this or that tribe. 
From this or that reservation” (4). Like Linda in Bitter in the Mouth, the facts are refused 
as a foundation for identity construction. His casual assessment comments on the 
categorizing impulse that would flatten American Indian culture, experiences, and 
ethnicity to more easily incorporate them into multicultural pluralism. Certainly, as David 
Eng has observed of other historical novels by contemporary U.S. writers, “the politics of 
naming and misnaming works to stabilize—indeed, to justify—the historical order of 
things” (1483). Yet if the real name of our narrator and the specifics of his indigenous 
heritage are not important—as Franklin Hata’s “real” (Korean) name and the specifics of 
his U.S. immigration and citizenship are elided in A Gesture Life—what is offered as 
significant in their place? And how does the de-privileging of the facts of history—the 
names of individuals, of tribes, of reservations—unsettle a conventional project of 
historical literariness?57 
Though Zits presents himself as a rage-filled autodidact, armored with dismissive 
language and violent impulses against a world that has proven itself alternately 
dangerous, disappointing, and abusive, he is deeply aware of the expectations upon him. 
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Often these expectations are structural and have to do with his identity as an orphan, a 
foster kid, and a “half-breed” Indian. In other moments, these expectations are grounded 
in particular relationships with the two people to whom Zits feels a sense of closeness: 
Officer Dave, who arrests him frequently and enjoins him to make better choices, and 
Justice, the detention center cellmate who encourages Zits to imagine a Ghost Dance 
brought violently to modern life in the form of a mass shooting. Though Zits often rages 
against such expectations, their terminology—the language of “supposed to”—frequently 
invades his narration. 
Propriety as an ideological apparatus structures much of his common sense, 
particularly about the history and life of American Indians. He watches television about 
tribal history and traditions in order to perform proper “Indianness” more thoroughly in 
the multitude of white foster homes: “Maybe I can’t live like an Indian, but I can learn 
how real Indians used to live and how they’re supposed to live now” (12). In the second 
time-traveling episode, as Zits inhabits the body of the Indian boy, he gazes 
appreciatively around the immense camp that awaits Custer at Little Bighorn, populated 
by dark-skinned natives: “These are how Indians used to be, how Indians are supposed to 
be” (60). These observations suggest the extent to which Zits has internalized a 
conception of indigeneity that denies Native Americans the possibility of evolving—a 
conception sourced by book and television histories he desperately ingests to ascertain a 
measure of authenticity: 
Everything I know about Indians (and I could easily beat 99 percent of the 




I know about famous chiefs, broken treaties, the political activism of the 1960s 
and 1970s, and the Indian wars of the nineteenth century. 
I know all this stuff because it makes me feel more like a real Indian. Maybe I 
can’t live like an Indian, but I can learn how real Indians used to live and how 
they’re supposed to live now. (12) 
To this image he opposes himself, as the light-skinned unofficial and illegible Indian.58 
The ways Zits negotiates this historical knowledge suggest the novel’s 
commitment to undermining any conception of the totality of historical knowledge 
available to us. A documentary has taught Zits that the two men, Horse and Elk, are 
“super famous” for their work “protecting traditional Indians from the evil Indian tribal 
government dudes” (46, 47). Yet it dawns on Zits, inhabiting the body of FBI agent Hank 
Storm, that the Horse and Elk of the History Channel documentary would never meet 
secretly with an FBI agent, much less converse on a first-name basis. Zits negotiates the 
realization that Horse and Elk are “double agents,” “traitors,” in the context of how this 
information from 1975 is unknown in 2007: “This is major news. Back in the future, 
these guys are still heroes” (49). This scene stages the complex chronology and 
epistemology of Alexie’s project as a whole: the question of how the present signifies a 
time period “back in the future,” and the ramifications for this unsettling in time when it 
comes to projects of historical knowledge. Perhaps, albeit obliquely, Zits’s ability to 
inhabit a white FBI agent in the first place gestures to the vulnerability of the neoliberal 
apparatus to invasion and co-optation. 
At times, the inevitable temporality of the what-will-happen dominates these 
exchanges, as the present-day knowledge Zits brings with him while time-traveling 
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collides with the knowledge he gains as a first-person witness to historical events. 
Blissfully basking in the fact that he has a father for the first time (albeit only in the sense 
that the thirteen-year-old Indian boy he embodies has a father), Zits is brought back to 
sorrow by his ability to see more than a hundred years of Native American history: 
All these old-time Indians are doomed. They’re going to die of disease. And 
they’ll be slaughtered by U.S. Cavalry soldiers. They’ll be packed into train cars 
and shipped off to reservations. And they’ll starve in winter camps near iced-over 
rivers. 
The children are going to be kidnapped and sent off to boarding schools. Their 
hair will be cut short and they will be beaten for speaking their tribal languages. 
They’ll be beaten for dancing and singing the old-time Indian songs. (66) 
Such moments create a dialectic between remembering what has been forgotten and the 
invasion of institutionalized history on a suddenly present past. The problem-space of the 
2007 narrative present collides with the problem-space of Custer’s Last Stand, bringing 
each into sharper relief even as this relation establishes continuity between past and 
present. 
As an inappropriate history, Alexie’s novel is careful to distinguish itself from 
what is often called magical realism. At one point, as the Indian tracker Gus helps a white 
cavalry officer and a young Indian boy flee from the bullets of the soldiers who follow 
them, Zits playfully adopts and then rescinds magical conditions as a way out of history: 
The pony leaps into the air. It grows wings and flies into the forest. 
No, of course not. It doesn’t grow wings. How can a horse grow wings? 
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That kind of extraordinary magic is not permitted here. No, the only magic here is 
ordinary. It’s so ordinary that it might not be magic at all. It might only be luck. 
(96) 
Alexie toys with his readers here, extending the conditions of historical possibility and 
then batting them down, even as the narrative itself stages an impossible relation to 
history—time travel—as reality. Ramón Saldívar defines magical realism as a genre that 
“present[s] the world in such a way as to entice readers to react with wonder at the 
marvelous nature of American reality” (594). In this sense, Flight is emphatically not a 
work of magical realism, in that it does not mean to situate magical acts as natural to the 
“real” world or appeal to our sense of wonder. The unlikely magic of Zits’s time-travel 
experience is meant to register as an exception to the rules of nature and it evokes not our 
wonder but our horror at the cyclical atrocities upon which “American reality” is 
founded. 
In this same vein, Alexie presents a realistic explanation for Zits’s brief 
disappearance on the bank security tape near the novel’s end. Watching with a detective 
and Officer Dave after Zits has re-appeared in the bank and surrendered instead of 
opening fire, Zits observes, “my image disappears for a second. I’m gone. And then I 
reappear” (166). They rewind the tape and it happens again: “I’m there in the bank. Then 
I’m gone—poof. And then I reappear” (166). The detective, whom Zits calls Eyeglasses, 
presents a logical explanation: “Aw, it’s just a flaw in the tape . . . They reuse these tapes 
over and over. The quality goes down. They got weird bumps and cuts in them” (166). 
Zits obliquely attests, “Eyeglasses is probably right” (166). And yet. And yet. Just 
because there are ordinary explanations—for time-travel disappearances, for a fifteen-
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year-old Indian foster kid, for revenge and betrayal, for the whole of a racially inflected 
U.S. history—does not mean that Flight will allow them for us as readers. 
Impossible, Embodied Memory 
Much of the historical sense of Flight is couched in terms of memory—
specifically, what Zits should and should not be able to remember. To couple history and 
memory in this way is to foreground the question of access. In the novel’s opening pages, 
Zits describes how his mother used to sing “I Love You More Than You’ll Ever Know” 
by Blood, Sweat & Tears to him as a baby: “I remember her singing it to me. I know I’m 
not supposed to remember it. But I do. My memory is strange that way. I often remember 
people I’ve never met and events and places I’ve never seen” (2). Here Zits does not 
forget, to paraphrase Lowe, the conditions of his own making: his relation to the what-
can-be-known is saturated by impossible memory. His claim in this passage foreshadows 
the time-travel structure of the novel—an experience that will allow Zits to literally 
remember people, places and events he could not have met or seen. Furthermore, this 
statement floats the question of what we ought to remember and what we ought to be able 
to remember, given the limitations and abilities we understand humans to possess.59 
While embodying Jimmy the pilot, Zits admits that he has only flown twice, and one of 
those times was in utero: “I know I’m not supposed to remember it. And I don’t 
remember it, not really. But I can feel it. I have the memory of it in my DNA” (108). A 
memory that can be felt, a memory that resides on the genetic level—such memories are 
impossible. As building blocks of affective histories, impossible memories violate the 
rules of history-telling in order to register emotion, attachments and diffused forms of 
agency. To possess an impossible memory is to possess a form of access to the blank 
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pages of our own histories. The ordinary magic of this story operates in terms of plot (the 
time-travel narrative) but also theorizes the way that impossible memories constitute 
contemporary subjects in legacies of inequality and racialization—the way subjects like 
Zits and Oscar (in his moments of near-death and death at the hands of Dominican hired 
muscle) must negotiate for their figurative and physical survival by way of ordinary (and 
sometimes not so ordinary) magic. 
The novel seems to be suggesting something else: not only that memory is a 
discursive formulation that is conditioned by what we are taught to remember and to 
forget, but also that the parameters of this discursive formulation can be disrupted. Zits 
remembers not with his conscious mind but with his body—the memory of his first flight 
resides in his DNA, he says. The memory of the night he was conceived is described in 
complementary terms: “I remember how they conceived me that night. Okay, I don’t 
exactly remember it. I can’t see my mother and father naked in bed, but I can feel a 
lightning ball rebound off my soul whenever I think about it” (3). For Zits and for this 
novel, the most effective, affective memories are those that are impossible and yet 
nonetheless manifestly pervasive—those memories that are encoded into the genes or that 
result in an affective response, like the “lightning ball” that rebounds off his soul. In this 
way, the novel posits an embodied, affective history centered in memory (and, 
perversely, in forgetfulness) that operates on a different plane from the official histories 
Zits has consumed in pursuit of a proper Native American identity. 
Another form of impossible memory Zits experiences is the holding of two 
memories, or even two sets of memories, at the same time. In his time-travel episodes, he 
remembers as two subjects simultaneously, the host and the traveler. In this way, the 
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novel’s theory of memory literalizes the emotional act we call empathy. As Zits travels 
through time and occupies the bodies of different figures (some Indian, some white, 
spanning three centuries of U.S. existence), the relationships he has to the bodies and 
minds of these figures vary. Yet somehow the bodies themselves are mediators that 
negotiate between the mind and affect of the body’s owner and the mind and affect that 
comprise the subject-narrator Zits. When Zits occupies the body of the young Indian at 
the Battle of Bunker Hill, he is at first confused about why he cannot speak. Yet the 
“memory” of the body he possesses floods him, as “his” father encourages him to slit the 
throat of a captured cavalry soldier: “In another camp on a different river, a white soldier 
grabbed my hair, lifted my chin, and slashed my throat with a bayonet. And now my 
father wants revenge. He wants me to want revenge” (75). How precisely this memory is 
transmitted to the mind of Zits is unclear, but it ultimately leads him to a memory from 
his own life, signaled by four longer paragraphs that all begin “I remember.” The 
narrative shifts from the memory of the boy’s body to his own memory, “back when I 
was Zits, back when I was eight years old . . . living in this foster home on a mountain 
near Seattle” (75). This entwined relationship between two sets of memories, two sets of 
desires, performs the interpersonal relation of empathy in the space of a single embodied 
subject. 
The four subsequent paragraphs describe his feelings while fostering with a rich 
white family and his fascination with the miles of model trains in his foster father’s 
basement. A secret is revealed to the reader: “I remember I played with those trains for 
hours and hours. Played until I could barely keep my eyes open. Then my new father took 
me into another dark room in the basement, one without any trains, and did evil things to 
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me. Things that hurt. Things that made me bleed” (75). The memory of the sexual abuse 
Zits has suffered is reworked and contextualized in the historical setting of this moment 
of time travel. The questions of violence—the violence he witnesses against the bodies of 
dead cavalry soldiers, the violence “his” Indian father encourages against the captive, the 
violence young Zits suffers in the Seattle basement—refuse a progressive understanding 
of history that would situate the violence of Little Bighorn comfortably in the past. The 
way revenge operates, as “a circle inside of a circle inside of a circle,” creates a 
continuum between past and present (77). The body’s memory leads him to his own 
memory, and the desire for revenge called up by his memory of the basement abuse helps 
him empathize with the revenge “his” father wishes him to enact. 
Yet in every instance when Zits is called upon to enact the violence of these 
scenes, he refuses or at least delays, closing his eyes. This act of refusing witness seems 
to trigger his transportation to another body. From the body of the Indian boy he finds 
himself inhabiting Gus, the Indian tracker. In this episode Zits is confronted with a more 
active question of agency and responsibility, because Gus is leading a cavalry regiment to 
an Indian camp on a revenge mission. When Zits realizes the plan and his complicity in 
it, he plots to foil the mission and “get very, very lost” (85). But as Zits soon discovers, 
the remnant of Gus that remains in Gus’s body exists to frustrate this plan of lostness: 
even though I keep thinking, I want to be lost, I want to be lost, I want to be lost, I 
can’t do it. Gus won’t let me. What it comes to is this: I can’t completely control 
Gus. I can move his arms and legs. I can talk with his voice. And I can think my 
own thoughts. But Gus is stronger than I am. His memories become my 
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memories, too . . . And Gus remembers—and I remember—what he saw when he 
came upon those slaughtered white settlers. (86) 
This episode speaks to the difficulty of intentionally enacting the state of being lost, and 
perhaps offers a gentle critique of the way Halberstam’s formulation of failure and 
forgetting elide the role (or lack thereof) of willed agency in those actions. At the same 
time, it stages the experience of empathy that foregrounds the question of individual 
sovereignty; in other words, this empathy does not and perhaps cannot remake the other 
in the image of the self. The clear distinction between the Indian boy and Zits established 
during the second episode, in which their memories were related but distinct, has 
evaporated in this next experience, as if these occupations are progressing to deeper 
levels of body/mind integration. “His memories become my memories, too,” Zits says of 
Gus. “This is new. I couldn’t see into the past of the other bodies I’ve inhabited. I’m 
scared that Gus might reclaim his body and drown me in his blood” (86). The stakes of 
this memory melding are significant, such that Zits feels threatened by the body of the 
white tracker seeking revenge. And yet while this potential violence is clear, it exists in 
tension with a deeper level of imbrication—the memories of bodily host and time-
traveling inhabitant cannot be clearly separated, and so when “Gus’s eyes water at the 
memory,” Zits feels his eyes watering, too (86). 
After Gus, Zits inhabits the body of Jimmy, a white pilot with his own small plane 
who is wracked by guilt and betrayal after unknowingly teaching a would-be terrorist to 
fly.60 This episode is complicated by the revelation that Jimmy has been unfaithful to his 
wife since the attack. From the beginning, the level of connection sets this embodiment 
apart: “I’m inside the body of the pilot. No, I have become the pilot. I don’t feel separate 
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from him” (107). This sense of one-ness extends to his surroundings as well, as he flies 
above the ocean: “I am the pilot and the clouds and the ocean and the plane” (107). While 
this one-ness might appear to operate only at the level of metaphor, Alexie is careful to 
bring us back to the deep embodiedness of Zits’s time travel: “I can feel this body 
remembering. Every part of you has different memories. Your fingers remember the feel 
of a velvet coat. Your feet remember a warm sandy beach. Your eyes remember a face” 
(109). The appeals to sense are reminiscent of the central work of sensation in Bitter in 
the Mouth’s representation of synesthetic archival subjectivity. Here again the repository 
of memory is not (or not only) the mind but also the body: it is the body that remembers, 
according to sensory interactions with the external world. Zits realizes that this body 
remembers—as all bodies remember, according to Zits—because he can feel this body 
conducting the process of memory, accessing a face: the face of Abbad, the mechanical 
engineer who lived in the U.S. for fifteen years before crashing a plane with his wife and 
child into downtown Chicago. If bodies can remember, then history and the archive are 
privileged but not singular in their access to memory. If bodies can remember, then 
history’s objectivity is complicated by a democratically subjective way of knowing, in 
that all bodies possess the capacity to know.61 
The clearest culmination of memory as embodied, as violent, comes in the final 
episode, when Zits embodies a homeless Indian man he later learns is his father. Citing 
Hamlet, Zits asks desperately, “Who can survive such a relation?”, and indeed this 
episode asks for the greatest expansive empathy yet required of Zits: to empathize with 
his own offender (151). Accessing his father’s memories is not like the process of 
memory meld (with Gus) or materialization (with Jimmy). Possessed of the opportunity 
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he has fantasized about—to demand satisfaction from the father who abandoned him—
Zits forces himself inside his father’s memory of that day: 
I will make him remember. I will force him to remember. I will kill him if I have 
to. 
And so I push against my father’s mind and soul. I crash through his fortifications 
and rampage into his memory and tear through his homes, wells, and streets, until 
I see it: the hospital where I was born. Or, rather, the memory of that hospital. 
And I burst inside and race up the stairs, and back through the years, and rush 
through a door into the maternity ward hallway where my father paces. (152) 
Memory is violent, here; moreover, it is physical. It erects fortifications to protect the city 
of memories (materialized as homes, wells, streets). When the memory of the hospital 
appears, Zits must “race up the stairs,” and this action brings him not just to a different 
space but a different time—“back through the years.” Such violence is not required 
because his father recognizes that Zits has possessed him and desires to keep such 
knowledge secret from his son; there is no indication that any of these characters know 
they are possessed, beyond a vague sense of a different agency at work that occasionally 
opposes their own. Rather, his father fights on his own behalf, Zits tells us: “he doesn’t 
want to remember the day he left me” (152). Here memory of the past is intrinsically 
violent, and forgetting is a mode of coping, surviving, living on. Memory cannot simply 
be recovered without destruction to the subject—this memory invasion, which reveals the 
psychological abuse inflicted upon Zits’s father by his own father, leaves Zits’s father 
“whipped and bloodied by his memory” (156). 
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To force remembrance and its related therapeutic concept, recovery, can be a 
violent act—at an individual level, certainly, but especially at the level of a community or 
people group. In the context of decolonization, David Lloyd questions whether the 
concepts of psychological trauma and therapeutic recovery often used to describe an 
individual’s response to past experience are useful formulations at the level of collective 
relation to the past. Lloyd argues that they are not, because the relationship of 
decolonization to the past incorporates “a social history and its material and institutional 
effects.”62 To advocate a psychological model of “recovery” at the level of the formerly 
colonized nation or people is to facilitate the way conventional historical archives seek 
reconciliation with the state in the aftermath of trauma. Rather than recovery, Lloyd 
posits a model of survival—a “living on” (akin to Halberstam’s “being in the world”) that 
holds the potential for “producing and reproducing a life that lies athwart modernity.” To 
do so holds historical resolution in suspension; it sustains “the memory of alternative 
possibilities that live athwart the mournful logic of historicized events.”63 Theorizing not 
reconciliative recovery but rather survivalistic living on thus entertains the “what could 
have been” described by Lowe; it refuses to bow to the historically determined “what-
can-be-known.” 
By the end of the time-travel journey, Zits has learned to appreciate, even to seek 
out, the deep empathy afforded by these fantastical embodiments. These bodily 
possessions have taught Zits how it feels to be loved as well as how it feels to betray and 
be betrayed. They have taught him the power of memory and the solace of forgetting. 
Returned to the present of the bank scene, moments before he first begins shooting, Zits 
purposely attempts to “step inside” the body of a young boy, jealous of the love the boy 
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appears to experience from his mother. But “it doesn’t work. I cannot be him” (158). The 
time-traveling embodiment that has allowed Zits to experience being a father (Hank 
Storm) and having a father (the teenage Indian) is no longer operational. 
Yet without the direct embodiment, Zits still comes to experience a sense of 
solidarity: “I think all the people in this bank are better than I am. They have better lives 
than I do. Or maybe they don’t. Maybe we’re all lonely. Maybe some of them also hurtle 
through time and see war, war, war. Maybe we’re all in this together” (158). On the heels 
of this sense of collectivity, this acknowledgement of the violence that knits together 
epochs and individuals, and the revelation of his father’s darkest memory, Zits presents 
readers with “the dirtiest secret [he] own[s]” (159). It is as if, in feeling his father’s 
degradation and entertaining the possibility that others are lonely and exhausted by seeing 
“war, war, war,” he prepares to trust the readers of his own story. After his mother’s 
death, Zits tells us, he lived with his Aunt Zooey, who hit him when he cried for his 
mother and allowed her boyfriend to molest six-year-old Zits even after he informed her 
of the abuse. During this time, he admits, “I learned how to hide inside of myself. I 
learned how to be somebody else” (161, emphasis mine). This statement recasts the time-
travel experiences that have come before as the necessary culmination of a process begun 
when Zits abandoned his identity (including his given name) as a necessary precursor to 
survival exemplary of the colonial experience. Learning how to be somebody else has for 
much of his life been a requirement, a mode of “living on” that his life demanded. Yet in 
Flight this learning is repurposed to the project of empathy, a project against unmediated 
and unmeditated revenge. In Flight, empathy is literally staged for Zits as an encounter 
between a body’s memories and his own memories. The impossibility of dual memory is 
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made possible, and eventually carried over, as in Oscar Wao’s blank page, from the 
literal to the figurative: the body’s memory to the process of storytelling. What is 
operational, even after Zits loses the ability to inhabit the body of another, is a form of 
empathy the novel reminds us is widely available. To truly empathize, this novel 
suggests, is both “to be somebody else” and, in the same moment, to be, to sense, and to 
remember ourselves. 
Storytelling as Living On 
The embodied time travel of Flight suggests a central question about the 
appropriate response to betrayal and a justified desire for revenge. This question is 
another way of articulating the difficult relationship between presence and absence that 
conditions what we recognize as history. In other words, to consider betrayal and revenge 
reformulates the pursuit of recovery—an act that substitutes facts, details, or histories 
obtained in the present for the gaps of the past—in terms of restitution. To pursue 
revenge is to privilege memory over forgetting and to refuse tropes of the blank page, the 
lost book. 
Each time-travel episode presents relations of betrayal. As Hank Storm, Zits 
facilitates the betrayal two tribe members enact against their own indigenous movement. 
As a Native American youth, he is confronted with the opportunity to enact revenge in 
the name of his old injury. While embodying Gus, Zits betrays his fellow soldiers to save 
an Indian boy, and as Jimmy he is unfaithful to his wife and lives in the aftermath of 
betrayal by a man he believed to be his friend. Finally, in the body of his homeless father, 
Zits is betrayed by “his” own father and in turn betrays “his” son. The final sections of 
the novel, from Zits’s realization that he embodies his own father, through his re-
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appearance at the bank and decision to surrender instead of shoot, to the scenes in which 
Officer Dave engineers Zits a new foster home with the officer’s brother and sister-in-
law, theorize an answer to the question of betrayal as they foreground the power of 
storytelling. 
Memory as purposely shared storytelling becomes a new mode of embodiment, 
replacing the time travel and violence that characterize Zits’s earlier episodes. Via 
storytelling, Flight shifts from a time-traveling narrative to a project of empathy that can 
be practiced in everyday life. Unlike the science-fictional nature of the bodily 
epistemology time travel engenders, the end of the novel presents an embodied empathy 
offered freely between strangers—a mode of living on through the process of betraying 
and being betrayed. This suggests that inappropriate histories engender empathy; they 
negotiate the conventional boundaries and relations between individuals and discard the 
violence of invasion in favor of a gentler mode of knowing others. 
As the homeless Indian in the final time-travel sequence, Zits instigates a violent 
encounter with a white couple and then wanders the streets shouting, “I want some 
respect” (141). When a man he encounters relents (“All right, all right . . . How do I show 
you some respect?”), Zits is baffled: “This body wants respect. I don’t know what I want. 
And I don’t know how to define respect, for me or for this homeless guy” (143). He 
guesses: “‘Tell me a story,’ I say . . . ‘something personal . . . something you haven’t told 
anybody. Something secret’” (143). At first the man refuses on the grounds that they do 
not know one another, but eventually he realizes that it is precisely this unknowing that 
enables such an exchange. 
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In brief snippets of conversational dialogue, the man describes how a parakeet he 
purchased for his daughter flew into a pot of boiling water one evening before dinner. 
Rushing the bird to an emergency animal hospital, the man finds himself laughing at the 
scene in the veterinary ICU—the bird is “hooked up to this tiny little oxygen machine 
[with] this tiny oxygen tube . . . running down his throat” (148)—in front of his horrified 
wife and daughter, who leave him the next day. Telling this story, this man emphasizes 
his unlikely connection to the bird, as well as the unbidden hilarity of the extraordinary 
measures that actually indicate a moment of familial crisis. While the man cries, Zits asks 
if he can see a picture of the daughter; the man complies, and requests the same of him—
a gesture that places them on a certain level of equality, furthering the mutual respect 
begun in the telling of the story. This unlikely relation generated by the telling of a story 
leads to Flight’s most dramatic revelation, as Zits draws out a picture from his pocket, 
and finds himself staring at a picture of five-year-old Zits, who he clarifies is “the real 
me” (150). It is only through the scene of storytelling that the photograph is revealed; 
wondering how the homeless man possesses such a picture, Zits finds a mirror, assesses 
himself as “battered, bruised, and broken,” and articulates an impossibility to match 
Shabine’s “I’m nobody” from the epigraph to Oscar Wao: “I am my father” (150). 
The second scene of storytelling takes place after embodied time travel has ended, 
as Officer Dave visits Zits in a holding cell following his surrender. Officer Dave weeps 
relating the details of a 9-1-1 call from earlier in the week that led him to discover two 
toddlers burned to death in the bath while their drug-addicted parents were passed out in 
the next room. Zits watches Dave carefully while the officer begins his story; when Dave 
looks at the ceiling “as if his memory was playing like a movie up there,” Zits looks up to 
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see the memory, too, but cannot: “I can’t jump into Dave’s body but I can feel and see 
and understand a little bit about his pain, I guess” (169). Though he does not inhabit 
Dave’s body, Zits admits that he can feel, see, and understand something of the officer’s 
pain—even if the “I guess” qualifies this sense of empathy and reminds us that fifteen-
year-old Zits still finds this kind of understanding unusual. Dave’s story ends with a 
meditation on time, but it is not clear, because Zits has paraphrased this story rather than 
relating the dialogue, whether the observation belongs to Zits or Dave: “He wants to go 
back in time. He only needs to travel back an hour—just one hour—and he’ll be able to 
save those kids” (171). Expressing a wish for the ability Zits no longer possesses, this 
unattributed desire reinforces the extent to which our understanding of the past conditions 
the way we encounter the present. 
Oscar Wao similarly posits storytelling as a mode of empathy and aesthetic 
betrayal. Díaz’s novel is about betrayal on multiple levels—the betrayal of Oscar’s 
grandfather by his friend and neighbor, who reports him to Trujillo; the betrayal of 
Oscar’s mother, Beli, by the Gangster; Yunior’s betrayal of Oscar in the act of illicitly 
reading his diary; the betrayal of Lola by Yunior, who cheats on her repeatedly during 
their romantic involvement. This last is particularly curious, as at least one of Lola’s 
narrative sections is apparently dictated to Yunior (she addresses him as “you”); his 
betrayal of her has not negated but perhaps facilitated their mutual storytelling. The end 
of Oscar Wao stages the power even of storytelling that is never completed. In the 
novel’s final pages, Lola receives a posthumous communication from her dead brother 
that opens out into a gesture of futurity. Eight months after Oscar’s murder, a package 
arrives at their New Jersey family home with two manuscripts and promise of a third: 
267 
 
“the new book he was writing, a book he was sending under another cover . . . (It’s the 
cure to what ails us, he scribbled in the margins. The Cosmo DNA.)” (333). But the 
book-as-cure never arrives, and the circumstances of this final betrayal remain unclear: 
“Either got lost in the mail or he was slain before he put it in the mail, or whoever he 
trusted to deliver it forgot” (334). A book that tantalizes Yunior with its existence—with 
its insight, if Oscar’s opinion of his own work can be believed, into cosmic DNA—
forever remembered for being forgotten, misplaced, or waylaid. 
As Berlant says, history hurts, but not only. Nancy Peterson writes that “[o]ne of 
the problems of Native American history is trying to record these losses and tragedies 
without falling into the predominant late nineteenth-, early twentieth-century image of 
vanishing Indians, of totally victimized and colonized natives on the verge of extinction. 
On the other hand, the writer-historian cannot ignore the painful events of the past simply 
because they seem to lend themselves to being organized along the lines of a tragic 
narrative.”64 This tension is dramatized in Zits’s narration by the conflicts between his 
2007 knowledge via historical documentaries and the scenes he experiences while time 
traveling, and in Oscar Wao by the deployment of the blank page and the lost book. Yet 
perhaps each of these texts walks the line by giving our main characters a do-over. 
Oscar’s death does not halt the production and dissemination of his storytelling, and the 
novel ends with the tantalizing possibility that one day another package will arrive that 
contains “the cure.” Zits remembers causing the deaths of others and his own in turn, but 
given the choice again—presented with the opportunity to take representative agency 
upon himself, Ghost-Dance style—Zits recalls the earlier scene of violence and refuses to 
re-enact it. Returned to the bank after his time travel, Zits is faced with a choice that he 
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has already made—whether to open fire on a bank full of people at the insistence of his 
mysterious friend, Justice. “I’m supposed to kill for Justice,” he thinks. This “supposed” 
speaks to the temporal structure of the time-travel experience. Zits is “supposed” to kill 
for Justice because he already has—because “I did it before: a long time ago, a little 
while ago, a second ago” (157). Yet Zits finds himself unbound from the dictates of his 
own history, able to choose differently. 
Many critics resist the end of Flight, which presents Zits at home with a foster 
couple who appear to truly care about him, as they take him to baseball games and tend to 
his acne and make pithy statements like, “A few months from now, you’ll be brand new” 
(180).65 Critical resistance to this remark is understandable if we consider adoption as a 
trope for the incorporation of minoritized citizens into the nation, as I do in this project’s 
third chapter.66 The implication that incorporation into the multicultural nation requires 
subjects to discard their old (inappropriate) selves in the process of transformation to 
proper citizens is troubling. Yet we should not forget that this is a transformation for 
which Zits longs deeply; the desire for normativization must not be summarily dismissed 
by cultural critics on behalf of those racialized outsiders who seek inclusion. And the 
novel implies that this “brand new” self—unspotted, adopted—hearkens back to a past 
self, in that Zits reveals his real name—Michael—in the novel’s final lines.  The text 
ends with a litany of the lessons Zits (and presumably the reader) should have learned by 
this point: 
I know the world is still a cold and cruel place. 
I know that people will always go to war against each other. 
I know that children will always be targets. 
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I know that people will always betray each other. 
I know that I am a betrayer. 
But I’m beginning to think I’ve been given a chance. I’m beginning to think I 
might get unlonely. (180) 
At the level of plot, the narrative certainly ends optimistically. However, the final litany 
of what Zits knows communicates the optimism of a “chance” for Zits in the context of 
relentless violence of war, child victims, and betrayal. Even the portmanteau of 
“unlonely” is a word that registers what it is not—not lonely, certainly, but also not 
befriended, in the world where people betray one another and we participate in that 
betrayal. 
Perhaps betrayal, like forgetting, is a traumatic act that nonetheless allows for new 
ways of remembering, of writing histories. Crystal Parikh describes the “after” of 
betrayal as “a new world of meanings and relations, brought into existence by betrayal, 
into which the subject is thrown.”67 This is not to romanticize betrayal or gloss over the 
deep injustices perpetrated by a nation that betrays its minority subjects through regimes 
of dispossession and enslavement and a general failure to uphold the principles of equal 
protection upon which it claims to be founded. It is not to forget that incommensurate 
betrayals can also be enacted by minority subjects against a nation (treason, in a literal or 
figurative sense) or other minority subjects (for example, by economic exploitation or 
political representation). Rather, it is to suggest that betrayal, for all its associated trauma, 
illuminates existing attachments—even as they are ruptured—and engenders new ways of 
living, or living on. 
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Betrayals “can open a future that is unimaginable and unintelligible from within 
the bonds of fidelity and identification.”68 Relationships of betrayal operate at the level of 
the political or collective and at the level of the intimate and the affective. Yet Parikh also 
suggests the possibility of something like an aesthetic betrayal when she describes how 
treating certain narratives as “exemplary and performative as an ethics of betrayal,” as 
she does in her study, reveals that such texts “always already betray the identity politics 
of representation that are so often attributed to them.”69 What is the relationship between 
betrayal and empathy? Both establish the relation, generally one of obligation, between 
self and other that is grounded in the ethical. To betray is to suspend empathy, or refuse 
its call, but not to negate the self-other relation at empathy’s core. To empathize is to feel 
another’s pain at being betrayed—or any other emotion—at a greater level of remove. 
Both betrayal and empathy engender a future not predicated on identification—on 
sameness—but on difference. 
Conclusion 
In interviews, Junot Díaz and Sherman Alexie have both expounded on the 
theories of history they believe their novels invoke and deploy. Alexie characterizes 
Native American literature as widely nostalgic for the purity of reservation identity: “very 
few of the top 30 or 40 Native writers publishing now grew up on the reservation, and yet 
most Native literature is about the reservation . . . a time when we were all together and 
our identity was sure.”70 Junot Díaz argues that “part of what allows us to move through 
the contemporary world is not knowing anything about how [it] was born.”71 
But in July of 2013, Junot Díaz took authorial commentary and paratextuality to a 
new level, releasing a self-annotated section of Oscar Wao via the poetry section of the 
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website Rap Genius.72 Originally conceived as a space for the collective annotation and 
explication of rap music lyrics (think Wikipedia for explaining rap allusions), Rap Genius 
began to branch out in late 2012 after a multi-million dollar investment from a venture 
capital firm, as users annotated works like T.S. Eliot’s The Wasteland and William 
Faulkner’s As I Lay Dying. 73 The site announced its newest set of verified annotations 
with a Facebook link on July 23, 2013, titled “The Brief Wondrous Annotations of Junot 
Díaz.”74 A literal aesthetic betrayal, in the sense that Díaz invades the sacrosanct space of 
the text to amplify, moderate, and personalize, this move theorizes an understanding of 
texts and of history as open, circulating forces. Perhaps this gesture can also be 
understood as a discursive betrayal of the literary prestige that accrued to the Pulitzer-
Prize-winning novel in the gesture to the editor-readers of Rap Genius as the appropriate 
audience with whom to amplify his text. 
From a literary studies perspective, Díaz’s choice of excerpt seems incongruous, a 
brief section near the end of the novel about the first time La Inca heard rumors that 
Belicia was still alive: “For two days she didn’t want to believe. People were always 
starting rumors about everything in Santo Domingo. Didn’t want to believe that the girl 
could have survived, could be alive in Outer Ázua, of all places” (256). Yet upon closer 
inspection this excerpt registers the dynamic between knowledge and the refusal of 
knowledge alongside the way rumors and truth coalesce to challenge accepted narratives. 
It also includes a textual footnote, which Díaz annotates along with the body text. 
Footnote number thirty-two begins with a reference to readers’ knowledge (or lack 
thereof) of the Dominican Republic, a familiar theme: “Those of you who know the 
Island . . . know exactly the landscape I’m talking about” (256). The region, Yunior as 
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footnote narrator continues, “resembled the irradiated terrains from those-end-of-the-
world scenarios that Oscar loved so much”; he goes on to list eleven imaginary worlds 
from the realms of works like Star Trek’s The Wrath of Khan, Dune, and Star Wars. 
In annotating this excerpt and its textual footnote, Díaz engages in the kind of 
discursive play that readers of Oscar Wao have come to expect. Specifically, he footnotes 
the footnote itself, creating a hyperlink to the number “32” that leads to an in-annotation 
discussion of the novel’s use of footnotes: “This is one of my Melville footnotes, where I 
simply go buckwild,” Díaz writes in the second of twenty-one RapGenius annotations. 
“The first editor I had on this novel wanted me to cut the footnotes. I’m so glad the 
second editor thought they were as important as I did to the book’s point about what 
narratives we authorize what [sic] narratives we don’t.” Here Díaz endorses the many 
literary scholars who read the interplay of text and footnote in the novel as drawing 
attention to the hierarchies of narrative and questions of authorization that always attend 
to the writing of histories.75 
The Rap Genius annotations draw not only upon his publishing history but also 
his personal history. Of the footnote’s reference to the Cursed Earth, from the Planet of 
the Apes, Díaz writes in his ninth annotation, “When I saw the first best film and scoped 
those landscapes I was convinced that they had filmed in Ázua. Everything looked like 
Ázua to me in those days; I was desperate for any connection to the homeland in those 
first lonely years in [New Jersey].” Explaining that Tatooine, the home planet of Anakin 
and Luke Skywalker in Star Wars, is “either the first or second most famous desert planet 
in nerdom,” Díaz says, “Again when I saw those landscapes in Star Wars I felt a surge of 
kinship. Shit, on first viewing I also thought my man’s name was Juan Kenobi. But that’s 
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what happens when you’re an immigrant kid of color in a culture that erases your 
community completely. You start inventing filiations.” Like the impossible memories 
that populate and undergird the affective histories of this novel, Díaz’s invented filiations 
register a kind of misremembering and forgetting. 
Díaz’s annotations engage with and collapse the three levels of discourse this 
project invokes: text, discourse, politics. At the textual level, Díaz reactivates and 
reinscribes the unconventional literariness of Oscar Wao, descending further into the 
published novel’s crevasse of self-reflexive textual and paratextual commentary to 
footnote the footnotes. Most obviously, these annotations operate at the level of discourse 
to foreground the process of discursive construction: the authorial intentions and affective 
connections that drove Díaz, the editorial battles he waged to preserve the literary form of 
his text, and the invocation of an active readership implied in the act of providing 
explanatory annotations via a public website. To do so suggests an openness to text and 
discourse, even to history. He specifically references magical realism, the Latin 
American-influenced genre in which many critics place him, avowing instead, “I’m way 
more SF [sci-fi] than magical realista.” In the same breath, he reinforces the imbrications 
between “real” and fictional—he sees Ázua in the planets of the apes and understands the 
Dominican Republic as best described by references to Star Wars and Star Trek. 
Furthermore, Díaz advocates an understanding of his novel both as historically 
situated and as utterly fictional. While the novel’s footnote describes his mother’s near-
death experience from rhumatic fever and how her uncles had already bought her coffin 
by the time she recovered, the twenty-third annotation admits that “[t]he coffin part of 
that sentence is true but it wasn’t fever that nearly killed my mom—it was getting herself 
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lost up in the highlands of Azua.” She only came down, Díaz claims, because she “came 
upon a talking mongoose in the brush that led her back to civilization,” an anecdote that 
Oscar Wao repurposes in twin episodes where a mongoose rescues Belicia Cabral and 
her son Oscar. Finally, the annotations invoke the realm of the political economy to 
foreground the process of diaspora that Díaz experienced and to implicate this diasporic 
identity as crucial to the writing of the novel: the boy who exists as “an immigrant kid of 
color in a culture that erases your community completely,” who “invent[s] filiations” and 
hears “Juan Kenobi” and sees Azua in the fictionalized planets portrayed in movies of his 
childhood. To invent origins; to situate origins in the realm of science fiction; to employ 
literature to critique the ideologies of History—these are the projects of inappropriate 
histories. 
Inappropriate histories like Oscar Wao and Flight stage memory and forgetting as 
equal partners and filter historical knowledge through the questions of access that 
memory raises. They exuberantly collide the problem-space of contemporary reading and 
writing with problem-spaces of the past to emphasize the intertwined nature of those 
seemingly discrete designations of past, present, and future. They question how and why 
we remember and even why we formulate questions of race, identity and subjectivity in 
terms of remembering and forgetting in the first place. Inappropriate histories blur the 
line between empathy and betrayal, unwilling to ascribe only good to one act and only 
bad to the other. Instead, they suggest that both impulses can produce a critical reflexivity 
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 This project began as little more than a hunch that inappropriateness had 
something to tell us about the contemporary moment: about minoritized subjectivity, 
about aesthetic production and cultural politics, about persistent economic, social, and 
political inequality; and about how literary works by ethnic writers engage with and 
illuminate these conditions. My analysis commenced with a novel that does not appear in 
the final dissertation, Gish Jen’s Mona in the Promised Land (1996), and with Mona’s 
disturbing sense that the roles she was expected to perform—“proper best friend,” 
“proper sister . . . proper daughter . . . proper student” (110)—fit her just as poorly as 
department store clothes sized for Anglo-American bodies. As the project took shape into 
the taxonomy of inappropriateness presented here (and as it became clear that I already 
had too many Asian American writers for a comparative ethnic literature dissertation), 
Mona was set aside. Yet the evocative resonances of her articulation of minoritized 
expectation—the repeated insistence on propriety and especially the framing of this 
dilemma in racial and economic terms, as the difficulty of purchasing clothes for her tiny 
Chinese American frame—carry through this project’s final iteration. Mona’s 
inappropriateness was suggestive, as was her choice to exacerbate the automatic 
inappropriateness of racialized U.S. citizenship by embracing and performing other 
modes of impropriety, most notably having sex and converting to Judaism, which 
disrupted her relation to her family and to Chinese American immigrant culture more 
broadly. 
 From these early thoughts, this study passed through several phases, each 
suggesting something richer about the kind of intervention inappropriateness might offer 
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to U.S. ethnic studies and American literary studies. I began with an interest in the 
fundamental inappropriateness of the literary: both its always inadequate attempt to 
represent the real by way of the non-real and the inappropriateness of positing the literary 
as a space of meaningful political critique and engagement. An initial interest in 
representations of curious forms, like ekphrasis of diseased bodies, embodied archives, 
and literary histories, was contextualized by a tentative periodization: neoliberal 
postracialization. Finally I concluded that the inappropriate literary and political acts and 
representations I was investigating arose in relation to a pervasive hegemonic force that 
calls for ethnic subjects, writers and texts to be representative and transparent—to 
perform their difference in a limited variety of acceptable modes. And so the scope of my 
study came to encompass not only inappropriateness but its inverse: appropriateness as a 
hegemonic disciplinary apparatus.  
Propriety has been a crucial component of liberal subjectivity since the 
Enlightenment period, when it was theorized as a partner and precursor to liberty itself. In 
various guises, propriety accompanied Western colonialism’s efforts to subjugate the 
globe, extending the effective life of colonization by equipping racial formations with the 
flexibility to account for and regulate class, caste, and other categories of difference. The 
power of propriety I describe in this study must be understood in the context of this 
genealogy, yet the contemporary contours of propriety with which this dissertation 
grapples differ significantly from its colonial and enlightenment legacies. In its 
contemporary form, propriety not only attends the work of racialization but in fact 
supplants it, fundamentally enabling the continuing minoritization of racialized subjects 
while allowing for the simultaneous propagation of the narrative of colorblindness that 
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has captured the U.S. national imaginary. To say that propriety as an ideological 
apparatus produces the appropriate minoritized subjects required of global neoliberal 
capitalism is not to ignore the ways that all contemporary subjects are called upon at 
times to conform to propriety’s dictates regarding public discourse, political engagement 
and social norms. But propriety as an ideological apparatus is different in scale and in 
degree: it names a discourse that takes the place of race in a postracial era, openly 
discriminating along racial lines while appearing straightforwardly fair, or even morally 
good. This discourse produces the figure of the appropriate ethnic subject and then 
provisionally extends the benefits of whiteness to individual subjects who adhere to its 
shifting and conditional dictates in pursuit of the ever-elusive “good life.”  
Inappropriateness rearticulates difference by refusing neoliberalism’s collapse 
into difference-as-sameness and by positing difference as more than otherness—as 
critical strategy, aesthetic practice, and affective attachment. Like the inappropriate Other 
theorized by Trinh T. Minh-ha, inappropriateness unsettles difference and identity by 
performing them concurrently. The implications of this study for U.S. ethnic studies are 
therefore profound. Since the mid-twentieth century and especially since the 
entrenchment of multiculturalism in the 1980s, overt appeals to race and discriminatory 
actions, policies and speech have fallen out of favor. Structural racism is downplayed and 
disavowed, and individual racist acts are explained away as the moral failing of particular 
individuals. As ethnic studies seeks to understand the relationship between declarations 
of postracialism on the one hand and continued material inequality on the other, my work 
details the way that the discourse of propriety allows, even encourages, Americans to 
employ apparently non-racial language that covertly identifies racially essentialist causes 
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for contemporary inequalities in employment, education, home ownership, and 
incarceration. This project illuminates the centrality of offensive but otherwise seemingly 
innocuous appeals to normativity for contemporary racial formation. 
 My conclusions also critique the ways American literary studies are institutionally 
organized, and to what ends. In terms of teaching and curriculum design, many students 
encounter ethnic literatures only after these literatures have been cordoned into general 
education courses designed to help students “understand plural societies,” to quote from 
the learning outcomes of my own institution—a weighty task for a single semester’s 
worth of novels, poetry, and short stories. This curricular organization is an example of 
the historical division between aesthetic greatness and political difference that encourages 
us to read literature by minoritized writers for information about difference. Hierarchized 
in this way, ethnic literatures are vulnerable to co-optation by neoliberal forces that 
would employ them to educate the next generation of a multicultural global workforce, 
maximizing the economic benefits of diversity and occluding the questions posed by 
knottier articulations of difference. Furthermore, when it comes to literary studies 
research agendas, my work reinforces the significance of comparative methods. Mindful 
of the different traditions and cultural contexts out of which the works studied here arise, 
I would nonetheless suggest that my identification of propriety as an ideological 
apparatus would never have materialized if this were a project about any ethnic literary 
tradition in isolation. Attempting to be undisciplined with regard to the disciplinary 
expectations of contemporary literary study, I have been able to articulate a sense of 
structural normativity that extends from public policy and (post)identity political 
283 
 
movements to the most private corners of contemporary life: home, family, individual 
sovereignty. 
 This project therefore posits inappropriateness as a model for contemporary 
literary studies. As a political and aesthetic category that indexes both subjectivity (the 
formation of inappropriate subjects) and epistemology (the creation of alternative modes 
of knowing and bodies of knowledge), inappropriateness suggests a starting point for 
critique of the postidentitarian status quo and theorization of alternatives to it that draw 
upon embodied, individual, unofficial ways of knowing. Inappropriateness does not 
discard inherited forms of knowledge like archives and histories—it re-imagines their 
location and impetus, in the process illuminating their affective features and 
potentialities. To do so reclaims these historically meaningful ways of knowing and 
forms of critique from neoliberal hegemony.    
 Each of these chapters does so by reading ethnic literatures as theoretically and 
aesthetically significant. These texts critique the institutional and disciplinary imperatives 
that condition American literary studies and ethnic studies. In place of mastery, 
consolidated official knowledges, and sanctioned genealogies, these novels present 
unanswered mysteries, unexplained time travel, rematerialized bodies, curious medical 
conditions, and open archives. This study of propriety and inappropriateness investigates 
inscribed silences—moments when literary texts suggestively conjure tropes of absence 
as a way of theorizing the presence of absence: the lost book, the blank page, the 
mysterious trailer fire, the untrasmittable taste, the ghost, the elided migration. All 
gesture to Lisa Lowe’s call to attend to the politics of our lack of knowledge—the 
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significance of these absences and of attempts at the textual, disciplinary, and political 
level to fill them. 
In its multiscalar intervention, this project poses a set of literary, political, and 
theoretical questions about the study of ethnic literature under neoliberal 
multiculturalism. In terms of literariness and literary study, what formal innovations have 
contemporary writers generated in order to represent the political subject and the subject 
of literature? What is the effect of contemporary literary works that reveal and revel in 
their own exteriority, for example through paratextual elements, or the flouting of genre 
convention, or the breaking of their own frames? How do literary texts explore the space 
of literariness as a challenge to the commodification of literature, as in the elisions and 
silences performed by first-person narrators—the fact of Linda’s race in Bitter in the 
Mouth, Zits’s real name in Flight, Hata’s Korean ancestry in A Gesture Life? On a 
political and cultural level, what is the significance of the way the discipline of U.S. 
literary studies organizes and codifies its textual objects? How do minoritized writers 
write race back into the national postracial imaginary? Can the strategies by which 
literature resists co-optation by neoliberal multiculturalism translate into the realm of 
political action and critique? What is gained and lost in the tropes, for example adoption, 
by which we conceptualize contemporary citizenship? On a theoretical valence, how does 
form operate as a condition of political possibility? What forms does inappropriate 
agency take and how do they relate to conceptions of (un)stable liberal sovereignty? 
What are the ethical implications of inappropriateness, for example, the possibilities of an 
aesthetics of empathy based in storytelling? 
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Theorizing these forces in terms of appropriateness and inappropriateness requires 
this project to contend with certain complexities, particularly involving the 
convolutedness of inappropriate agency—whether appropriateness or inappropriateness 
can actually be chosen, and to what extent, by contemporary subjects. The question of 
agency haunts my theorization of inappropriate literatures: is this set of acts, affects and 
representations dependent on the intentions of these ethnic writers? As this project is 
revised and expanded, I will conduct an analysis of institutional shifts in the publishing 
industry and mass media writ large, in order to better situate these ethnic writers as 
products and drivers of contemporary changes in publication, reception, and readership. 
At the level of political economy, the conditional nature of hegemonic propriety invites 
subjects to feel they are choosing to perform properly in their social, economic, political 
and cultural encounters; those who choose wisely are rewarded with ensuing privileges. 
Yet this appearance of agency is always circumscribed by appropriateness as an 
ideological apparatus that invites consent but predetermines who can qualify as 
appropriate, and on what terms. The paradox of inappropriate agency takes shape more 
fully when we consider figures who are not invited to choose appropriateness even 
provisionally, and thus whose performances of appropriateness always depend on stealth: 
most notably, for future iterations of this work, trans and gender nonconforming people 
and illegal immigrants.  
Certain throughlines have emerged as a consequence of the analyses I conduct in 
this dissertation. The first is a preoccupation with time, which begins with the project’s 
sense of its own untimeliness, or what I term the prematurity of writing a history of the 
present in the midst of its unfolding. While the shared historical sense evinced by these 
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literary works allays some of my analytical anxiety, to be premature in terms of scholarly 
endeavor is to risk imprecision and revision. In the time of literary study, as institutional 
and disciplinary imperatives shift, do inappropriate texts that critique them become 
appropriate—in other words, is inappropriateness always a potentially temporary 
condition? I also investigate the (un)timeliness of particular forms, like the appropriate 
inappropriateness of contemporary realism. At the level of representation, the texts 
examined in this dissertation illuminate the complexities of contemporary senses of time, 
as in the condensed timeline of A Gesture Life, which pulls twentieth-century history 
inexorably toward turn of the twenty-first century, or Flight’s narrative of a boy unstuck 
in time that is introduced by a nonsensical epigraph—“Poo-tee-weet?”—from 
Slaughterhouse-Five’s final avian witness. These repeated intersections between 
inappropriateness and time suggest how much the state and project of inappropriateness 
is conditioned by its placement in time—and further, that repressing the fluidity and 
uncertainty of time is a linchpin for the ideological apparatus of propriety and, 
consequently, a site of propriety’s vulnerability. 
 Sketching the contours of inappropriateness also intersects with surprising 
frequency with the space of family and kinship, including the family as the always-
deferred prerequisite to the good life, kinship (or its lack) as a frame that produces 
outsider status and an attendant epistemological inappropriateness, and the family as a 
metaphor for particular forms of citizenship. Recent work by David Eng and Lauren 
Berlant illuminates how ideological battles once contested on public terrain have 
transitioned to the realm of the private—what Eng calls the racialization of intimacy. The 
analyses in this dissertation extend Eng’s claims to suggest that propriety’s need for the 
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proper family space reveals the centrality of intimate, affective power and self-policing to 
its continued hegemony. While A Gesture Life posits (and then undermines) the “normal” 
family as a precursor for minoritized citizenship, Bitter in the Mouth investigates the 
limits of familial relation in Linda’s musings on the reciprocity of favoring—“I favor you 
(your eyes, your chin). You favor me (with love and attention),” a “biological 
imperative” and “primal vanity” that renders precarious those subjects of the family, and 
the nation, whose appearance does not elicit this mutual relation. Family spaces enable 
exploitation and abuse in My Brother and Flight, yet familial or kinship relations based 
not in biology but in choice simultaneously become sites from which inappropriate 
subjectivity and knowledge formation can be enacted. These examples reinforce the 
relationality of inappropriateness—while inappropriateness does not require the nuclear 
family hailed by propriety, it nonetheless is not performed in isolation.  
As this project draws to a preliminary close, certain questions remain, especially 
about the performative ethics of inappropriateness. What is the “after” of 
inappropriateness—what are its ends? What responsibilities inhere to it? As alluded to 
earlier on the level of the political economy, how do we account for those who cannot 
“choose” appropriateness, who are unable to align with the model of propriety 
neoliberalism perpetuates? What improper relations does inappropriateness establish, and 
how do those relations—between minoritized subjects, between the political subject and 
the subject of literature—disrupt the smooth functionality of neoliberalism’s production 
and management of appropriate difference? The work of theorizing inappropriateness is 
far from complete. Yet as this dissertation has argued, the aesthetic is a space that 
produces difference and from which difference can be reimagined. I suggest that 
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inappropriateness presents a particular strategy for the rearticulation of difference that 
clarifies the constitutive relationship between aesthetics and difference and resists 
racialized propriety’s transformation of difference into diversity.  
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